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Introduction 
Climate change has been one of the most widely discussed environmental issues 
since 1990, following the first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC).  The IPCC’s assessment provided evidence that emissions from human 
activities might be adversely affecting the climate. Subsequent IPCC studies were 
completed in 1996 and 2001 that supported the initial findings. There is now fairly 
widespread consensus that climate change is occurring, that it is caused principally by 
anthropogenic sources, and that some sort of policy response is called for to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from their current levels. Nonetheless, there has been 
continuing debate in both scientific and policy communities about (a) to what extent, if 
any, action should be taken (essay no. 1), (b) by whom (essay no. 3 and 4), and (c) over 
what time period (essay no.2).  
These issues are particularly complicated because, due to a combination of 
several features, climate change is profoundly different from most other environmental 
problems we have had to deal with. The features include public goods issues that 
require collective global action, the multiplicity of decision makers ranging from the 
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international governmental level down to the micro level of firms and individuals, and 
the heterogeneity of emissions and their consequences around the world. Moreover, the 
long-term nature of climate change due to the fact that it is the concentrations of 
greenhouse gases that matters, rather than annual emissions, raises the thorny issues of 
intergenerational transfers of wealth and environmental goods and bads. Next, human 
activities associated with climate change are widespread, which makes narrowly defined 
technological solutions impossible, and the interactions of climate policy with other 
broad socio-economic policies are strong. Finally, large uncertainties, and in some areas 
even ignorance, characterize many aspects of the problem and require a risk 
management approach to be adopted in all decision making frameworks that deal with 
climate change (IPCC 2001).  
In response to the IPCC findings, countries at the Second World Climate 
Conference in 1990 agreed to negotiate a ‘framework treaty’ to control climate change, 
which culminated in more than 150 nations signing the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992. Article 2 of this convention states the objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas 
emissions within a time frame at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Signatory nations volunteered to adopt policies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by the end of the decade to their 1990 levels, but did 
not specify targets for greenhouse gas reductions beyond 2000. The climate convention 
was to serve as a framework for future Conferences of the Parties that would specify 
targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions and develop mechanisms for achieving 
these targets.   
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Procedural negotiations started in Berlin in 1995 with the first Conference of the 
Parties (COP1), where it was agreed that industrialized countries should set emissions 
limits with reduction targets to be achieved within specific time limits. The third COP 
was in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was signed, requiring Annex I (industrialized) 
countries to reduce their combined annual average emissions during the period 2008–
2012 to five percent below their 1990 levels. The Kyoto Protocol establishes limits on 
greenhouse gas emissions for industrialized countries only, differentiated between -8 
and +10 percent of the emissions in 1990. It also provides the means to reduce these 
emissions in cost-effective ways. These so-called flexibility mechanisms include 
international emissions trading, joint implementation, and the Clean Development 
Mechanism. 
To enter into force, the Kyoto Protocol must be ratified by 55 countries 
responsible for at least 55 percent of the 1990 carbon dioxide emissions from Annex I 
countries. At present,1 106 parties representing 43.9 percent of these emissions have 
ratified. Whether Kyoto goes into effect now depends solely on ratification by Russia 
(with 17.4 % of Annex 1 carbon dioxide emissions). Prospects for implementation of 
the Kyoto Protocol have been unclear principally because of the United States’ refusal 
to ratify the accord. Ratification by the United States (36.1 %) was uncertain from the 
time the Kyoto Protocol was signed, but President Bush eliminated all doubts of the 
U.S. position when he repudiated the treaty in March 2001. Despite the U.S. rejection of 
the Kyoto Protocol, there have been subsequent Conferences of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC in Bonn (July 2001), Marrakech (October/November 2001), and New Delhi 
(October 2002). These Conferences have resolved some, but not all, of the difficulties 
                                                 
1
 April 2004 
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among signatories regarding emissions trading, carbon sinks, and other implementation 
issues. 
For global environmental protection, the public goods problem of under-
provision is difficult to overcome because there is no supranational authority to enforce 
an agreement. In the absence of such an authority, alternative arrangements are needed. 
Existing international environmental regimes do not include a centralized equivalent to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), but there are a large number of organizations, 
international treaties and other institutions aimed at resolving transnational 
environmental conflicts and protecting environmental resources. Currently, the United 
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) lists more than 300 international 
environmental agreements with secretariats or other types of organizational structures. 
These international environmental agreements can be thought of as institutional 
structures designed to solve particular international public goods problems. 
The existence of international regimes, however, does not ensure that countries 
will be able to achieve optimal levels of cooperation. Failure to solve the problem of 
providing international public goods is well known. The incentive for nations to free 
ride and the costs of detecting and punishing such behavior will be greater the larger the 
number of nations. Institutions must therefore be designed to reduce these incentives.   
One possible solution for providing global environmental goods is the creation 
of a supranational environmental organization. The advantages of such an institution 
include the potential for achieving environmental protection levels close to the social 
optimum, and cost savings from the reduction of administrative duplication and 
economies of scale in negotiating provisions for coordination of the environmental 
regime with other international regimes, such as those focusing on trade or development 
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(Peterson and Wesley 2000). However, costs of negotiation and administration in a 
large supranational authority could be significant. In addition, large international 
bureaucracies can themselves be a source of inefficiency and waste. Perhaps most 
importantly, sovereign nations are generally reluctant to cede national authority to 
supranational organizations and institutions. Thus, domestic legislation remains the 
method by which international environmental agreements are implemented.  
International environmental treaties face further difficulties because they 
generally attempt to correct instances of government failure as well as market failure. 
International contractual solutions to environmental problems are therefore more 
challenging to achieve than solutions to domestic environmental problems. Those 
challenges are likely to continue as long as nations remain sovereign (Congleton 2001). 
There is a considerable body of literature addressing under-provision of 
international pollution control. The main problem analyzed by these models is free 
riding in international pollution control. There are two types of incentive for free riding: 
the incentive for a country to not sign the agreement and thus benefit from the 
signatories’ abatement efforts, and the incentive for a signatory to violate its 
commitments in an agreement (non-compliance). Because of these free-rider incentives, 
there will generally be suboptimal equilibrium coalition structures in global pollution 
control (Finus and Rundshagen 2001).  
A standard game theoretic solution to the free-rider problem is international 
transfers. The transfer rule redistributes the surplus to be gained from cooperation to 
compensate the countries that would otherwise have chosen the non-cooperative 
outcome.2  The transfer solution might, however, be difficult to implement in the case of 
                                                 
2
 For contributions on this issue see for example Carraro (1999), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) Barrett 
(1994, 1997, 2003), Finus (2001), and Eykmans and Tulkens (2001). 
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climate change. Simulation models for climate change mitigation have shown that, in 
the long run, the gains from cooperation will more than compensate for the initial losses 
due to abatement efforts. However, the fact that the expected break-even date lies very 
far into the future makes current cooperation on restricting greenhouse gases difficult. 
For instance, Eykmans and Tulkens (2001) point out that the transfers in their 
simulation model are single numbers representing the present value of consumption 
flows over 320 years, and that these cannot realistically be conceived of as being paid as 
lump sum transfers at time t = 0. Furthermore, they argue that these transfers also 
cannot be spread over time because the countries cannot borrow against future gains in 
order to compensate for early losses, although these kinds of distribution problems 
might be solvable through some kind of banking system.  
Another suggested solution to offset countries’ free-riding incentives is the 
linkage of environmental negotiations to other economic issues (issue linkage). The idea 
is to link an issue with excludable benefits (a club good) to the public good provision. It 
has for example been suggested to link the climate change negotiations with 
negotiations on trade liberalization (Barrett 1995, 2003) or research and development 
cooperation (Barrett 2003), (Carraro and Siniscalco 1995, 1997). 
 
By its very nature, a legally binding agreement for climate protection among 
more than 170 nations – the Kyoto Protocol – will have both supporters and detractors. 
Many would applaud the notion that such an agreement even exists, given the nature of 
the problem, the scientific uncertainties, and the long timeframe involved. Others would 
point to the innovative methods embodied in the Protocol to reduce costs, including 
emissions trading and the ability of nations to consider changes in land use and new 
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forestry techniques (carbon sinks). Still others support Kyoto on equity grounds, taking 
the position that since industrialized nations have been the major contributors to the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, it is appropriate for them to bear 
the major burden of controlling emissions in the future. On the other hand, critics of 
Kyoto most often point to high costs, uncertain benefits, and lack of commitment from 
developing countries. Other detractors say that the Protocol left too many specific 
details to be negotiated at a future date.   
For industrialized countries, both damage costs and adaptation costs of climate 
change are likely to be relatively low. The reason is that the sectors most likely to be 
affected by climate change – agriculture and forestry – account for a very small share of 
total output. Thus, the willingness of industrialized countries to pay for climate control 
is likely to depend on their concern for the situation of developing countries, whether 
they see climate change mitigation to be a high priority area for aid, and the costs of 
abatement. Climate change will have a much greater impact in developing countries 
because of their greater reliance on agriculture and exposure to potential health impacts 
from waterborne and parasitic diseases. However, developing countries are likely to be 
less vulnerable to climate change in the future. Furthermore, they might prefer to invest 
in economic development or climate change adaptation rather than greenhouse gas 
emission reductions. Finally, the impact on the global climate of reducing emissions in a 
single country is likely to be negligible. Thus, without a regime that imposes binding 
commitments on sufficiently many countries, neither industrialized countries nor 
developing countries have an incentive to voluntarily contribute to climate control 
(Schelling 1992, 1997).  
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The climate negotiations began by focusing on the short term, with the 
industrialized countries agreeing to cut their emissions of greenhouse gases by about 
five percent relative to 1990 emissions by 2008–2012.  Then there was agreement that 
these cuts should be achieved cost effectively, incorporating ‘flexibility mechanisms.’ 
Only later did the signatories worry about whether the treaty created incentives for 
broad participation and full compliance. Thus, the Kyoto agreement offers little 
incentive for countries to ratify. At the same time, a country may make its participation 
conditional on easy terms, and easy terms will not protect the climate (Barrett 2001; 
2003). 
Furthermore, there is little in the Kyoto agreement that ensures that even 
ratifying countries will actually do what they say they will do. In fact, any compliance 
mechanism entailing “binding consequences” must be approved by amendment (Article 
18), which essentially means a new treaty. Since any party to Kyoto could decline to 
ratify a subsequent compliance amendment, it can avoid being punished for failing to 
comply. The compliance mechanism approved in Bonn requires that a country that fails 
to meet its emission ceiling in the first commitment period (2008–2012) compensate for 
this deficiency plus an additional 30 percent of this amount in the second commitment 
period (2013–2017).  As additional punishment, the possibility to sell emission permits 
may be suspended, and a plan for how the non-compliant country intends to get back in 
compliance must be presented. The legal formulation of the rules in the Kyoto Protocol, 
however, has been postponed to the first meeting of the parties to the protocol after it 
has entered into force.3 The agreement does not address what happens if a country fails 
to comply in the second period as well. Nor does it provide emissions limits for the 
                                                 
3
 For a more detailed description of the compliance mechanism, see Torvanger (2001). 
Introduction 
 
 15 
second commitment period. Thus, a country that worries about not being able to comply 
in the first period may hold out for easy targets in the second period (Barrett 2001; 
2003). This way the punishment, even if triggered, does not actually bite and the free-
rider problem is not solved. 
Game theory thus suggests that if Kyoto enters into force and achieves full 
compliance, it will be because the treaty achieves very little. A more ambitious version 
of Kyoto, on the other hand, would likely either fail to enter into force or fail to sustain 
full compliance. Though Kyoto is considered to be only a first step, if the subsequent 
stages in the process replicate the Kyoto formula, the outcome is likely to be very close 
to ‘business as usual.’ Moreover, since many of the proposals for Kyoto alternatives 
also do not address the fundamental issues of enforcement and participation, they too 
are likely to fail (Barrett 2001). 
 
Essay no. 1, ‘Decision criteria, scientific uncertainty, and the global warming 
controversy’ addresses the question of whether to take action. This question is 
complicated since climate change involves scientific uncertainty on many levels: 
uncertainties in predicting the timing and magnitude of future climate change caused by 
greenhouse gas concentration; uncertainties in predicting the ecological, economic, 
social, and political impacts from this; and uncertainties in predicting the effectiveness 
and costs of policy options. Because of these uncertainties, policy advisors disagree 
significantly in their recommendations of how to act.  
  Two major risks have been put forward. One is the risk of significant human 
and ecosystem impacts from large-scale climate change in the next century, a potential 
environmental problem of immense dimensions. The other is the risk of incurring large 
Introduction 
 
 16 
economic costs now, for policies that might slow global warming or mitigate its 
impacts, when there is considerable uncertainty about the effectiveness of the policies as 
well as the severity of the problem. This controversy has been highly visible in the 
climate negotiations. The U.S. administration has, for example, explained its 
repudiation of the Kyoto treaty by pointing at the lack of certainty. Essay no. 1 shows, 
however, several cases where uncertainty regarding climate change impacts indicate 
implementation of climate policies. 
Many economists support the view that we should not impose strong policies 
before the level of knowledge has been improved (e.g., Manne and Richels 1991; 
Nordhaus and Popp 1997; Schelling 1992; Kolstad 1996; Ulph and Ulph 1996). Others 
argue that precisely because of the lack of knowledge, abatement should take place now 
in order to reduce the possibility of extensive and irreversible damage (e.g., Arrow and 
Fisher 1974; Henry 1974; Grubb 1997; Tol 1995). Essay no. 1 does not give a direct 
recommendation of how to act, but rather offers basic insight into what the choice of 
decision criteria implies for various actions. It illustrates that the complexity of the 
climate problem makes it nearly impossible to predict the full consequences of choices, 
and raises the question of whether the use of less information-demanding alternatives to 
the expected utility model is indicated. The essay concludes that the choice of criterion 
is a political question, that those in favor of abatement policies might be using one of 
the alternatives as basis for their advice, and suggests that if the possibility of making 
irreversible mistakes is of great concern, then the minimax regret criterion might have 
increased relevance. 
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One should think that the degree of uncertainty in the climate change area to a 
large degree would influence the political processes and decisions, and that economic 
analyses thus would treat uncertainty as a central feature. Although the insights into the 
basic science have improved substantially over the past decades, there is still 
uncertainty around almost every aspect of the climate change problem. Nevertheless, 
the main perceptions about economic issues related to climate change and climate 
policy, for example as assessed and reported by IPCC (2001), are based on deterministic 
studies. This does not necessarily mean that the uncertainties have been ignored, but 
rather that this part of the economics literature is somewhat inconclusive. 
An explanation for this may be that most of the climate change studies are based 
on numerical models. The uncertainties per se are therefore difficult to trace. Results of 
numerical models hinge on assumptions about economic relationships, such as damage 
and abatement cost functions, which are far from well known. It is therefore difficult to 
tell, for example, how a better ability to predict temperature change in the future should 
affect current policy choices, unless we assume that we know all there is to know about 
the climate change impacts and the costs of mitigation. This is somewhat of a paradox, 
because learning is one of the main issues that have been focused on in studies of 
climate policy under uncertainty. 
The purpose of Essay no. 2, ‘Option Values and the Timing of Climate Policy,’ 
is to isolate the effects of future uncertainties on current climate policy choice. The 
model captures what we perceive as the most important issues, including the 
irreversibility of climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions and irreversibility in 
abatement technology investments, both of which will necessarily see a gradual change 
in uncertainty due to learning.  
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In the static setting adopted in Essay no. 1, it is found that uncertainty alone, 
even if large, does not affect present optimal abatement to a large degree, if expected 
utility is maximized in a risk-neutral framework. This is to some extent due to the 
complex relationships along the chain of causality from emissions of greenhouse gases 
to impacts of climate change: We do not have, at the time being, sufficient knowledge 
about whether the impacts of a possible temperature change ranging from 1.8 to 2.2 ºC 
in a given future year should be assigned a significantly different expected damage cost 
than those of a temperature ranging from, for example, 0.2 to 3.8 ºC. There might thus 
be good reasons to base climate policy on other decision-making criteria than the 
maximization of expected utility. 
The difference between a static and a dynamic analysis under uncertainty is that 
the decisions are taken sequentially in dynamic analyses. While a static problem gives a 
solution to the best decision once and for all, a dynamic problem aims at finding the 
best strategy given the available information. This is why learning becomes relevant: If 
uncertainty affects the decision, future amendments to the information will change 
decisions in the future. Whether current decisions should be affected by future learning 
therefore depends on whether future decisions depend on present decisions, or, in the 
words of the option value literature, whether present decisions are irreversible. 
Irreversibilities and learning in environmental economics were first formalized 
by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974), and the implication for climate change 
policy was to introduce mitigation strategies now to keep future options open (‘early 
action’). However, later contributions (Kolstad 1996a,b; Ulph and Ulph 1995) 
downplay the importance of the irreversibility of climate change due to greenhouse gas 
emissions in favor of the irreversibility in abatement technology investments, and thus 
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advocate a ‘wait and see’ strategy. Essay no.2 reconsiders the importance of 
irreversibilities in climate change policy. 
We use a stylized model to highlight three important uncertainty effects on 
climate change policy. When uncertainty is high, the probability of making a perfect 
guess is low.  Under a process of learning, no matter what strategy is chosen, costs must 
thus be expected because of adjustments desired due to new information. This is the 
first effect we study. In addition, there are two opposing option values of policies that 
maintain flexibilities: one related to climate irreversibility and the other related to 
investment irreversibility. We show that the climate irreversibility imposes an option 
value to the ‘early action’ strategies if and only if there is a positive probability of 
encountering the climate irreversibility constraint, and similarly that the investment 
irreversibility imposes an option value to the ‘wait and see’ strategies if, and only if, 
there is a positive probability of encountering the investment irreversibility constraint. 
We also show that investment irreversibility scales down the future climate effects in 
the same way as an increase in the discount factor. Furthermore, the effect the climate 
option value  has on current policy choice is reduced the more irreversible the 
investments, but this effect is smaller, the longer the time horizon.  
The preferred policy option thus depends on the relative size of these option 
values and of the ex ante adjustment costs. We conclude that if the sum of the climate 
option value and the expected adjustment cost due to too low initial abatement exceeds 
the sum of the investment option value and the expected adjustment cost due to too high 
initial abatement, the net option value is positive, the climate irreversibility effect 
dominates, and ‘early action’ should be preferred over a ‘wait and see’ policy. 
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The structure and characteristics of international agreements on climate change 
will have a significant influence on the effectiveness as well as the costs and benefits of 
mitigation. The effectiveness and the costs and benefits of an international climate 
change regime (such as the Kyoto Protocol or other possible future agreements) depend 
on the number of signatories to the agreement and their abatement targets and/or policy 
commitment. (IPPC 2001). Previous research suggests that, at best, a global climate 
treaty will achieve very little. At worst, it will fail to enter into force. It is therefore 
interesting to consider whether multiple treaties can be more successful. In Essay no. 3, 
‘Regional versus Global Cooperation for Climate Control,’ it is argued that individual 
nations might have a greater incentive to join a regional coalition than a global one. 
Regional arrangements for climate control are thus more likely to enter into force. A 
global agreement like the Kyoto Protocol (was intended to be), that requires agreement 
among a large number of nations, is therefore not necessarily the best way to effectively 
control emissions of greenhouse gases.  
There is speculation about U.S. interest in a regional climate arrangement that 
would include NAFTA members (Canada, Mexico, and the United States) and 
(possibly) Australia.  While such an arrangement is complicated since Canada is still 
within the Kyoto arrangement and Mexico is exempt as a developing country, a western 
hemispheric continental agreement is possible because an existing institutional 
framework – the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) – 
exists to oversee and monitor implementation of a North American emissions trading 
region should it be established. 
The European Union (EU) is already dealing with climate change in a regional 
arrangement. In March 2000, the European Commission launched the European Climate 
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Change Programme (ECCP) to coordinate the EU response. The EU response includes 
ratification of Kyoto by the EU Commission in May 2002 and the establishment of an 
emissions trading scheme within the European community in 2005. The EU-wide 
emissions trading system is intended not only to ensure that the EU achieves the eight 
percent cut in emissions by 2008–2012 to which it is committed under the Kyoto 
Protocol, but also to reduce member-nation abatement costs and lessen competitive 
impacts of achieving regional compliance.  
There is thus a possibility of at least two regional arrangements (NAFTA + 
Australia, and the EU), and a likelihood of more as developing nations make 
arrangements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the future. Using a simple dynamic 
game-theoretic model, Essay no.4 shows that a regime based on regional agreements 
can sustain a larger number of cooperating parties than a global treaty. This is true even 
when the cost of reducing emissions is the same for both types of regime. The model 
provides upper and lower bounds on the number of parties under each regime. It is 
shown that a system with two agreements can Pareto-dominate a regime based on a 
global treaty. We conclude that, should the Kyoto Protocol not enter into force, 
cooperation based on regional agreements could be an even better substitute. And even 
if Kyoto does enter into force, regional cooperation might still be an option for future 
commitment periods. 
 
Decision making frameworks related to climate change involve multiple levels 
ranging from global negotiations to individual choices and a diversity of actors with 
different resource endowments, and diverging values and aspirations. This explains why 
it is difficult to arrive at a management strategy that is acceptable for all. The dynamic 
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interaction among economic sectors and related social interest groups makes it difficult 
to arrive at a national position to be presented at international forums in the first place. 
The intricacies of international climate negotiations result from the manifold, often 
ambiguous, national positions as well as from the linkage of climate change policy with 
other socio-economic objectives (IPCC 2001).  
Conflicts of interests represent a major obstacle for the achievement of a 
common strategy to combat global climate change. The parties’ positions in the climate 
negotiations are results of political solutions to internal conflicts due to different 
preferences among people, uneven perceptions of fairness, and various economic effects 
of policy measures. The performance of a party is closely associated with the causes of 
these conflicts, how serious they are, and the required means to mitigate them.  
It is a matter of common knowledge that the existing climate regime will not be 
sufficient to keep greenhouse gas concentrations under control. First, the Kyoto 
Protocol has not yet entered into effect. Second, important issues around compliance 
and sanctions have yet to be decided on. Third, the targets beyond the year 2012 have to 
be negotiated. Forth, no global agreement will be fully effective without the 
involvement of the countries which have not yet committed to reducing emission levels 
under the Kyoto framework, like China, other developing countries, the United States, 
and Australia (the enlargement issue).  
For a region like the European Union (EU), with cross-national institutions and 
political infrastructure, the prospects of solving severe conflicts are brighter than for the 
global society. Therefore, the means to develop a common strategy for climate policy 
for the EU also represents an opportunity to demonstrate directional leadership in the 
global climate regime. Hence, it is crucial to analyze whether the EU can play a 
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leadership role with respect to the enlargement issue by proposing strategies, measures, 
and institutions that can help expand the number of countries that commit to controlling 
their emissions (Carraro 2000). 
To explore possible internal means for the EU, and to evaluate their applicability 
for the global society, we need to understand the sources and the extent of the 
underlying internal conflicts.  
Climate policy touches every economic sector and thus matters to most interest 
groups in the economy (Michaelowa 2000). This is why conflicts of interest among and 
within EU countries have represented a major obstacle for the achievement of a 
common climate policy. Organized interests have resisted increased costs and have 
successfully used arguments like that of competitiveness. National positions in the 
policy negotiations are results of political solutions to internal conflicts, due to different 
preferences among people, perceptions of fairness, and various economic effects of 
policy measures. The stance of each nation is closely associated with the causes of these 
conflicts, how serious they are, and the means required mitigating them.  
More than ten years after the EU Commission originally proposed a directive on 
carbon taxes they reached agreement on a proposed framework for energy taxation. The 
1992 proposal faced so much domestic resistance that agreement was not reached until 
the directive had been considerably watered down. The lobbying succeeded in having 
the tax altered significantly, with an energy component added, energy-intensive sectors 
exempted, and the entire tax package made conditional on other OECD countries 
undertaking precisely the same tax. 
Essay no. 4, ‘Sectoral Opposition to Carbon Taxes in the EU – a Myopic 
Economic Approach’,  study economic reasons for the political infeasibility of extensive 
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carbon taxes. More specifically, it points out reasons for why the opposition to carbon 
taxes was so great. The study is based on estimating and comparing the costs of 
expected emissions cuts across sectors and across countries in the EU. This illustrated 
how different economic sectors might have anticipated the impacts from an expected 
carbon tax. This focus shows exactly how what seems to be cost-effective and to the 
best for EU as a region on paper may, because of the myopic vision of the affected 
sectors, turn out too controversial to be politically feasible.  
From the analysis it is clear that the selection of measures is vital, and that 
different countries have different needs when it comes to policy design. While certain 
measures may be acceptable to some countries, they are likely to generate opposition in 
others. The conflicts of interest are largely the result of dependency on fossil fuels, 
which is higher in the three northern countries and lower in the three southern EU 
countries in this study. In general, the greater the interest conflicts, the greater are the 
opportunities to find ways to reduce emissions because of the relative low efficiency in 
these countries’ electricity production.  
Three main conclusions can be drawn. First, common measures across countries 
are generally less attractive since a particular measure may be advantageous to one 
country in order to keep the national cost of climate policy down, but may in another 
country spur opposition that could be avoided if exceptions were allowed. Second, the 
electricity sector plays a key role in climate policy in every EU country and in the 
potential opposition to any policy measure. Conditions in the electricity sector vary 
greatly among countries, and a long-term strategy to reduce opposition due to internal 
as well as external conflicts of interest would, therefore, be to introduce a common 
electricity market. Third, before a common electricity market can be established, further 
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differentiation of national emissions targets could represent an important opportunity 
for mitigating conflicts of interests across countries. 
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Abstract 
This paper applies several well-known decision criteria to the climate change problem. 
The policy process is represented by a simple game against nature with two possible 
choices: abate or no action. The outcome is considered a compound lottery, with one 
representing emissions and another representing damages. Assuming that costs exceed 
benefits of abatement for the participant, the paper analyzes how different decision 
criteria affect the decision to abate. The role of expert opinion and quality of 
information in climate change decisions are also considered. 
 The complexity of global warming makes it impossible to completely overlook 
the consequences of alternative choices. The paper discusses the question of whether the 
use of less information demanding alternatives to expected utility theory is indicated. It 
concludes that the choice of criterion is a political question, and that those in favor of 
abatement policies might be using one of the alternatives as basis for their advice, and 
suggests that if the possibility of making irreversible mistakes is of great concern, then 
the minimax regret criterion might have increased relevance. 
 
Key words: climate policy, decision criteria, global warming, greenhouse gas 
abatement, irreversibility, scientific uncertainty, uncertain choice 
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1. Introduction 
  
The global warming controversy has to a large degree been a debate among scientists, 
policy analysts, and politicians about how to deal with uncertainty. Two major risks 
have been put forward. One is the risk of significant human and ecosystem impacts 
from large-scale climate change in the next century, a potential environmental problem 
of immense dimensions. The other is the risk of incurring large economic costs now, for 
policies that might slow global warming or mitigate its impacts, when there is 
considerable uncertainty about the effectiveness of the policies as well as the severity of 
the problem. This controversy has been highly visible in the climate negotiations. The 
US administration has for example explained their repudiation of the Kyoto treaty by 
pointing at the lack of certainty. This paper shows, however, several cases where 
uncertainty regarding climate impacts and policy effects could be reason for policy-
makers to implement climate policies. 
 Regardless of which strategy policy-makers choose when faced with the threats 
of global warming, there is considerable uncertainty with respect to the outcome. On 
one hand, they risk undertaking costly abatement measures to avoid what may turn out 
to be a minor problem. On the other hand, refusing actions to mitigate climate change is 
also risky business. Although most of the debate has been over the scientific evidence, 
the real issue is rather which risk is perceived to be the greater threat (Colgazier 1991). 
 The complexity of global warming makes it impossible to completely overlook 
the consequences of alternative choices. A question thus arises of whether this problem, 
that exhibits such severe forms of uncertainty, should be analyzed in a framework of 
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ignorance, or at least partial ignorance. Theories of rational behavior under complete 
ignorance can be found for example in Arrow and Hurwicz (1972). Non-probabilistic 
criteria build on such a notion of ignorance. Critics of these criteria have put forward 
that the decision maker must at least have some vague partial information about the true 
state of nature (Luce and Raiffa 1957). The question remains, however, if this vague 
partial information is sufficient to assign subjective probabilities to the possible states of 
the world. 
 Theories on decision-making under uncertainty have suggested various 
alternatives to expected utility maximization. This paper examines some of these well-
known principles in the context of the global warming problem. The most well-known 
non-probabilistic criterion is perhaps the maximin principle (Rawls 1971). Other ones 
are the principle of insufficient reason, and minimax regret, suggested by Savage (1951) 
as an improvement on the maximin criterion. Discussion of one or more of these criteria 
can be found for instance in Arrow (1951), Chernoff (1954), Luce and Raiffa (1957), 
Cohen and Jaffray (1980), Sinn (1980), Fishburn (1987), Dobbs (1991), Chrisholm and 
Clark (1993), Bouglet and Vergnaud (2000), and Chevé and Congar (2002). 
Combinations of probabilistic and non-probabilistic criteria have also been suggested. 
Those studied here are the limited degree of confidence criterion, recently treated in 
Stigum (1990), Eichberger and Spaniels (1998), Chichilnisky (2000), and Lange (2003), 
and generalized maximin/maximax criterion, also known as the pessimism-optimism 
index criterion of Hurwicz (1951). Lastly this paper gives a brief discussion of a 
completely different class of decision criteria known as safety first criteria (see Rawls 
1971), where one example is the highest constant consumption criterion, treated for 
instance in Solow (1974). 
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 When evaluating a decision criterion it is possible to look at the axiomatic 
foundation, the practical implications, or both aspects of the problem. Generally 
speaking, if we accept the axiomatic foundation underlying the criterion, we must also 
accept their implications. However, axioms are abstract and often difficult to fully 
understand. Therefore it can be fruitful to look at their implications when applied to a 
specific problem which is exactly what is done here. 
 Applying the criteria to a practical problem that needs solving demonstrates the 
implications of using different decision criteria in a frame of uncertainty. As an 
illustration, this paper uses a very simplified example of a game against nature, with 
two possible policy options: action to try to prevent global warming (abatement), and 
business as usual (no action). The framing of the example is such that the decision-
maker runs the risk of investing in vain, because the probability of the cost of abatement 
exceeding the damage avoided is more than 50 percent. In other words, it is likely that 
the abatement measures will eventually result in a loss. The exercise shows that 
applying the abstract principles to the problem of global warming illustrates how 
different decision criteria affect the decision to abate, the role of expert opinion, and the 
implications of information quality. The paper builds heavily on Aaheim and Bretteville 
(2001) and Bretteville (1999), and the object is to focus on the lack of certainty 
regarding impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and the effectiveness of policy in order 
to compare implications of the use of alternative criteria with those of expected utility 
maximization. One finding is that those arguing in favor of abatement policies might 
use one of the alternatives as basis for their advice. The choice of criterion is thus a 
political question. 
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 The global warming controversy is briefly discussed before sketchily attending 
to the structure of standard decision theory under uncertainty, presenting various 
decision criteria, and exploring their implications for the simple game example. 
Conclusions are presented in the final section. 
  
2. The Global Warming Controversy 
  
The question of human-induced global warming definitely involves scientific 
uncertainty: uncertainties in predicting the timing and magnitude of future climate 
change caused by greenhouse gas emissions; uncertainties in predicting the ecological, 
economic, social, and political impacts; and uncertainties in predicting the effectiveness 
and costs of policy options (Colgazier 1991). Because of these uncertainties, policy 
advisors disagree significantly in their recommendations of how to act5.  
Referring to the precautionary principle, some argue that we should cut 
emissions of greenhouse gases now. The precautionary principle has many definitions. 
Among the common themes are the undesirability of irreversible damage, the need to 
prevent and anticipate damage, and the argument that lack of complete scientific 
uncertainty should not be used as an excuse for inaction (Harding and Fisher 1992). The 
Bergen Ministerial Declaration from 1990 states that the precautionary principle implies 
that “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.” 
                                                 
5
 This is discussed further in Aaheim and Bretteville 2001. 
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 The precautionary principle thus implies that there is a case for reducing carbon 
dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas emissions now, even if it is uncertain whether 
these emissions contribute to the greenhouse problem, and what the economic costs of 
climate change impacts might be (Chrisholm and Clarke 1993). This interpretation is, of 
course, dependent on the belief that the climate problem represents “threats of serious or 
irreversible damage”. Those who share this view argue that uncertainty should dictate 
abatement now to reduce the possibility of extensive and irreversible damage. They 
look upon abatement as insurance against catastrophic events and claim that uncertainty 
alone gives rise to a willingness to pay for insurance (Schelling 1995). A parallel would 
be fire insurance, which is considered wise even if one is not realistically expecting 
one's house to burn down. 
 Those who question the view of the climate problem as representing “threats of 
serious or irreversible damage” argue that one should not impose stringent policies 
before the level of knowledge has improved significantly. By postponing action, they 
argue, we may learn more about the effects of climate change, and new and cleaner 
technologies may be discovered. Meanwhile, we can invest in alternative projects, 
which will better prepare us to both abate greenhouse gases and adapt to changes in the 
future (Kolstad 1994). Additional knowledge about the impacts of climate change will 
allow the design of better climate policies. Yet, we do not know whether improved 
knowledge implies less uncertainty. This is why we need more discussion about 
framing, what information is needed, and how to use available knowledge about the 
uncertainty in order to make better decisions. 
 Much of the climate change literature gives recommendations of how to act. 
Many economists support the view that we should not impose strong policies before the 
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level of knowledge has been improved (i.e. Manne and Richels 1991; Nordhaus and 
Popp 1997; Shelling 1992; Kolstad 1996; Ulph and Ulph 1996). Others argue that 
precisely because of the lack of knowledge, abatement should take place now in order to 
reduce the possibility of extensive and irreversible damage (i.e. Arrow and Fisher 1974; 
Henry 1974; Grubb 1997; Tol 1995). This paper does not give a direct recommendation 
of how to act, but rather offers basic insight to the implications for action of the choice 
of other decision criteria compared to expected utility maximization. 
 
 
3. The Stylized Climate Problem 
  
What is the best way to approach the climate problem? When making policy choices 
under uncertainty in areas characterized by disagreement among experts, a value 
judgment will have to be made about what counts as evidence. The question thus 
becomes: what scientific evidence is sufficient and admissible to justify a policy 
decision under these conditions? Where to set these standards of proof - how sure is 
sure enough - is a value judgment. People's values are affected by both their general 
principles of rights and responsibilities, and their self-interest. They might be primarily 
concerned either about a fair decision-making process or about the fairness of outcomes. 
Values play a significant role in judging the fairness in allocation of the costs, benefits 
and risks to initial stakeholders, and also with respect to the outcome for society as a 
whole (Colgazier 1991). 
 The disagreement among expert recommendations on climate policy thus may 
originate in different value judgments. The discussion of how to deal with the scientific 
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uncertainty is mixed with discussions on other complicated questions such as whether to 
discount future costs and benefits, the best method for valuing environmental damages, 
and how to use the precautionary principle. This paper looks beyond both global and 
intergenerational political problems by introducing a benevolent decision-maker, 
planner, or principal as a theoretical abstraction whose goal is to decide the best climate 
policy. Political feasibility and the problems attached to reaching a global climate 
agreement is thus not touched upon. In other words the decision-maker is assumed to 
have the `right' preferences, from the social point of view, and will take all relevant 
factors into consideration in taking action, focusing on the lack of certainty regarding 
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and the effectiveness of policy. This rather 
abstract perspective is taken to make the implications of choosing different decision 
criteria more transparent and thus comparable. 
  
4. Decision Criteria 
  
A decision problem is defined by the acts or options among which one must choose, the 
possible outcomes or consequences of these acts, and the contingencies or conditional 
probabilities that relate outcomes to acts (Tversky and Kahneman 1987). Theories of 
decision-making under risk and under uncertainty have attempted to formalize the way a 
decision-maker chooses among alternative courses of action when the consequences of 
each course of action are unknown at the time the choice is made. A situation is said to 
involve risk if the attached randomness can be expressed in terms of specific numerical 
probabilities (roulette lotteries). These probabilities are objectively specified, as with 
lottery tickets, or a dice: The numbers are known. However, situations where one cannot 
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(or does not) assign actual probabilities to the alternative possible occurrences are said 
to involve uncertainty (horse lotteries). In this case probabilities reflect the individuals 
own subjective beliefs: The numbers are unknown (Knight 1971). The two main 
theories on this field is the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) expected utility 
theory with risk and Savage’s (1954) theory of expected utility with uncertainty.  
 The essence of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory is a set of restrictions 
imposed on the preference relations over roulette lotteries. It determines a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that can be used to range different roulette 
lotteries.  The Savage theory is a theory of decisions in a situation of horse lotteries. 
Here the outcomes are uncertain (which horse that wins), while acts are the subject of 
decision (which horse, if any, to place the bet on). Acts are defined as functions from 
the set of states to the set of outcomes. The theory suggests that the decision-maker has 
preferences over acts and that these preferences can be represented by a utility function 
assigning subjective probabilities to states, and furthermore, that choice between acts is 
equivalent to choice between lotteries. The Anscombe and Aumann (1963) theory 
combines this. They define acts as functions from states to randomized outcomes. The 
objective randomization over outcomes determines a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function while the preferences over acts determine subjective probabilities over states6.
     
4.1 MAXIMIZATION OF EXPECTED UTILITY 
The theory of maximization of expected utility have a set of underlying axioms. In short, 
these axioms require that individuals be able to rank actions (completeness), make 
                                                 
6
 See e.g. Fishburn (1987), Karni and Schmeidler (1991) or  Kreps (1990) for a more comprehensive 
treatment of standard decision theory under uncertaity. 
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consistent choices between them (transitivity), and evaluate proximity choices correctly 
(continuity) (see e.g. Arrow 1965). This implies that the choices of an individual, whose 
actions are consistent with the axioms, can be described in terms of the utilities of 
various outcomes for that individual. The utility of an act is equal to the expected utility 
of its outcomes, obtained by weighing the utility of each possible outcome by its 
probability. When faced with a choice, the model says that a rational decision-maker 
prefers the act that offers the highest expected utility. 
 This theory has been challenged from several perspectives since it was 
formalized by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and later Savage (1954)7. A 
common basis for much of the criticism has been that people either does not act 
according to expected utility theory in practice, that they cannot behave according to 
expected utility theory because it is too demanding in terms of informational 
requirements, or that rational people should not behave according to expected utility 
theory because the axioms on which the theory is based are not sound or appealing.  
Maximization of expected utility is based on the assumption that the decision-
maker can attach probabilities, ps, and outcomes, xs, to each possible state of nature, s, 
and that utility, u(xs), can be assigned to each of the possible outcomes. The decision is 
made by maximizing expected utility or welfare:  
 )u(xp  Eu 
s
ss∑=  
Machina (1989) points out two critical properties of expected utility. First, the 
comparison between two pairs of outcome and probability is made independent of all 
other pairs of outcome and probability. If a given combination of outcome and 
                                                 
7
 Frank P. Ramsey developed basically the same decision-making framework, published in Ramsey 
(1931), before his death in 1928. 
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probability (x1, p1) is preferred to another combination (x2, p2) in one lottery, a 
replacement of (x2,p2) by (x1,p1) will be preferred in any other lottery as well. This is 
called the replacement property. Second, if one outcome is preferred to another 
outcome, i.e. u(x1)>u(x2), any combination, px1 will be preferred to px2. That is, one may 
mix outcomes with any probability without affecting the preferences. This is called the 
mixture property. These two properties can be summarized in the independence axiom. 
 The independence axiom: Lottery X is preferred to (f ) or indifferent to (~) to 
lottery Y if and only if 
p)-Z,1p,(Y,  p)-Z,1p,(X, f  
for all lotteries Z and all p>0. 
 Replacement follows directly from the independence axiom because the 
preference of X over Y also means that a compound lottery of X and Z is preferred over 
a compound lottery of Y and Z if the probability for Z is the same in both compound 
lotteries. By setting p = 1 in the independence axiom we get YXf . The axiom states 
that this preference applies for all p, which is the mixture property. 
 Experimental studies have revealed systematic violations of the expected utility 
hypothesis8. The evidence indicates in particular that decision-makers do not satisfy the 
independence axiom. In the choice between acts Ellsberg (1961) concludes that 
decision-makers preferences are inconsistent with expected utility theory and in 
particular with the existence of additive subjective probabilities. This is referred to as 
the Ellsberg-paradox. In one version of the experiment subjects are presented with a jar 
that holds 90 balls. They are told that 30 of these balls are red and that each of the 
                                                 
8
 See e.g. Fishburn (1988, Chapter 3) or Machina (1982) for a review of experimental evidence. 
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remaining 60 balls is either white or black and a bet involves guessing the color of a ball 
randomly drawn. Subjects are asked to rank the three possible bets. The finding reported 
is that the bet on red typically is preferred over the other two, who are considered 
equivalent. Furthermore, he finds that subjects also prefer a bet on either black or white 
to black or red and to white or red, while they are indifferent between the latter two 
bets. An explanation for this is that people dislike the ambiguity that comes with choice 
under uncertainty; they dislike the possibility that they may have the odds wrong and so 
make the wrong choice. Hence, they go with the bet where they know the odds. 
In the choice between prospects the most well-known violation is referred to as 
the Allais-paradox. One version of this (taken from Kreps 1990) goes as follows: 
a) Choose between two gambles. The first gives a 0.33 chance of $27,500, a 
0.66 chance of $24,000, and a 0.01 chance of nothing. The second gives 
$24,000 for sure. 
b) Choose between two gambles. The first gives a 0.33 chance of $27,500, a 
0.67 chance of nothing. The second gives a 0.34 chance of $24,000 0.66 
chance of nothing. 
The typical response pattern is to choose the sure thing in a) and the first gamble in b). 
This violation to expected utility theory has been explained by that individuals rescale 
probabilities, with more weight (proportionally) given to small probability events.   
 Driven by the experimental results, several alternative theories have been 
proposed that depart from expected utility theory. A full review is beyond the scope of 
this paper9. One direction, however, discussed in Aumann (1962) is to weaken the 
assumption of complete preferences. According to his theory, one can still rank roulette 
                                                 
9
 See i.g. Karni and Schmeidler (1991) for an overview. 
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lotteries, but it opens up for the possibility of not knowing whether one will place a bet, 
and if one does, which horse to bet on. In this case one cannot assign a specific 
subjective probability distribution over states. Aumann shows that the preferences over 
acts in stead can be characterized by a set of subjective probability distributions, such 
that one act is preferred to another if it is considered better under all subjective 
probability distributions in the set. Another direction motivated by the Ellsberg paradox 
and discussed for example in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Schmeidler (1989), 
also characterizes preferences by a set of subjective probability distributions, but an act 
is evaluated by using the subjective probability distribution that gives the lowest 
expected utility. 
Violations of the axioms of expected utility theory is not the subject of this 
paper, nor is the axiom’s soundness or appeal. The analysis below is instead motivated 
by the claim that maximization of expected utility assumes a higher ability to 
consistently handle large amounts of complex information than one can possibly expect 
from decision-makers. Whether this criticism applies depends, however, on the goal of 
the decision analysis. An argument in support of the expected utility model has been 
that people's inability to handle complex information consistently confirms the need for 
analysis, because the analysis may contribute to better decisions.   
Savage (1954) holds the view that by processing partial information we can 
generate an a priori (subjective) probability distribution over the states of nature 
sufficient for making decisions. However, to transform vague information concerning 
the states of nature into an explicit a priori probability distribution, the decision-maker 
has to register consistent choices in a series of simple hypothetical problems involving 
these states (Luce and Raiffa 1957). Expected utility theory is thus particularly useful 
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when dealing with situations where probabilities and possible outcomes are within the 
normal range of human experience. The climate problem is not within this range. We 
simply do not have the experience to calculate proper weights to aggregate utility over 
states. The requirement of consistent treatment of a large amount of information 
represents a problem and alternative decision rules, where the amount of information 
needed might be less, have therefore been suggested. The aim of this paper is to 
illustrate and discuss the implication of some of these decision criteria within a specific 
numerical example of greenhouse gas abatement. The example is not chosen to 
demonstrate the problems with expected utility maximization, but is simply to compare 
the differences in implications for the abatement decision. In fact, there is nothing in 
this example indicating that there cannot be a stable assignment of utilities to outcomes. 
 
4.1.1 The numerical example 
Consider a strongly simplified numerical example of abatement with uncertain 
benefits where the decision-maker has to choose between abatement and no action at all. 
The problem is interpreted as a game against nature, a non-strategic player10. The 
uncertainty about the final outcome is related partly to uncertainty regarding the 
magnitude of future emissions, and partly to the uncertainty regarding the future 
damage of global warming. Future emissions are also uncertain due to factors beyond 
the control of the policy-maker, such as population growth, economic growth, and 
technological innovations. The outcome of a given choice can be considered a 
compound lottery, which consists of two sub-lotteries. The first lottery concerns 
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 The example used is the same as in Aaheim and Bretteville (2001). 
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emissions, and the second concerns the damage from an increase in the concentrations 
of greenhouse gases. 
 The numerical example is illustrated in Figure 1. With a business as usual 
strategy (no abatement) there are two scenarios, alternative 1 and 2, and a policy choice 
of abatement is assumed to give the same decision tree (the bottom one in Figure 1). In 
alternative 1, the decision maker replaces the top left scenario with the bottom scenario 
by choosing to implement climate policy. In this case abatement reduces the damage 
regardless of what happens, without affecting the probabilities, whereas in alternative 2, 
abatement affects both the spread of outcomes and the probabilities. For alternative 2, a 
choice of implementing climate policy will change the relevant scenario from the upper 
right hand tree to the bottom one. The main difference between the two alternative 
scenarios, however, is that a possible catastrophe is avoided through abatement in 
alternative 2. 
The specific numbers are chosen to construct these differences between the two 
alternatives, to simplify calculations, and to generate the same expected damage costs 
for both alternatives; in fact, the expected damage costs of each branch are the same for 
the two alternatives11. A risk neutral decision-maker will thus view them as identical.  
It is reasonable to assume that the considerable difference in the spread of 
possible outcomes in alternative 1 and alternative 2 is important to a decision-maker. 
However, applying risk neutrality, expected utility theory does not separate between the 
two alternatives because the mixture of probabilities from alternative 1 to alternative 2 
does not alter the ‘contribution’ to the expectations from each branch of the decision 
trees. For example, for the upper branch of the two alternatives, we have 0.5 * 0.77 * 
                                                 
11
 For benchmark estimates of the damages of climate change, see e.g. Tol (2002). 
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302.4 = 0.5 * 0.025 * 9313.9 = 116.3. This equality applies for all the branches in 
alternative 1 and 2. Hence, due to the independence axiom, the two alternatives in the 
upper part of Figure 1 are identical to a risk neutral expected utility maximizer. A risk 
averse or risk loving expected utility maximizer will however discriminate both 
alternatives. Attitude towards risk thus play a key role in decision making under 
uncertainty (IPCC 2001)12. 
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Figure 1: Alternative scenarios for uncertain choice with equal expected damage costs 
and two policy options 
 
                                                 
12
 Confer with the brief treatment of the Ellsberg paradox and uncertainty aversion above.  
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First, let the policy choice of no abatement be described by alternative 1 in 
Figure 1. This decision tree indicates a fifty-fifty chance of `high' (H) and `low' (L) 
emissions. The expected value of damage costs with no action is assumed to be USD 
146 billion. If emissions turn out to be high, there is a considerable chance (77 percent) 
for a relatively high damage of USD 302.4 billion, and there is a probability of 23 
percent for relatively low damages of USD 75.6 billion. If emissions instead turn out to 
be low, there is a 91 percent probability of an even lower damage cost of USD 15 
billion, and only a 9 percent chance of the same high damage cost as with high 
emissions. 
 The results from a policy choice of abatement are described by the bottom 
decision tree in Figure 1. In this example, abatement reduces the damage regardless of 
what happens, without affecting the probabilities. The result is that the expected damage 
is reduced to 60 US billion and the spread of possible outcomes is less. Without 
abatement, the possible range of outcomes is between USD 15 and 302 billion, while 
abatement narrows the range to be between USD 2 and 134 billion. 
 A risk-neutral decision-maker will not abate if the cost of abatement measures 
exceeds the expected gains, USD 146 - 60 = 86 billion. Note that even the risk-neutral 
decision-maker runs the risk of investing in vain because the probability that damage 
turns out lower than USD 86 billion is 57 percent. In other words, it is likely that the 
abatement measures eventually result in a loss. If risk averse, the decision-maker is 
actually willing to pay more than USD 86 billion as an insurance against significant 
loss, should damages turn out to be high. This is because abatement also narrows the 
range of possible outcomes. 
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 Now consider alternative 2 in Figure 1, which is very different from alternative 
1, but where the expected damage costs are the same: USD 146 billion. There is still a 
fifty-fifty chance of high and low emissions, but now both cases have the outcome of 
low damage costs from global warming as the most likely (with a probability of 97 
percent). This can be due to an expectation of people being able to adapt to climate 
change without severe problems. Nevertheless, there is also a small chance that the 
damage costs become severe, for example because it is more or less impossible to adapt. 
In this case the damage costs become extreme if future emissions turn out to be high 
and severe even if emissions are low. 
 Assume, moreover, that abatement leads to the same probability tree as in the 
former alternative. This means that the effect of abatement is different from the first 
alternative, because now abatement affects both the spread of outcomes and the 
probabilities (endogenous risk). Hence, for alternative 2, abatement implies that a 
catastrophe is avoided, but the abatement costs will most likely turn out to be a waste of 
resources. The question is now what to do in the second alternative. Since abatement 
affects the expected cost of climate change equally in alternative 1 and alternative 2, a 
risk-neutral decision-maker will again choose action if abatement costs are lower than 
USD 86 billion.  
 
As mentioned above, a large number of experiments have shown that people do not 
consider compound lotteries with identical expected utility values to be identical 
(Machina 1989; Camerer 1995). Machina (1989) identifies two effects. First, people 
become more risk averse if the spread of outcomes increases. The above decision tree 
was tested in a small audience. The results showed a the tendency to accept higher 
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abatement costs in alternative 2 than in alternative 1. Second, a linear transformation of 
the probabilities of a pair of prospects tends to change the preferences from the `high 
probability, low gain' to `low probability, high gain' if the high probability is reduced. 
This effect is consistent with the first effect, but relates to a change in probabilities 
rather than a change in outcomes. 
It is important to be aware of the axioms on which expected utility builds and 
that they may be violated when tested against behavior. However, this is not the same as 
claiming that maximization of expected utility is useless or ‘wrong’. It may limit the 
applicability of the expected utility model, but on the other hand the expected utility 
model may also help decision-makers make better decisions. People often make 
systematic errors. Experiments with the Monty Hall Game13 show one example. If that 
is what is going on here, then policy should not reinforce intuitive but destructive 
judgments, but rather strive to be rational. It is important to emphasize that systematic 
violations are usually identified in extreme cases, where the probabilities are small and 
outcomes are large. In many cases, this weakens the criticism of expected utility, 
although probably not in the case of climate change, where it is difficult to discard the 
possibility of catastrophic events. The issue in this discussion, however, is not about 
preferences regarding uncertainty, but rather about how to process information about 
uncertainty. Let us thus return to the discussion of decision criteria. 
  
4.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF INSUFFICIENT REASON 
The principle of insufficient reason, first formulated by Bernoulli in the 17th century, 
states that if there is no evidence leading us to believe that one event is more likely to 
                                                 
13
 see for example http://www.stat.sc.edu/~west/javahtml/LetsMakeaDeal.html 
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occur than another, then the events should be judged equally probable. Applied to the 
example presented in Figure 1, the probability of each outcome would be 0.25, and the 
decision rule would be abate greenhouse gases if the abatement costs y ≤ 104 for 
alternative 1 and abate if y ≤ 2549 for alternative 2, which of course in both cases is less 
restrictive than for expected utility maximization, and the tendency to abate is thus 
higher. 
  
4.3 MAXIMIN (MINIMAX) PRINCIPLE 
The maximin (maximum minimorum) criterion ranks alternatives by their worst 
possible outcomes, and adopts the alternative for which the worst possible outcome is 
preferable to all other worst outcomes (Rawls 1971). Similarly, the minimax principle 
applies when disutility is considered; that is when the decision-maker attempts to 
minimize the maximum loss from taking action. 
 The maximin principle implies maximization of the welfare in the worst possible 
case, and essentially it allows risk aversion to become infinite. Applied to the problem 
of climate change, it can be interpreted as the following. The decision-maker chooses 
the level of abatement, A, that maximizes the social welfare, w, in the worst possible 
state of nature, chosen from all possible states, s:  
( ){ }sAw
sA
,minmax  
 The example presented above allows only two alternative levels of abatement: 
the decision-maker decides either to use resources to try to prevent global warming 
(abatement) or to do nothing (no action). The choice between the two will naturally 
depend on the magnitude of abatement costs, y, and on the decision-maker's beliefs 
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about possible future damages14. Generally, the decision-maker will choose abatement if 
the costs are less than the benefits, namely the damage prevented. If he believes in 
alternative 1 (see Figure 1), where choosing abatement will lower the damage in all 
cases without affecting the probabilities, he will choose abatement if 302.4-134.4-y ≥ 0, 
that is, if y ≤ 168 billion USD. If he believes in alternative 2, where choosing abatement 
affects the spread of both outcomes and probabilities, he will choose abatement if y ≤ 
9180 billion USD. Thus the condition for imposing measures to reduce emissions is less 
restrictive with the maximin criterion, compared to the expected utility criterion where 
the critical value was 86 billion USD. This reflects the criterion's emphasis on the worst 
case scenario, and it is particularly obvious in alternative 2 where there is a small 
chance of a catastrophic outcome under a no action policy.15 
  
4.4 MINIMAX REGRET 
Minimax regret (risk/loss), suggested by Savage (1951) as an improvement on the 
maximin criterion, aims at minimizing the difference between the best that could 
happen and what actually does happen (see also Fishburn 1987). The decision-maker 
tries to minimize regrets for not having, in hindsight, made the superior choice. In the 
global warming context, this could be interpreted as choosing the option which the 
decision-maker believes future generations would least regret:  
( )( ) ( )[ ]{ }sAwssAw
sy
,,maxmin * −  
                                                 
14
 It is important to note that abatement costs are encumbered with just as much uncertainty as the 
damages, although they are treated in the example as fixed for the sake of simplicity. 
15
 For resent treatments of maximin, see e.g. Bouglet and Vergnaud (2000), and Chevé and Congar 
(2002). 
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Let A*(s) be the optimal choice of abatement if we knew for certain that s would occur. 
The term A(s) represents the level of abatement that would have been chosen if we 
knew in advance what would happen in the future. Since s is unknown ex ante, we will 
most likely choose a different level of abatement, denoted A. The minimax regret 
criterion says that the ex ante choice of A should be chosen in order to minimize the 
future loss in the case where your decision is as bad as it can get. This averts the chance 
of making a major mistake. In order to find the preferred policy, the decision-maker 
must predict and compare the maximal regrets for all possible policy choices. 
To more easily grasp the concept of this criterion, consider first the following 
simple utility payoff and regret matrix: 
payoffs s1 s2  regrets s1 s2 
a1 0 100  a1 1 0 
a2 1 1  a2 0 99 
 
In terms of payoffs, the result is 0 if s1 occurs and 100 if s2 occurs when choosing a1, and 
the payoff is 1 in both states if a2 is chosen. In terms of regrets, choosing alternative a1 
has the possible maximum regret of 1 because if a1 is chosen and s1 is realized the 
payoff is 0, but it could have been 1 if a2 was chosen instead. If a1 is chosen and s2 is 
realized the result is the maximum payoff and there is nothing to regret. Choosing 
alternative a2 has the possible maximum regret of 99. This is because if a2 is chosen, 
there is nothing to regret if s1 occurs, but a regret of 99 if s2 is realized. Consequently, 
alternative a1 minimizes the maximum regret, and should therefore be chosen according 
to this criterion. 
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For the numerical global warming example assumed in this paper, the minimax 
regret cost matrix is shown in Table 1. The numbers in the matrix are found in the 
following way: Take for instance the possible state of high emissions and high increase 
in temperature (HH) in Figure 1. The maximum regret will depend on the abatement 
cost y. For alternative 1, the regret will be the net benefit from abatement; the damage 
when no action is taken, 302.4, minus the damage that is faced when action is taken, 
134.4, and minus the cost of abatement, y, namely 168-y. Or, if y is sufficiently large, 
the regret will be zero. For sufficiently large costs, abatement should not be chosen and 
the decision-maker should have no regrets when choosing no action. The regret given 
alternative 1 with no abatement is thus the maximum of 168-y and 0. If instead the state 
of high emissions and low increase in temperature (HL) occurs, the regret would be the 
maximum of 67-y and 0, etc. The maximum regret for a strategy is found by comparing 
the regrets in each state. If we believe in alternative 1 and consider choosing no action, 
the maximum regret would thus be the maximum of 168-y and 0. 
 
States/   
Beliefs + Strat. 
HH HL LH LL Max Regret 
Alt. 1, NA max(168-y,0) max(67-y,0) max(168-y,0) max(13-y,0) max(168-y,0) 
Alt. 1, A max(0,y-168) max(0,y-67) max(0,y-168) max(0,y-13) max(0,y-13) 
Alt. 2, NA max(9180-y,0) max(9.4-y,0) max(924-y,0) max(12-y,0) max(9180-y,0) 
Alt. 2, A max(0,y-9180) max(0,y-9.4) max(0,y-924) max(0,y-12) max(0,y-12) 
 
Table I: The game’s maximum regret matrix 
 
 Given alternative 1 and abatement, the regret in the state of HH is the maximum 
of 0 and y-168; for sufficiently high costs the decision-maker will regret choosing 
abatement, and the regret will be the abatement cost minus the avoided damage. Thus, if 
we believe in alternative 1 and consider choosing abatement, the maximal regret would 
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be the maximum of 0 and y-13. The numbers for alternative 2 are found in a similar 
fashion. 
 The preferred policy is found by comparing the maximal regrets and choosing 
the minimum. The result will naturally depend on y, and for alternative 1 in the example 
the strategy has to satisfy: 
( ) ( ){ }13,0max,0,168maxmin −− yy
ssA
 
When applied to our example the criterion says that if y ≤ 168, the decision-maker 
should choose abatement. For alternative 2, the critical value for choosing abatement is 
y ≤ 9180. These are the same critical values as for maximin.16 
 
4.5 GENERALIZED MAXIMIN/MAXIMAX 
The maximin and the minimax regret criteria are each very conservative in the sense 
that they put emphasis on the worst case scenario. What if we look at the best state, or a 
combination of the best and the worst? This is the essence of the pessimism-optimism 
index criterion of Hurwicz (1951), also known as generalized maximin/maximax. This 
criterion states that the level of abatement should be chosen in order to maximize a 
weighted average of the social welfare in the best and the worst state:  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }sAwsAw
ssA
,max1,minmax αα −+  
One interpretation of the size of the pessimism-optimism index, α, is that it reflects the 
decision-maker's beliefs about the likelihood of facing the worst case in the future. The 
generalized maximin/maximax is thus a simplification of the expected utility criterion. 
When determining α, the decision-maker can either find the best and the worst case with 
                                                 
16
 For other discussions on this criterion, see e.g. Chernoff (1954), Crisholm and Clark (1993), and Chevé 
and Congar (2002). 
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appurtenant subjective probabilities, or divide all possible states into two groups: the 
bad states and the better states, and α will be the probability of realizing one of the bad 
states. For the numerical global warming example assumed in this paper this means 
picking out the best and the worst case for both alternatives. 
 
α 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 
Alt. 1: Abatement if y ≤ 13 38 59 90 121 152 168 
Alt. 2: Abatement if y ≤ 12 929 2762 4596 6429 8263 9180 
 
Table II: Abatement criteria for alternative choices of α under the generalized 
maximin/maximax criterion 
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Figure 2: Critical values for the generalized maximin/maximaxcriterion 
 
The critical value of abatement costs will obviously depend on the size of α, and is 
shown in Table II and in Figure 2. As can be seen, for alternative 1, the remedial policy 
will be implemented if y < 13 billion USD if α =0 (no weight is put on the worst case), 
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and if y < 168 billion USD if α =1 (all weight is put on the worst case, which coincides 
with maximin). The critical value of y in alternative 2 ranges from 12 to 9180. 
  
Choosing the value of α that corresponds to the probability distribution for alternative 2 
in Figure 1 yields α = 0.5 * 0.025 = 0.013. The generalized maximin/maximax criterion 
then prescribes abatement if y < 126 billion USD, which again is less restrictive than the 
expected utility criterion's 86 billion USD. If we use alternative 1's corresponding 
weight, however, α = 0.43, we get the slightly stricter critical value y < 80. Obtaining 
the expected utility level for the critical y requires a belief about α of 0,47 for alternative 
1, and 0,008 for alternative 2. Thus, if alternative 2 applies, the critical value of 
imposing climate change mitigation is less restrictive than with expected utility if the 
probability of a catastrophe is less than 0.008. This illustrates how sensitive the 
generalized maximin/maximax criterion is to the possibility of catastrophic events. 
Recall that the probability of the worst case in alternative 2 is 0.0125, which is more 
than one and a half times 0.008. 
 
4.6 LIMITED DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE 
The limited degree of confidence criterion implies that the decision-maker maximizes a 
weighted sum of the expected utility criterion and the maximin criterion:  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }sAwsAwE
s
sA
,min1,max γγ −+  
The decision-maker's degree of confidence in the probability distribution underlying 
wEs  is measured by [ ]1,0∈γ  and for 1<γ  more weight is put on the worst case than a 
under standard expected utility maximization. In the case of full confidence, γ = 1, the 
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expected utility criterion is used, whereas under complete uncertainty, γ = 0, the 
maximin decision rule is applied. The discussion above showed that the conditions for 
imposing measures to reduce emissions are less restrictive using the maximin criterion, 
compared to the expected utility criterion, due to the maximin criterion's emphasis on 
the worst case scenario. Thus, γ represents the uncertainty about the uncertainty, or 
alternatively the degree of ignorance. In this interpretation, ignorance is simply the 
counterpart of confidence in the probabilistic assessment underlying the expected utility 
calculation (Eichberger and Spaniels 1998; Stigum 1990).   
 
γ 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 
Alt. 1: Abatement if y ≤ 168 160 143 127 110 94 86 
Alt. 2: Abatement if y ≤ 9180 8270 6451 4633 2814 995 86 
 
Table III: Abatement criteria for alternative choices of γ under the limited degree of 
confidence criterion 
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Figure 3: Critical values for the limited degree of confidence criterion 
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Returning to the example, it can be seen from Table III that the critical value of 
abatement costs spans from the maximin value to the expected utility value and the 
lower the confidence in the probability distribution, the higher the willingness to pay for 
emission reductions. This is also illustrated in the graph in Figure 3.  
In Lange (2003) the limited degree of confidence criterion is compared to expected 
utility maximization in a two period model with learning. 17 
 
4.7 SAFETY FIRST  
Another way of showing precaution is by lowering the probability that the welfare level 
in the future will be too low (Rawls 1971). Two alternatives are:  
( )[ ]{ }ksAw
sA
≤,Prmin  
( ){ } ( )[ ]{ }β≤≤ ksAwtssAwE
s
sA
,Pr..,max  
The first alternative, a probabilistic non-expected utility criterion, minimizes the 
probability of the welfare being less than some constant k. The second alternative 
maximizes the expected social welfare, subject to a constraint, which says that the 
probability of welfare being less than level k should be less than β. 
 Another safety-first approach is to have constraints on the welfare of the worst 
off group, land or region. One example is: 
 
( ){ } ( )[ ]{ }β≤≤ ksAwtssAwE iissA ,minPr..,max  
Now the decision-maker maximizes the expected future social welfare subject to the 
probability of the welfare of the worst off, being less than β. If β = 0 the constraint can 
                                                 
17
 Chichilnisky (2000) discusses this criterion in a static setting. 
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be interpreted as a floor. If k is chosen properly, this criterion will then ensure expected 
intergenerational equity and sustainable development. Loosely put, sustainable 
development demands that each generation use no more than their legitimate share of 
the world's resources (Asheim 1993). If one or several generations consume more than 
their legitimate share, or their consumption generates too much pollution, the 
consumption possibilities of later generations will be undermined. Later generations 
might then not be able to reach the social welfare level k, and the criterion is violated. 
This is also known as the highest constant-consumption criterion (Solow 1974). 
  
4.8 APPLICABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE DECISION CRITERIA 
The use of any of these criteria as a basis for decision-making requires ideally the 
decision-maker to have complete awareness of the possible states of nature. In a way 
they require what Savage would call ‘a closed universe’. Nothing genuinely surprising 
can be expected to happen. Given the uncertainty structure of the climate problem, this 
is a very restrictive assumption. Most of these criteria, however, focus on one or a few 
of the possible outcomes, so the information on the rest need not be as accurate. The 
theory of expected utility demands, in a way, more detailed information than most of the 
other criteria discussed here, and also an opinion on the probabilities. Yet, expected 
utility theory may provide an adequate framework for explaining and predicting social 
choice in uncertain situations. The information problems associated with this approach 
are not necessarily avoided by using other approaches. Furthermore, even if individuals 
place higher weights on low-probability extreme events, this does not mean that the 
decision-maker necessarily will do the same. 
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 It is important to note that the conclusions presented above are highly dependent 
on the framing of the problem, i.e. how states of nature are defined, and in the case of 
expected utility, on the subjective beliefs about the probability distribution over states. 
An obvious framing problem with the principle of insufficient reason for example is that 
the number of states considered will influence the decision: Consider a case where the 
policy choice depends on the possibilities that a) there will be no damage from global 
warming, or b) there will be severe damage. Since what will happen is unknown, the 
principle of insufficient reason says that we should use a probability of 1/2 on both 
states. Second, consider the case where three possibilities are considered, namely a) no 
damage from global warming, b1) severe damage from sea-level rise, and b2) severe 
damage from extreme weather events. If the principle of insufficient reason is applied, 
there is a probability of 1/3 on each state. Compared with the first framing of the 
problem, however, the probability of state a) has decreased from 1/2 to 1/3, and the 
probability of b) has increased from 1/2 to 2/3. Many such listings are possible, and in 
general these different abstractions of the same problem will, when resolved by the 
principle of insufficient reason, yield different solutions (Luce and Raiffa 1957). 
 Using maximin to decide upon abatement policy reflects an extreme fear of the 
worst case. Its conservatism, however, might make good sense in some contexts. Chevé 
and Congar (2002), for instance, argue that maximin complies with the precautionary 
principle, however, knowing the actual nature of the worst case is problematic. What is 
the worst that can happen as a consequence of anthropogenic climate change? 
Answering this question is difficult because of uncertainties about the strength of 
climate change impacts, and whether and how they will materialize. Another problem is 
that the worst case might be a catastrophe of such dimensions that deciding between 
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two policy options might have no significant impact on the outcome. Furthermore, if 
there is a tiny chance that the abatement strategy is ineffective, the worst case scenario 
would be to implement a costly remedial policy that fails to avert severe damages. This 
means that unless there is complete certainty regarding the policy effectiveness (which 
is assumed in this example), abatement cannot be rationalized as the appropriate 
maximin strategy in any game against nature. 
 The following simple illustration exhibits an obvious objection to the maximin 
criterion: 
  
Matrix I   
payoffs s1 s2 
a1 0 100 
a2 1 1 
 
Matrix II   
payoffs s1 s2 
a1 0 1,000,000 
a2 0.000001 0.000001 
 
For matrix I, the maximin criterion favors a2 over a1. Some consider this unreasonable, 
because it would still be true if 1 were reduced to 0.000001 and the 100 increased to 
1,000,000 as is the case in matrix II. The critics agree that since nature is considered a 
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non-strategic player, clearly a1 must be chosen when matrix II is the problem (Luce and 
Raiffa 1957). 
 Minimax regret has been criticized first on the grounds that it has never been 
clearly demonstrated that differences in utility do in fact provide a measurement of 
regret. In other words, it is not clear that the `regret' of going from a state of utility 5 to 
a state of utility 3 is equivalent to that of going from 15 to 13. Second, one can construct 
examples where an arbitrarily small advantage in one state of nature outweighs a 
considerable advantage in another state. Such examples tend to produce the same 
feeling of uneasiness that is explained in the previous paragraph on maximin. A third 
objection is that in some examples the minimax regret criterion may select a strategy a3 
among the possible strategies a1, a2, a3, and a4. If, for some reason, a4 was made 
unavailable, this might lead to the choice of a2 instead. And the criticism is thus that the 
presence of an undesired strategy should not influence the choice among the remaining 
strategies (Chernoff 1954). 
 The minimax regret rule is also criticized on the grounds that regret consists of 
“crying over spilt milk”, which may not be the best way to optimize. On the other hand, 
applying the notion of regret to the maximin rule gives some weight to the relationship 
between the costs of implementing a remedial policy and the loss of doing nothing 
when the damages caused by global warming turn out to be significant. This holds even 
when there is uncertainty about whether the abatement policy will be effective 
(Chrisholm and Clark 1993). However, the uncertainties regarding impacts and the 
results of abatement efforts make it difficult to define and measure the regrets. When 
using this criterion, the decision-maker has the same need for information as with the 
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expected utility criterion, but does not need to assign probabilities to the various 
outcomes. 
 Minimax regret might be particularly relevant when policies serve dual 
purposes. In many instances, actions to combat local environmental problems, protect 
biodiversity, and so forth will simultaneously have a desirable impact on global 
warming (Ekins 1996; Aunan et al. 1998). Conversely, policies aimed at combating an 
enhanced greenhouse effect, such as reducing forms of air pollution caused by the use 
of fossil fuels, and reducing the clear-felling of forests, will also often help alleviate 
local environmental problems. These dual purpose policies are particularly attractive if 
there is a significant chance that either a greenhouse problem will not occur, or that 
human preventive action will be ineffective because if the policy should fail to remedy 
global warming, it will still reduce local environmental problems, and the abatement 
effort has not been a sheer waste. If the ancillary benefits are sufficiently large, the costs 
of implementing the abatement policy will be outweighed. If this is the case, we will 
have –y > 0 and the remedial policy will always be preferred, regardless of its effect on 
climate change, and regardless of the criterion chosen. No-regret policies might thus 
provide a way for the politicians to minimize the ex post critique. 
 The safety-first criteria pose questions about how to determine welfare levels, k 
and probability, β. What determines the acceptable size of β, the probability of the 
future welfare being less than k? How likely can it be? This question might depend on 
the size of k. How low a welfare can be accepted? This is again dependent on whether 
or not k measures the welfare on average. If so, is this a weighted average, and how then 
are the weights determined? And what level of aggregation is applied? Is k a weighted 
sum of each group, land or region? In addition, even if k and β are determined in the 
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face of the uncertainty, how can the decision-maker know that a certain policy decision 
will satisfy the constraints? The typical economics approach to climate change focuses 
on total or average effects. Nordhaus for example aggregates impacts in his analyses of 
what to do about this problem, but people who are worried about climate change focus 
on specific outcomes like flooding in Bangladesh or loss of coral reefs. Is it right to 
average over total effects? Or does it matter that some things are being harmed even 
while other things are being helped by climate change? 
 The class of safety-first criteria has information challenges in addition to the 
problems of deciding upon the strictness of restrictions touched upon above. The idea of 
safeguarding the worst off from too low a level of welfare seems sensible. However, in 
extreme cases, this could mean that one would have to lower the welfare of the majority 
substantially in order to marginally benefit the worst off, and no politician could do that 
without losing popularity. One possible solution to this problem is side payments. The 
worst off could get transfers from the majority which would increase the utility for all 
parties in comparison with strict safeguarding. 
 Using the highest constant-consumption criterion, the decision-maker will seek 
to pick an efficient path. He will ask for the largest steady per capita consumption that 
can be maintained indefinitely (the maximum steady state). However, predicting and 
finding such a path demands pretty much the same amount of information as the 
calculation of expected future welfare, and will thus be highly uncertain. 
 A common criticism of criteria such as maximin, minimax regret, generalized 
maximin/maximax, and the principle of insufficient reason is that they are rationalized 
on some notion of ignorance. In practice, however, the critics claim that the decision-
maker usually has some vague partial information concerning the true state of nature 
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(Luce and Raiffa 1957). The question remains, however, if this vague partial 
information is enough to assign subjective probabilities to all possible, or at least 
sufficiently many, states of nature - and for a case like global warming, whether the 
available information is enough even to apply non-probabilistic criteria. 
 The principle of insufficient reason, maximin, generalized maximin/maximax, 
and the limited degree of confidence criteria can be looked upon as simplifications of 
the expected utility criterion. What separates them is which states are given the larger 
weights, and also the type and extent of information they demand. They all, however, 
demand less information than the expected utility criterion, since probabilities are not 
required. For the limited degree of confidence criterion, an unsatisfactory level of 
information about the probability distribution over states is compensated for by putting 
extra weight on the worst case scenario. These criteria, as well as the expected utility 
criterion, all attempt to control the outcome. The safety-first criteria have a different 
goal: to control the uncertainties. The minimax regret criterion's concern is that of 
making mistakes, and may therefore be the criterion that best reflects the political 
process. In fact, the tendency of people to systematically violate the independence 
axiom in experimental settings might indicate that they are using a form of the minimax 
regret criterion when the stakes are high. In the example above, this implies that people 
are willing to accept higher abatement costs in alternative 2, where a catastrophe is 
avoided with abatement, than they do when comparing alternative 1 with the abatement 
case18. 
 
                                                 
18
 This is consistent with the result we got when it was tested in a small audience. 
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4.9 THE TIME DIMENSION 
Unlike most other political issues, climate policy has an extremely long time horizon. 
Nearly half of the greenhouse gases will remain in the atmosphere for a hundred years 
and some of them for thousands of years. In addition it is likely that estimates of 
impacts and benefits will improve considerably over the next century, but we will never 
reach full knowledge. In the example discussed above, we make a decision ‘today’ and 
know ‘tomorrow’. In a more realistic description of climate policy, the decision would 
be a process where adjustments were made according to new information. A possible 
way to model the process would be that the outcomes of the lottery we consider today 
are tickets to new lotteries with different probabilities.  
The long-term nature of climate change due to the fact that it is the 
concentrations of greenhouse gases that matters, rather than annual emissions, raises the 
thorny issues of intergenerational transfers of wealth and environmental goods and 
bads. This again raises the question of discounting19. One argument for discounting over 
time is that consumers are impatient; they have a preference for immediate over 
postponed consumption. A second is that the marginal utility of consumption decline 
with growing per capita consumption. One could question, however, the validity of the 
first argument, when discussing discounting in the light of the climate problem. In this 
case we are talking about consumption hundred or several hundred years ahead. It might 
be difficult to justify the impatience argument, considering the time horizon. It is not the 
same generation consuming today and a hundred years from now, and some might 
                                                 
19
 This is a widely discussed issue. Some examples are d'Arge et al. (1982), Azar and Sterner (1996), 
Howarth (1996, 2004), Jones-Lee and Loomes (1995), Khanna and Chapman (1996), Pearce et al. (2003) 
Schelling (1993), Toth (1995), and Weitzman (1994, 1998, 2001). 
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consider it immoral to state that our consumption today is more important, or more 
valuable, than the consumption of the generations to follow.  
The second argument in favor of dsicounting follows from an assumption about 
continuing future growth, which implies increased future consumption. Assuming 
decreasing marginal utility, this future consumption will be of less value, on the margin. 
This means that, given continued growth, the last unit consumed in the future has less 
utility value than the last unit consumed today. The generation that undertakes the 
abatement, however, is not the one who will consume the possible long-term benefits 
from the reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases. Thus, if the economic sacrifices 
are carried by the countries that can best afford it; the transfers will tend to be from 
people in the developed part of the world, to people in the less developed parts. 
Hopefully the residents of the developing countries will be far better off a century from 
now than they are today. However, they may not yet be as well off then, as people in the 
developed part of the world is today (Schelling 1993). 
   
4.9.1 Time inconsistency 
One of the responsibilities of present policy makers is to take care of the interests of 
future generations. It is a common experience, however, that people tend to postpone 
unpleasant tasks, preferring to have them done in the next period, even if it might be 
optimal to complete the task now. This might also apply to policy makers, and will 
probably reflect time-inconsistent preferences.  
A decision rule is said to be time-consistent if at each decision node reached 
when the rule is followed, the decision rule is still optimal in the sense of maximizing 
the welfare as evaluated at the reached node (Asheim 1997). Considering the climate 
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issue, policy makers’ preferences (and they might also reflect the preferences of the 
present generation) seem to give extra weight to current welfare over future welfare. 
These present-biased-preferences might lead to procrastination of climate change 
remedial action, a decision that might be time-inconsistent. The incentives to 
procrastinate stem from the fact that the policy makers plan to do a task based on its 
long-run benefits, and these benefits are strongly dependent on whether they accept 
taking on the costs of greenhouse gas abatement today20.  
 
4.10 SCOPE FOR FURTHER WORK 
The simplicity of a presentation like the above always raises the question of whether the 
results would stand up if the analysis introduced greater complexity. A natural direction 
to go would be to expand the analysis to take into account change (or lack of change) in 
certain variables over time. How will the irreversibilities affect decision-making in a 
dynamic framework? Would we abate now or would we wait and see what happens? 
Taking into account the possibility of change (or lack of change) over time will allow us 
to consider how future learning might influence decision-making. Then the problem of 
climate change evolves as a subject of risk management in which strategies should be 
reformulated as new knowledge arises (IPPC 2001). This will give an opportunity to 
analytically address robustness. Robust strategies21 are closely tied to the idea of 
adaptive decision strategies, that is, strategies that can change over time in response to 
observations of the climate and economic systems. (Adaptive decision strategies differ 
from sequential strategies in that in the former information is endogenous, that is, the 
                                                 
20
 For a contribution on incentives for procrastination see O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). 
21
 See for example Lempert and Schlesinger (2000). 
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type, rate, and quality of information gained depends on both the unfolding scenario and 
policy choices whereas information is exogenous in the sequential strategies.) Adaptive 
decision strategies are closely tied to the concept of robustness, because such strategies 
are most useful in situations of deep uncertainty–where robustness, as opposed to 
optimization, appears to be the best decision-making criterion (IPCC 2001). 
 A second possible direction could be to check how the results are affected by the 
ability to make continuous choices, i.e. abate 30%, 31% etc. Today the policy question 
is not so much about whether to abate, but rather how much to abate.  
 A third direction could be to check how the results depend on an expanded 
strategy set. For example, instead of only looking at a decision about whether to abate, 
the analysis could consider a choice of investing in research and development that 
would lower the cost of abating in the future, or alternatively, investing in expanding 
future consumption to compensate for future climate change damages. 
  
5. Conclusions 
 
 The information needed to make better climate policy decisions depend, on the 
one hand, on which decision-making criterion is chosen. On the other hand, the amount 
and type of information available may help determine which decision criterion should 
be used. When selecting a decision criterion, one of the very first things that needs to be 
determined is the target of control. Then the preferred policy choice depends very much 
on the framing of the problem: how states of nature are defined, subjective beliefs about 
the probability distribution over states, and the magnitude of costs. Furthermore, the 
answer to whether more uncertainty should imply more or less abatement to a large 
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extent depends on the specification of relationships. Different functional forms, i.e. 
linear vs. non-linear, will give different results22. The outmost consequence of this is, of 
course, that the skilled modeler can get any result he desires. It is therefore of great 
importance that the framework for analysis of climate policy is as realistic as possible.
  
Focusing on the lack of certainty regarding impacts of greenhouse gas emissions 
and the effectiveness of policy made a comparison of alternative criteria with the 
maximization of expected utility model possible: for maximin and minimax regret the 
condition for imposing measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases are less 
restrictive, that is, the costs of abatement (y) can be higher, compared with the critical 
value for y under maximization of expected utility; the generalized maximin/maximax 
criterion is less restrictive under alternative 2 where a possible catastrophe is avoided, 
but slightly more restrictive under alternative 1; and for the limited degree of confidence 
criterion the conditions are equal to or less restrictive depending on the degree of 
ignorance (See Table IV).  
 Decision Criterion 
Alt. 1 
Choose 
abatement if 
Alt. 2 
Choose 
abatement if 
EU (risk 
neutral) 
 )w(Ap   Ew
s
ss∑=  y ≤ 86 y ≤ 86 
Minimax ( ){ }sAw
sA
,minmax  y ≤ 168 y ≤ 9180 
Minimax 
Regr. 
( )( ) ( )[ ]{ }sAwssAw
sy
,,maxmin * −  y ≤ 168 y ≤ 9180 
Gen. 
Minimax 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }sAwsAw
ssA
,max1,minmax αα −+  y ≤ 80  (α = 0.43) 
y ≤ 126  
(α = 0.013) 
Lim. D. of 
Conf. 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }sAwsAwE
s
sA
,min1,max γγ −+  y ≤ [168,86] γ = [0,1] 
y ≤ [9180,86] 
γ = [0,1] 
                                                 
22
 This is discussed further in Aaheim and Bretteville (2001). 
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Table IV. Critical cost values for choosing abatement 
  
 Differences in recommendations on climate policy might thus be due to the use 
of different criteria as basis for analysis. Those arguing in favor of abatement policies 
might use one of the alternative criteria as basis for their analysis, rather than 
maximization of expected utility. Furthermore, unless there is complete certainty 
regarding the policy effectiveness, maximin can be used to back up a no-action strategy. 
This is because if there is a tiny chance that the abatement policy is ineffective, the 
worst case scenario would be to implement a costly remedial policy that fails to avert 
severe damages. 
The choice of a given decision criterion is not independent of the attitude 
towards climate risks and the amount, type of, and confidence in the available scientific 
information. The complexity of the climate problem makes it very difficult, if not 
impossible, to completely overlook the consequences of alternative choices and how 
they affect uncertainty. The result may be that people cannot say whether they prefer 
maximization of expected utility or an alternative decision rule as a basis for climate 
policy making. It is therefore hard to determine whether decision criteria such as the 
maximization of expected utility model, which demands high levels of information, 
represent decision-makers' preferences properly. This may be an argument for the use of 
alternative rules that demand less information and enable the decision-makers to better 
predict the consequences of their choices. It is important to emphasize that the tendency 
to violate the expected utility axioms is particularly strong in extreme cases, where there 
are small probabilities of extreme outcomes. For the case of global warming, it is 
difficult to discard the possibility that at least one disastrous event will occur, so 
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expected utility may fail to reflect the preferences of decision-makers. However, 
whether the benevolent decision-maker should use the expected utility criterion is 
another discussion. 
 The choice of decision criterion is thus a political question. The decisions of 
today will influence the consumption possibilities of future generations, and long-term 
problems in particular should be treated with this in mind. Colgazier (1991) claims that 
a good guide for making decisions under uncertainty is to hedge your bets. This requires 
finding a course of action that is reasonably robust in leading to positive outcomes and 
avoiding negative ones. This might point towards using the principle of expected utility 
maximization. However, when faced with a problem such as global warming, which is 
very long term and outside the range of human experience, the possibility of making 
huge mistakes should be of great concern, and hedging one's bets might require that the 
choice of climate policy is, at least partly, in accordance with the minimax regret 
criterion.  
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“All things are so very uncertain, 
 and that's exactly what makes me feel reassured.” 
Too-Ticky in Moominland Midwinter by Tove Jansson 
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Abstract 
This paper reconsiders the importance of irreversibilities in climate change policy. The model 
presented captures the irreversibility of both climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions 
and abatement technology investments, both of which are subject to uncertainty that will 
necessarily change gradually over time as a result of learning. The climate irreversibility adds 
an option value to the ‘early action’ strategies as long as there is a positive probability of 
encountering the climate irreversibility constraint. In contrast, irreversibility in abatement 
investments scales down the future climate effects in the same way as an increase in the 
discount factor would. The effect the climate option value has on policy making is reduced the 
more irreversible the investments, but this effect decreases with the length of the time periods. 
The preferred policy option depends on the relative size of these option values and the possible 
policy adjustment costs. The framework allows a clear distinction between costs caused by 
desired adjustments due to new information and the two opposing option values. It also allows 
graphic illustrations that increase the understanding of the different effects on optimal climate 
policy. If the sum of the climate option value plus the adjustment costs resulting from too low 
initial abatement exceeds the sum of the investment option value plus the adjustment costs 
resulting from too high initial abatement, the net option value is positive, the climate 
irreversibility effect dominates, and ‘early action’ should be preferred over a ‘wait-and-see’ 
policy26. 
 
Key words: climate policy, decision criteria, global warming, irreversibility, learning, option 
value, timing, uncertainty  
                                                 
23
 camilla.bretteville@cicero.uio.no 
24
 aaheim@cicero.uio.no 
25
 Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo: www.cicero.uio.no 
26
 The paper was originally prepared for the 12TH Annual Conference of EAERE, Bilbao, Spain, June 
2003 
 
Essay no. 2: Option Values and the Timing of Climate Policy 
 
 
 80 
1. Introduction 
Intuitively it seems very plausible that environmental irreversibilities would play an 
important role in questions concerning global climate change. In the economics 
literature, however, this is widely disputed. Due to the long time horizon and the 
uncertainty aspects of the problem, climate change policy decisions made today may 
influence welfare hundreds of years into the future. It is also likely that many of the 
changes caused by global warming will be irreversible. One example is the possible 
change in the path of the Gulf Stream; it can hardly be assumed that it could be moved 
back to its original basin once change has occurred. Another example is that changes in 
the climate might destroy unique ecosystems or drive certain species to extinction if 
their habitats are destroyed. Also, since greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere, 
the emissions themselves are irreversible.27  
 The issue of irreversibility and learning in environmental economics was 
introduced in the seminal papers by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974). 
Focusing on a one-time development decision, their basic idea was that making an 
irreversible decision induces additional costs because the current decision restricts 
future decision possibilities. This implies that a flexibility premium or an option value, 
adds to the reversible alternatives. Hanemann (1989) defines the option value as the 
value of flexibility. This extra value is the value of retaining the option to choose any of 
the alternatives in the light of new information – an option that is lost if an irreversible 
alternative was chosen in the first place. Thus, if there is a chance of learning, they 
                                                 
27
 Every gas has a specific atmospheric lifetime – that is, the time it takes before 1/e of an emitted 
quantity of the gas is left in the atmosphere, eg. 114 years for N2O, 12 years for CH4, and up to 200 years 
for CO2. No single lifetime can be defined for CO2 because of the different rates of uptake by different 
removal processes (IPPC 2001). 
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argue, it becomes more important to keep future options open. With regard to climate 
change policy, the implication is that the current level of greenhouse gas emissions 
should be lower if there is a possibility of learning more about irreversible damages in 
the future. Arrow and Fisher (1974) refer to this as the ‘irreversibility effect’, and the 
implication for climate change policy is to introduce mitigation strategies now to keep 
future options open (‘early action’). However, later contributions (Kolstad 1996a,b; 
Ulph and Ulph 1995) downplay the importance of the irreversibility of climate change 
due to greenhouse gas emissions (henceforth referred to as climate irreversibility) in 
favor of the irreversibility in abatement technology investments (henceforth referred to 
as investment irreversibility), and thus advocate a ‘wait and see’ strategy28. 
 Brekke and Lystad (2000), however, observe that Kolstad is not depreciating the 
capital: his capital lasts forever. They show that with a small depreciation rate on 
capital, Kolstad’s conclusion is turned around.  Fisher and Narain (2003) points out that 
in Kolstad (1996b) the obvious reason why there are no findings of impacts from 
climate irreversibility is that there is no scenario were it would be optimal to emit 
negatively in the future to compensate for too high emissions today. Furthermore, in the 
parameterization of the model, the non-negativity restriction on emissions, used in the 
model to define emissions irreversibility, is never binding.  
A different example where the question of timing is addressed is Pindyck 
(2002), here analyzed as an optimal stopping problem. He looks at when (if ever) 
climate policy should be adopted. So adopting a policy today competes not only with 
never adopting the policy, but also with adopting it next year, in two years, and so on. 
He focuses largely on a one-time adoption of an emission reducing policy. 
                                                 
28
 See Fisher (2001); Fisher and Narrain (2003); or Heal and Kriström (2002) for more details. 
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All in all, the rather sparse economic literature on the implications for the timing 
of climate policy of uncertainty and irreversibility seems to favor the ‘wait and see’ 
policy over ‘early action.’ Fisher (2001) argues that the reason for this result, which 
may appear counterintuitive to most, is that, given the assumptions or parameter values 
built into the models, there is relatively little cost in deferring abatement while waiting 
to learn more about the benefit. The climate irreversibility, therefore, plays less of a role 
in driving current policy recommendation on controlling emissions. 
Contrary to the standard assumptions of economic climate change models, 
Fisher and Narain (2003) assume that the probability of a catastrophic impact at some 
point in the future (the next period), although very small, may be positively related to 
the level of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere. Their model also allows 
for the possibility of regrettable first period investments. The introduction of 
endogenous risk has a positive effect on abatement investments, but they find the effect 
of investment irreversibility to dominate the effect of climate irreversibility essentially 
because the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere does not change much 
over a 10 year period. However, Torvanger (1997), using a three-period stochastic 
dynamic programming model, shows that in the case of endogenous probability of 
irreversible climate change the climate irreversibility effect dominates. Aaheim (2004), 
using a stochastic model with Brownian motion, shows that both investment 
irreversibility and climate irreversibility may affect optimal abatement significantly, but 
if the policy is updated frequently in accordance with new information, the two effects 
tend to weigh each other out. 
The conflicting irreversibilities were first treated in Kolstad (1996a). He finds 
that, if the learning process is sufficiently slow, compared with the rates of pollution 
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decay, and capital depreciation, learning does not influence the decision. However, if 
learning is significant, the two irreversibilities can affect the desired first-period level of 
emissions in opposite directions. The dominant effect is determined by the relative sizes 
of the rates of pollution decay, and capital depreciation, as well as the expectations 
about damages. It thus seems pertinent to study further the conditions for the 
irreversibility effect to hold, that is: Under what conditions will the implications for the 
timing of climate policy of uncertainty and irreversibility favor an ‘early action’ type 
policy over ‘wait and see’?  In an effort to make this complicated issue more transparent 
we use a stylized model to highlight three important uncertainty effects on climate 
change policy. The simplicity of the model is chosen to enable an explicit illustration of 
these effects. It is important to note that the choice in our model is continuous. 
However, we operate with an interval in which the policy choice is expected to lie. 
Hence, when we refer to a ‘wait and see’ policy we refer to an abatement choice that is 
relatively closer to the lower bound for abatement investment (low initial abatement), 
and when we refer to ‘early action’ we mean a choice that is relatively closer to the 
upper bound (high initial abatement). The question addressed here is thus how much to 
do, rather than whether to take action. 
When uncertainty is high, the likelihood of making a perfect guess is low.  
Under a process of learning, no matter what strategy is chosen, costs must thus be 
expected because of adjustments desired due to new information (henceforth referred to 
as ‘adjustments costs’). This is the first effect we study. In addition, we study the two 
opposing option values of policies that maintain flexibilities: one related to climate 
irreversibility and the other related to investment irreversibility. We show that the 
climate irreversibility imposes an option value to the ‘early action’ strategies if, and 
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only if, there is a positive probability of encountering the climate irreversibility 
constraint, and similarly that the investment irreversibility imposes an option value to 
the ‘wait and see’ strategies if, and only if, there is a positive probability of 
encountering the investment irreversibility constraint. We also show that irreversibility 
in abatement investments scale down the future climate effects in the same way as an 
increase in the discount factor. Furthermore, the effect the option value of early 
abatement has on current policy choice is reduced the more irreversible the investments, 
but this effect decreases as the time horizon increases.  
Our framework allows a clear distinction between costs caused by desired 
adjustments due to new information and the two opposing option values, which to our 
knowledge is a new approach. It also allows graphic illustrations that increase the 
understanding of how the adjustment costs and option values affect optimal climate 
policy. This clarification is our main contribution to the debate, and it shows clearly that 
the preferred policy option depends on the relative size of the two option values and of 
the ex ante adjustment costs. We conclude that if the sum of the climate option value 
plus the expected adjustment cost resulting from too low initial abatement exceeds the 
sum of the investment option value plus the expected adjustment cost resulting from too 
high initial abatement, the net option value is positive, the climate irreversibility effect 
dominates, and ‘early action’ should be preferred over a ‘wait and see’ policy.  
A short discussion on changes in uncertainty and learning is given in Section 2. 
Section 3 starts with a presentation of the general two-period model with continuous 
policy choice,  uncertainty, and learning, followed first by an analysis of climate 
irreversibility, which corresponds to the traditional option value discussion, and second 
by an analysis of how investment irreversibility may affect the solution. Section 4 
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considers briefly implications of the use of alternative decision criteria, while 
concluding remarks are given in Section 5. 
 
2. Uncertainty and learning 
Although insights into the basic science of climate change have improved substantially 
over the past decades, there is still uncertainty around almost every aspect of the 
problem – including future levels of emissions, temperature changes resulting from 
greenhouse gas concentrations, impacts from changes in global mean temperature, 
technological developments, and costs of abatement and adaptation. One might think 
that the degree of uncertainty would significantly influence the political processes and 
decisions, and that economic analyses thus would treat uncertainty as a central feature. 
Nevertheless, the main perceptions about economic issues related to climate change and 
climate policy, for example as assessed and reported by IPCC (2001), are based on 
deterministic studies. This does not necessarily mean that the uncertainties have been 
ignored, but rather that this part of the economics literature is inconclusive. 
One possible explanation is that most of the climate change studies are based on 
numerical models. The uncertainties per se are therefore difficult to trace. Results 
derived from numerical models depend on assumptions about economic relationships 
such as damage and abatement cost functions, which are far from well known. It is 
therefore difficult to tell, for example, how better ability to predict temperature change 
in the future will affect current policy choices, unless we assume that we know all there 
is to know about possible climate change impacts and the costs of mitigation. This is 
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somewhat of a paradox, because the impact of learning is one of the main issues that 
have been studied in analyses of climate policy choice under uncertainty. 
Impacts from learning must be studied in a dynamic framework where decisions 
are taken sequentially. While a static problem gives a best solution once and for all, a 
dynamic problem aims at finding the best strategy under a given set of information. This 
is why learning becomes relevant: If uncertainty affects the decision, future 
amendments to information will change decisions in the future. Whether decisions of 
today are affected by future learning therefore depends on whether future decisions 
depend on present decisions, or, in the words of the option value literature, whether 
present decisions are irreversible. 
The alternative strategies can be illustrated schematically by Figure 1. This is a 
two-period decision tree with alternative strategy paths. The dotted paths in the middle 
represent static expected utility maximization without learning. According to this 
strategy, at time t = 0 (the first decision node) we choose abatement levels based on a 
weighted sum of the probabilities of states (our expectations). The probabilities are 
formed in accordance with our beliefs. If damages turn out to be high, we get the net 
benefit of HEUB ; and if they turn out to be low, we get
L
EUB . The outer branches represent 
sequential decision paths: At time t = 0 we have to decide which state we perceive as 
the most likely, and choose our first period abatement level accordingly. Either way we 
risk making the wrong guess. The state is, however, now revealed at time t = 1. This 
means that if we initially made the wrong guess we can now adjust our abatement effort 
according to the new available information. If we guess the state of damages to be low 
at t = 0 (the left hand side in figure 1), the net benefit is LRB if we are correct and LWB  if 
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Figure 1: Alternative decision strategy paths 
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we are wrong. If we guess the state of damages to be high, the net benefit is HRB  if we 
are right and HWB  if we are wrong. Regardless of our choice of path, we get a lower 
benefit if we make the wrong guess because the level of first period abatement
 
is not 
chosen optimally.29 
Such a sequential decision-making process aims to identify short-term strategies 
in the face of long-term uncertainties. The next several decades will offer many 
opportunities for learning and mid-course corrections. The relevant question is not 
                                                 
29
 The benefits in Figure 1 are in arbitrary order. Generally we can only say that HRB >
H
WB  and 
L
RB >
L
WB . 
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“What is the best course of action for the next 100 years?”, but rather “What is the best 
course for the near-term given the long-term objective?” (IPPC 2001).  
There is a vast amount of ongoing research aimed at improving our 
understanding of the implications of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. We 
will therefore learn more about the problem in the future, and most likely the scientific 
background for climate policy will improve. To the extent that learning has an influence 
on decision making, it should therefore be taken into account also in current climate 
policy choice.  
However, a better understanding of climate change issues does not necessarily 
mean less uncertainty. The connection between uncertainty and the state of knowledge 
is illustrated by comparing reports from the UN Intergovernmental Panel of Climate 
Change (IPCC). The Second Assessment Report (IPCC 1995) estimates that a doubling 
of CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere (2 x CO2) will lead to a global mean 
temperature increase between 1.8 ºC and 4.2 ºC. In the Third Assessment Report (IPCC 
2001), the possible range of the future increase in global mean temperature increased to 
between 1.4 ºC and 5.6 ºC. The reason for the increase in uncertainty is improved 
knowledge in the underlying science linking greenhouse gas emissions to atmospheric 
accumulation and global temperature change. A better and more precise description of 
the relationships between policy, economic and human development and emissions, on 
the one hand, and atmospheric processes, on the other, improved the consistency 
between the scenarios in the Third Assessment Report (TAR), and resulted in a wider 
range of possible outcomes. 
The Third Assessment Report was the first to also indicate the degree of 
uncertainty associated with its predictions by stating the degree of confidence the 
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leading authorities in the field of climate change report with their forecasts, ranging 
from ‘very high’ (≥95%) to ‘very low’ (≤5%). Most of its findings are assigned a 
probability ranking (see the TAR or e.g. Heal and Kriström (2002) for more details). 
Even though improved knowledge may not reduce the total uncertainty in the future, the 
aspect of learning is still important, simply because some of the uncertainty is resolved 
as time goes by. Just as it is easier today to predict the climate in 2010 than in 2100, it 
will be easier in 2090 than it is today to predict the climate in 2100.  
 
Figure 2. Spot prices for Saudi light (1970–1979) and Brent Blend (1980–2000) in 
nominal prices and real 1990 prices30. 
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To illustrate this more or less passive way of learning, consider the price of 
crude oil over the past 30 years. In the wake of oil price hikes in the 1970s, significant 
effort was put into forecasting the oil price around 1980. Forecasts were based on 
                                                 
30
 Sources: Aslaksen et al. (1990) and Statistics Norway (2003) 
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uncertainty and Hotelling’s rule,31 which predicted an increase in the price of 
exhaustible resources, such as petroleum.  
Figure 2 shows the actual development of oil prices from 1970 to 2000. Most 
forecasts of the trend made in the early 1980s were found in the upper half of the area 
between the dotted lines, typically in the range between US$ 35 and US$ 55, in real 
terms.32 Thus, most pessimistic (low price) forecasts turned out to be far too optimistic. 
However, one cannot claim that oil price changes are better understood today than they 
were 20 years ago. It may be granted that the importance of the Hotelling rule was 
exaggerated, but this is also a result of past observations. Therefore, a forecast for the 
year 2000 made the year before with the same uncertainty had, of course, a much higher 
probability of being correct than a forecast made in 1980. The main point is that short-
term predictions are more accurate than long-term predictions, since learning occurs 
along the way, regardless of whether the uncertainty has decreased. 
One may expect that gradual resolution of uncertainty will be considered the 
main source of learning in the climate policy process, at least in the foreseeable future. 
Some of the uncertainty may be irreducible in principle, and hence decision makers will 
have to continue to take action under significant degrees of uncertainty. Thus, the 
problem of climate change evolves as a subject of risk management in which strategies 
should be reformulated as new knowledge arises (IPPC 2001).  
 
                                                 
31
 See e.g. Hanley et al (1997) for a description of Hotelling’s rule. 
32
 Lorentsen et al. (1985) denotes by US$ 20 a ‘collapse price scenario.’ 
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3. Irreversibilities and option values 
This section analyses the abatement decision taken by an agent subject to uncertainty 
both in benefits of mitigating climate change (damages prevented) and in abatement 
technology investment costs. We will concentrate on irreversibility in one of these 
variables at a time to see how both types of irreversibility affect the optimal solution. 
We start with a presentation of the general two-period model with uncertainty and 
learning. Then, we analyze the case of climate irreversibility, which corresponds to the 
traditional option value discussion (Arrow and Fisher, and Henry). Next, we look at 
how investment irreversibility may affect the solution.  
 
3.1 A two-period model with a binary distribution of outcomes 
We consider climate policy over two periods, ‘the present’ and ‘the future.’ We do not 
discount ‘the present’, hence this is referred to as period 0, and ‘the future’ is referred to 
as period 1. Without abatement, emissions of greenhouse gases are fixed in both periods 
and denoted e0 and e1, in the initial and future time periods, respectively. Abatement 
may be invoked in either period at costs of a0 and a1, respectively. The abatement cost 
per unit of emissions cut, ct, is assumed to be independent of scale in each period. 
Hence, the actual abatement is a0/c0 in period 0 and a1/c1 in period 1.  
The emissions of greenhouse gases in period t can then be written as [et  -  at/ct].  
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These add to the previous level of concentrations of greenhouse gases, denoted by yt-1. 
Then, the development in atmospheric concentration33 can be written yt = yt-1 + et – 
at/ct. For the two specific periods we have: 
   
0
0
00 ˆ
c
a
eyy −+= , (1) 
 
1
1
101
c
a
eyy −+= , (2) 
where the historical level of concentrations, ŷ, is assumed known.  
Assume, moreover, that the relationship between concentrations and economic 
damages has a logarithmic form, with an exponent larger than one.34 Without loss of 
generality, we choose a quadratic damage function for the sake of simplicity, f(yt) = 
αyt2, where α is a constant.  
Recall that the periodic emissions levels are exogenously given. The benefits of 
abatement can thus be expressed by the damage avoided. For the initial period, this is 
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where q0 is the price on damages or the willingness to pay for avoiding them in period 
0. Similarly, the benefits of abatement in the future can be written, 
 
                                                 
33
 Note that concentrations are usually measured in terms of parts per million or billion by volume (ppmv 
and ppbv respectively), whereas emissions are measured in tons. We therefore convert emissions to 
concentration units and calculate costs in corresponding terms. 
34
 The usual choice in economic studies is somewhere between 2 and 3. See e.g. Aslaksen (1990) for a 
discussion on the choice of exponent. 
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To simplify the formalization, we will in the following normalize the value of damages 
and thus set  q0 = q1 = 1.  
 In the initial period, there is certainty about present costs and benefits but uncertainty 
about the state in period 1 (the future). Furthermore, assume that learning takes place 
during the initial period, such that the decisions in the future are adjusted according to 
this new information. Since we simplify the problem to look at two periods, this is 
modeled as if the future decisions are made under full certainty. However, when we 
assume that the uncertainties resolve in the future, we refer only to the information 
revealed since we made the initial policy decision. In real life there will be substantial 
uncertainty remaining also in the future.  
When deciding upon abatements, we take into account that our initial decisions 
will influence future benefits. We simplify the uncertainty by considering only two 
future states of the world: low damages (state A) and high damages (state B). Denote by 
π the probability of state A. 
 
A standard expected utility maximizing agent determines 
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where E is the expectations operator over possible outcomes, and r is the discount rate. 
Note that, so far, we have not taken any kind of irreversibility into account. That is, the 
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solution to this problem gives the optimal policy, from the initial-period perspective, 
when there are no other restrictions.  
 
Inserting for b(yt) we can write the welfare function as  
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 Assume that the  damage cost function  has a quadratic form 2)( tt yyf α=  and that 
uncertainty in period 1 is characterized by two states, A and B with a vector of 
outcomes, x = ( α1 , c1).such that  
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Then, the first order condition for abatement in period 0 can be written as:
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where αi is the initial damage per unit concentration, that is, the damage of an increase 
in concentrations by, for example, 1 ppmv carbon from “today” if the present damage is 
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zero. The term t
t
t y
c
α2
 is the marginal damage per euro of abatement when the 
concentration level is yt. This term may be interpreted as the shadow price of 
concentrations at level yt, and because of the quadratic damage function it is linear in 
the level of concentrations.  
 
Similarly, the first order condition for abatement in the future period can be written as: 
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Equations (7) and (8) imply that the marginal expected value of the concentrations in 
each period should be equal to 1, which is the marginal cost of abatement in value 
terms.  
 
In order to simplify the expressions further, define the following constants: 
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C0 and C1 are both expressions for the expected marginal damage per euro abatement 
minus the unit cost of abatement (= 1) at a business as usual concentration. The 
difference is that C0 take in hand both periods, while C1 only applies to period 1.  
Moreover, define  
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Фt (t = 0,1 ) can be interpreted as the contribution, at the margin, to total benefits from 
abatement in period t whereas Ψt can be interpreted as the contribution, at the margin, to 
total benefits at time t from abatement at time s (s = 0,1; s ≠ t). Thus, Ψ0 denotes the 
marginal present value in period 0 of the abatement that is planned carried out next 
period. This value includes both damages avoided and saved abatement costs due to 
undertaken investments. In the same manner Ψ1 denotes the marginal value in period 1 
of the abatement undertaken in period 0. 
The first order conditions can now be written as the linear equation system: 
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 10000 aaC Ψ+Φ= , (9) 
 11011 aaC Φ+Ψ= . (10) 
 
Equations (9) and (10) require that in optimum, the marginal damage should be equal to 
the marginal value of abatement in period i of the abatement scheme planned over both 
periods.  
The level and the distribution of abatement in the two periods can now be written as 
two linear functions in a0 and a1. We rewrite (9) and (10) and get 
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These two linear functions express the trade-off between abatement costs in the two 
periods. Thus, for period 0, a reduction of 1 € in present abatement cost, a0, must be 
replaced by an increase of ψ0/Ф0 € in period 1 in order to keep marginal costs equal to 
marginal benefits. For period 1, a 1 € reduction in period 0 must be replaced by 
increased abatement cost of Ф1/ψ1 € in period 1, if marginal costs are to be equal to 
marginal benefits.  
Note that the linearity between a0 and a1 applies regardless of the uncertainties 
involved. How the degree of uncertainty affects optimal abatement, or how uncertainty 
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in the damage costs affect the solution compared to the uncertainty in abatement costs 
can therefore be analysed by corresponding shifts in the parameters Ct, Фt and Ψt. In 
Appendix 1, we show how these parameters are affected by an increase in the 
uncertainties, and what the consequences are for the intersections and the slopes of the 
a1 = f(a0) lines. This provides a background for the discussions about the implications 
for the importance of the irreversibilities below. 
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal allocation of abatement costs in the two periods. 
The curves correspond to (11) and (12) and represent all abatement allocations whereby 
marginal costs equal marginal benefits. That is, the period 0 curve shows all 
combinations of a0 and a1 that satisfy the first order condition for period 0, and the 
period 1 curve shows all combinations that satisfy the first order condition for period 1. 
Where the curves intercept, both conditions are satisfied simultaneously.  
Abatement costs for period 0 start at a lower level and increase at a lower rate 
compared to the line for period 1. From the definitions of the constants we have that 
ψ0/Ф0 < Ф1/ψ1, unless there is large uncertainty in abatement costs (see Appendix 1). If 
so, the trade-off curve is steeper in period 1 than in period 0. Then, a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for interior solution is that C1/ψ1 > C0/Ф0. Alternatively, if Ф1/ψ1 < 
ψ0/Ф0 we must have C1/ψ1 < C0/Ф0 to obtain an interior solution. It follows from the 
definition of C1 and C0 that this depends on the relationship between damage costs and 
abatement costs in period 0 and period 1. ‘Corner solutions’ with abatement in only one 
period is possible, but the following discussion will be based on the case of interior 
solutions. Then a reduction in present abatement may be compensated by more 
abatement in the future.  
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 The optimal solution is found where the two lines intersect. Consider an allocation 
with abatement in period 0 only. Then the total benefit of abatement would be C0/Ф0. 
This value, however, would increase if some abatement were postponed to period 1. 
Reallocation from today until the future would, in fact, increase the total benefit of 
abatement until the two lines intersect. From this point on, further reallocation of 
abatement between the two periods will give lower total benefit. Intertemporal 
optimality is therefore attained at the intersection. 
 
Figure 3. Optimal allocation of abatement between the present and the future 
a1
a0
Period 1
Period 0
a1
a0
 
Changes in the parameters will affect total abatement, as well as the allocation 
between the periods. If q1α1 increases, the constants for abatement assigned to both 
periods increase, but more so in equation (12), which applies for the future (period 1), 
than in equation (11), which applies for the present (period 0). Also the multiplicative 
term in equation (11) increases, while the multiplicative term in equation (12) is 
unchanged. In sum, both total and future abatement increase compared with present 
abatement. An increase in the expected unit cost of future abatement does not affect the 
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constant term, but reduces the multiplicative term for period 0. The constant term for 
period 1 decreases, while the multiplicative term in period 1 increases. All these three 
shifts thus contribute to an allocation of abatement from the future to the present.  
An increase in the discount rate affects the abatement assigned to period 0 only 
in this model. The effect is that the present value of abatement in period 1 is reduced. 
This contributes to a reduction of the abatement in period 0. At the same time, 
abatement in period 1 becomes relatively less expensive. This tends to change the trade-
off between abatement in the two periods. Both effects reduce abatement in period 0. 
Some may be allocated to period 1, but the total amount is likely to be unchanged.35 
Changes in uncertainty on future beliefs will also affect optimal abatement in the 
two periods. One exception is the case where there is uncertainty in future damage costs 
only, while the future abatement costs are certain. Appendix 1 shows that all the above-
defined constants remain unaffected if the expected damage remains unchanged. 
However, if future damage costs are certain, but abatement costs for this period are not, 
we show in the appendix that the constants will increase. Except for the constant term in 
equation (11), the terms in equations (11) and (12) will also be affected. The 
multiplicative term for period 0 increases, while both terms for period 1 decrease. All 
changes contribute to a reallocation of abatement from the present to the future. 
An illustration of the case with uncertain damages is given in Figure 4A. This is 
simply a more complicated version of Figure 3, where there is uncertainty regarding the 
position of the trade-off curves. Figure 4A displays two alternative trade-off curves 
between the abatement in period 0 (the present) and period 1 (the future): one pair 
representing state A (low future damage costs) where the optimal solution is a0A and 
                                                 
35
 Appendix 2 shows the changes in these parameters for a specific numerical example. 
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a1
A(right)
, and one pair representing state B (high future damage costs), where the optimal 
choice is a0B and a1B(right). These two solutions are to be considered the boundaries for 
the abatement choices. The rational decision maker would choose an allocation between 
the two extremes, based on his subjective probability distribution over states. For 
example, insertion of the parameters in equations (11) and (12) gives the best ex ante 
allocation of abatement investments for the expected utility maximizer. 
 
Figure 4A. Optimal abatement allocation when damage costs are uncertain 
a1
a0
a1B(right)
a0B
a0A
a1A(right)
Period 1
Period 0
 
Because of uncertainty, the initial period decision is based on guesses about the 
future state of the world and the amount of next period abatement. If learning takes 
place (uncertainty is lessened) before the final decision for the next period, the decision 
maker may want to make adjustments to her beliefs in period 0. Irreversibilities place a 
constraint upon these adjustments which will be addressed below, but let us first take a 
closer look simply at the costs of policy adjustments.  
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As a benchmark, assume that the initial period decision is based exclusively on beliefs 
about either state A (the lower pair of trade-off curves) or B (the upper pair of trade-off 
curves) in Figure 4A, and not on maximization of expected utility. Furthermore, assume 
that one of these states is realized in period 1. If the guess is right, future abatement (a1) 
will be chosen as predicted. If the guess is wrong, however, period 1 abatement should 
be adjusted according to the new information. Since the choice of initial period 
abatement (a0) was conditioned upon a guess about a1, the benefits will be higher when 
the guess is right. The situation for when the guess is as wrong as it can get is illustrated 
in Figure 4B. Here we put all our eggs in one basket, but after learning we wish we had 
put them in the other. The best abatement solutions after learning that the guess was 
wrong are marked a1A(wrong) and a1B(wrong,) respectively (see below for explanations).  
Recall that each curve represents abatement allocations that satisfy the period’s 
first order condition for optimal abatement, and that the social loss of guessing wrong 
can be measured in present value terms. According to the objective function (6), this can 
be measured by differences in initial (period 0) abatement costs. In Figure 4B these 
losses are indicated by the two vertical lines to the left of the a0-axis. The black dotted 
line represents the loss incurred when the wrong guess was the high damage cost 
scenario, and the grey one the loss for when the wrong guess was the low cost 
alternative, and in both cases the other extreme was learned to be the real state of the 
world. The explanation goes as follows:  
Start with supposing we based our decision solely on state B; the high damage 
cost scenario. Then the initial period choice of abatement cost was a0B. Suppose further 
that at the start of the next period we discover that damage costs are instead low. Thus, 
now we wish we had chosen a0A initially, but since we cannot move back in time, this is 
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no longer a possible option. For the optimality condition to hold for period 1, abatement 
cost must be on the period 1 trade-off curve for state A, and the best move is to choose 
a1
B(wrong)
. This is a reduction compared with our initial guess for period 1 abatement, 
and the social loss of guessing wrong can be measured by the difference between the a0 
value where a1B(right) crosses the trade-off curve for period 0 in scenario A and the a0  
 
Figure 4B. Cost of guessing wrong under damage cost uncertainty 
 
a1
a0
a1A(wrong)a1A(right)
a0B
a0A
a1B(wrong) a1B(right)
Period 1
Period 0
 
 
value that was chosen, namely a0B. This social loss is thus the difference between what 
we thought our initial abatement was worth and what it turned out to be worth according 
to the information received. Since we abated too much in period 0, the initial abatement 
Essay no. 2: Option Values and the Timing of Climate Policy 
 
 
 104 
is worth less than we thought. The loss is illustrated by the black dotted line along the 
a0-axis.  
Suppose instead that the initial guess is state a; the low damage cost scenario. 
The period 0 abatement cost choice is then a0A. Suppose further that at the start of the 
period 1, we discover that costs instead are high. Since the optimal allocation for state B 
is no longer attainable, the best we can do is to satisfy the optimality condition for 
period 1, given this new information. In this situation we abated too little initially and 
have to compensate by abating more than we thought we would in period 1. The best 
choice is a1A(wrong). The social loss of guessing wrong, in this case, can be measured as 
the difference between a0A and the a0 –value where a1A(wrong) intersects with the trade-off 
curve for period 0 in state B. The loss is illustrated by the grey dotted line along the a0-
axis in Figure 4B. 
 
3.2 Irreversible emissions of greenhouse gases. 
So far, we have imposed no restriction on possible abatement in each period. Since 
emissions of greenhouse gases are considered irreversible, however, abatement in each 
period cannot exceed the emissions in that period. This gives the constraint  
 
 111 eca
∗∗ ≤  (13) 
 
where c*1 is the actual unit costs in period 1 and a1* is the optimal abatement cost in 
this period. (Note that both c1 and e1 are exogenous.) If the decision in the initial period 
was based on a prediction of higher future abatement than c1*e1, the optimal solution 
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cannot be achieved. If future emissions are low or uncertainty is large, or both, there 
will be a positive probability for encountering this irreversibility constraint. The lower 
we set present abatement, the higher is this probability, and an extra value thus attaches 
to the choice of high initial abatement. This is the option value of early abatement.  
Assume that there is uncertainty in the damage costs only and that these turn out 
to be higher than expected. Initial abatement was then lower than optimal, when 
evaluated in hindsight. A relative loss has therefore occurred and adjustments are 
needed. In this case abatement will have to be adjusted upwards, something that can 
cause a violation of the maximum abatement constraint (13). If (13) is violated, the 
optimal level of abatement for period 1 is not attainable, the climate irreversibility 
constraint is binding, and the best we can do is to choose the maximum level of 
abatement.  
The option value of early abatement is illustrated in Figure 4C.  The maximum 
period 1 abatement (a1max) is illustrated by the vertical solid line. Suppose, as a 
benchmark, we choose the most conservative ‘wait-and-see’ strategy and base our initial 
period decision solely on low damages (state A). Suppose further that we learn that 
damages instead are high (sate B). We then would prefer to choose abatement costs 
equal to a1A(wrong) . This point is, however, to the right of a1max. Since we cannot choose 
an abatement cost level that is higher than the maximum, the climate irreversibility 
constraint is binding. The second best solution is thus not reachable, and the best we can 
do under these circumstances is to choose a1 equal to a1max. The social loss from 
guessing wrong is represented by the grey line along the a0-axis, where the solid 
segment represents the option value, and the dotted segment represents adjustment 
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costs36. Thus, the loss imposed if the climate irreversibility constraint is encountered 
adds to the costs of the ‘ordinary’ adjustments to resolved uncertainty. The black dotted 
line to the left of the a0-axis is the same as in Figure 4B and represents the loss for the 
benchmark case when the most expansive ‘early action’ policy is chosen and we learn 
that we should have chosen the most conservative ‘wait-and-see’ strategy. 
 
Figure 4C. Cost of guessing wrong under climate irreversibility 
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In the special case of figure 4C, if wrong, the total cost of assuming low 
damages exceeds the total cost of assuming high damages, but this depends on the 
dimension of the option value of early abatement. The option value depends on the 
                                                 
36
 The graphic representations shows the relative, rather than the actual, size of the different costs linked 
to the three uncertainty effects studied. 
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probability of encountering the climate irreversibility constraint, which depends on 
a1
max
, and the maximum possible abatement depends on the periodic emissions, which 
are exogenously given. In the special case of Figure 4C, the irreversibility constraint 
will be encountered under high damage costs if the policy in period 0 is based on low 
damage costs. Note that a1A(wrong) represents the maximum possible abatement that the 
decision maker might want to choose in period 1. Hence, if a1max is to the right of 
a1
A(wrong)
, there is no option value of early abatement. As pointed out in the introduction 
this is the case in Kolstad (1996b), where he does not have a binding climate 
irreversibility constraint in the parameterization of his model. This means that there is 
no option value of early abatement, and the climate irreversibility therefore, by 
assumption, has no impact on decisions, something that makes his conclusion rather 
obvious. 
If instead the damage costs turn out to be lower than initially expected, one 
could think of a situation where it is optimal to emit more than e1. This constraint does 
not depend on the initial period decision, but the likelihood of encountering it is of 
course higher with higher initial levels of abatement. 
Recall that the rational decision maker will choose an abatement allocation 
between the two extremes discussed above. Figure 4D illustrates the option value when 
the decision is based on expected utility maximization. Compared to Figure 4C, the 
trade-off curves for state A and B are now dotted. The solid lines in between are the 
ones that apply for expected utility maximization with equal probabilities (π = 0.5). The 
optimal ex ante solution is a0Exp and a1Exp.   
The social losses of guessing wrong are represented by the vertical lines to the 
left of the a0-axis. Again we look at the most serious mistakes possible. First, take the 
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case where we learn at the end of period 0 that the state of the world is low damage 
costs (state A).  Since we cannot do anything about our period 0 abatement cost choice, 
we must compensate by lowering the period 1 abatement cost until the first order 
condition for this period is satisfied, namely to a1A in Figure 4D.  The loss can be 
measured as the difference between a0Exp and the a0 value at the point where a1A crosses 
the period 0 trade-off curve for state B. It is represented by the black dotted line to the 
left of the a0-axis. 
 
Figure 4D. Cost of guessing wrong under expected utility maximization 
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Second, suppose instead that we learn that the state of the world is high damage costs 
(state B). We then wish we had done more initially, and this must be compensated for 
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by increasing future abatement. To satisfy the first order condition for period 1, we must 
choose a1B. This level is, however, not attainable since it is to the right of a1max. The best 
we can do then is to choose period 1 abatement equal to a1max. The cost of guessing 
wrong is represented in the figure by the grey line to the left of the a0-axis, where the 
solid segment represents the option value and the dotted segment represents the 
adjustment cost. 
How the option value of climate irreversibility is affected by the degree of 
uncertainty in damages and abatement costs is found by investigating the resulting shifts 
in the trade-off curves for state B (the upper pair in Figure 4D). In Appendix 1 we show 
that increased uncertainty in damage costs leads to an upward shift it the state B curves 
for both periods. This leads to an increase in the climate option value. The increase is, 
however, to some extent counteracted by the fact that the state B trade-off curve for 
period 0 becomes steeper, implying that the adjustment costs contribute a larger part of 
the total cost of guessing wrong, when damage costs increase. More uncertainty in the 
abatement costs also implies that the state B trade-off curve for period 0 and becomes 
gentler. The shift in the trade-off curve for period 1 is ambiguous. However, since the 
strongest shift is in the trade-off curve for period 0, the cost of encountering the climate 
irreversibility constraint, the climate option value, decreases. 
To conclude so far, the option value of early abatement relates only to the costs 
of meeting the climate irreversibility constraint. Under a process of learning, additional 
costs will occur because of adjustments desired as a result of new information. In the 
model discussed here, the costs related to these adjustments depend on the slope and the 
position of the trade-off curves for the two periods. These positions depend on the 
choice of damage functions and abatement costs, and to which of these that are being 
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subject to uncertainty. For example, Figure 4 is restricted to uncertainty in damage 
costs. If abatement costs are uncertain, the slope of the trade-off curve for period 0 
becomes less steep for high costs without changing the intersection with the a1-axis. 
The trade-off curve for period 1 shifts downwards and becomes steeper. Therefore, 
whether a policy close to the ‘wait and see’ strategy, i.e. a policy that puts relatively 
more weight on state A, should be preferred to a policy close to ‘early action’, i.e. a 
policy that put relatively more weight on state B, or vice versa, or whether the optimal 
strategy is exactly in the middle, depends on the specification of the model. The only 
conclusion we can draw so far, unless a numerical study is carried out, is that the 
climate irreversibility imposes an option value to ‘early action’ strategies as long as 
there is a positive probability of encountering the climate irreversibility constraint. This 
is, however, not sufficient for recommending such a strategy. Compared to the case 
with equal probabilities, such a recommendation also requires that the climate option 
value exceeds the loss resulting from deviating from this strategy in period 0. On the 
other hand, a ‘wait-and-see’ policy can never be expected to do better than the equal 
probability strategy when there is climate irreversibility only. The expected cost of 
encountering the climate irreversibility constraint always is higher in a ‘wait-and-see’ 
policy option, unless additional restrictions are imposed. 
  
3.3 Irreversible abatement technology investments 
The model (1) to (4) assumes that the abatement level is set in each period, independent 
of previous actions. As Kolstad (1996a,b) and Ulph and Ulph (1995) point out, when 
focusing on the importance of irreversibility, it would be particularly inappropriate to 
disregard the fact that capital costs contribute to a large share of the costs of mitigating 
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climate change. Furthermore, these investments are to a large degree sunk and lock the 
economy into a particular use of resources, thereby representing an irreversible cost. 
Capital irreversibility is therefore modeled by letting the initial investment costs, a0/c0, 
adhere to the next period. Thus, compared to above the capital investments are 100 
percent irreversible which is a rather strong assumption, but chosen here to underscore 
the effects of capital irreversibility. Note that the interpretation of abatement 
investments is now somewhat different. One way of thinking about it is that the 
investment costs undertaken in period 0 only covers part of the total investment costs; 
that some of the costs, for instance in terms of interests and repayments, have to be paid 
in future periods. Equation (2) is replaced with 
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The capital irreversibility has two implications for future options, as long as a0 > 
0, because the initial abatement investment adheres to the next period. The maximum 
level of concentrations in the future is now reduced to  y0 + e1 – a0/c0 compared with y0 
+ e1 in the previous sections. Consequently, the climate option value, the value of 
keeping open the option of further increasing the abatement in the future, is reduced 
because the initial investment will lower the abatement also in the future. Second, this 
means that the maximum level of abatement in the future now also depends on the 
investment decision taken initially. In other words, a wrong guess in period 0 may lead 
to negative optimal abatement in period 1. Since negative abatement is not possible, an 
extra cost may occur in period 1 because of the positive probability of encountering this 
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capital constraint. Thus an extra value attaches to the ‘wait-and-see’ strategies that we 
choose to call the option value of late investments (investment option value). Inserting 
for (5) in the benefit function yields 
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which corresponds to equation (4) above.  
The introduction of capital irreversibility thus implies that the initial abatement 
becomes ‘twice as important’ compared to the case with climate irreversibility only. 
Apart from this, the model is unchanged. The optimal solution can, in principle, thus be 
discussed within the same framework as in section 4.1 and 4.2. However, with capital 
irreversibility, the constants C0, Ф0 and Ψ0 change to: 
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while the expressions for C1, Ф1 and Ψ1 are unaltered. Note that in this model, capital 
irreversibility with no depreciation implies only that the discount term 1/(1+r) is 
doubled. Ceteris paribus this leads to an allocation of abatement from period 1 to period 
0. Total abatement is, however, likely to decrease. (See the discussion in section 4.1.) 
Compared to Figure 4, the introduction of capital irreversibility leads to a 
positive shift in the trade-off curves for period 0, and they also become steeper, since 
Ψ0/Ф0 < Ψ0*/Ф0*. The probability of encountering the climate irreversibility constraint is 
thus lowered. Recall that this constraint is due to the restriction a1 ≥ 0; we cannot have 
negative abatement. The likelihood of encountering this constraint depends on the 
emissions under ‘business as usual’ in the future (e1- a0/c0).  
The option value of late investment is illustrated in Figure 5. If the decision in 
period 0 is based on expected utility maximization with equal probabilities, we choose 
a0
Exp
, expecting to choose a1Exp in period 1. If the low damage state occurs in period 1, it 
turns out that a0Exp was more than enough investment for both periods. The optimal 
choice, according to the new information, is to lower a1 until the low damage cost trade-
off curve for period 1 is reached (the state A curve), that is to Aa1 . In Figure 5 this point 
is to the left of the a0 axis and is not attainable due to the requirement of non-negative 
investments. The loss due to this overinvestment can be measured by the difference 
between the chosen policy, a0Exp, and the value of a0 where a1 = 0 crosses the low 
damage cost trade-off curve for period 0. The loss is indicated by the black bar along 
the a0 axis in Figure 5, where the option value of late investment represents the solid 
segment. 
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Figure 5. Cost of guessing wrong under irreversible investments and expected utility 
maximization 
a1
a0
a1B
Period 0
Period 1
a0Exp
a1Exp0a1
A
Investment option value {
 
  
Correspondingly, the loss when the high damage cost scenario is realized is the 
difference between the a0 –value at the point were a1B crosses the trade-off curve for 
period 0 in the high damage cost state and a0Exp. This is indicated by the grey dotted line 
to the left of the a0 axis in Figure 5. 
The effects from changes in the uncertainties in damage costs and abatement 
costs on the interception point of the state A trade-off curves with the a0-axis affect the 
investment option value. We show in Appendix 1 that an increase in the uncertainty 
related to damages, implies that the interception point of the state A curve with the a0 -
axis for both periods shift downwards. This leaves open the question of whether it 
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increases the investment option value. If the uncertainty in abatement costs increases, 
however, the interception of the period 0 curve shifts downwards, while the change in 
the interception point for period 1 is ambiguous. The investment option value is 
therefore likely to increase. 
Note that we cannot say whether it is the climate irreversibility constraint or the 
investment irreversibility constraint that represent the larger ex ante costs. This depends 
on the choice of parameters, and the ‘business as usual’ emissions, e0 and e1. However, 
if the uncertainty in damage costs increases, we can say for sure that the climate option 
value increases, but the effect on the investment option value is ambiguous. With 
reasonable choices of parameters, however, an increase in the uncertainty of abatement 
costs will increase the investment option value, but tends to decrease the climate option 
value. 
 It may be noted, however, that a doubling of the discount factor to account for 
the investment irreversibility represents the maximum possible implication of this 
irreversibility, namely for the case where the rate of capital depreciation is zero, which 
is equivalent to the case analyzed in Kolstad (1996b). Introducing depreciation would 
reduce this term to somewhere between 1 and 2, depending on the rate of depreciation. 
If the periods under consideration are 20–25 years or more, the term is probably close to 
1, which would be equivalent to the case analyzed by Arrow and Fisher, and Henry 
discussed in Section 4.2. Note, however, that climate irreversibility is also subject to 
‘depreciation’ but the time perspective is substantially longer. The concentrations of 
CO2, for example, are reduced by 2/3 over a period of 150–200 years, and 10 percent of 
emissions will remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years.   
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Thus, within the framework of this model, considering the time perspective of 
the global warming problem, the introduction of irreversibility in investments is not 
likely to have large impact. In principle, the requirement for an option value of early 
abatement to arise is similar to the case of reversible damage costs. However, the 
investment irreversibility scales down the future climate effects in the same way as an 
increase in the discount factor would. This implies that the possible cost of choosing a 
too low initial level of abatement is smaller. The conclusion is nevertheless similar: 
whether a possible climate option value of early abatement affects policy making 
depends on the degree of climate irreversibility, but this effect is reduced the more 
irreversible the investments. This last effect is, however, smaller the longer the time 
periods we make decisions for. We interpret this as having two option values that point 
in different directions, and whether the preferred policy option is an ‘early action’ or a 
‘wait and see’ strategy depends on the relative size of these option values plus the 
possible adjustment costs. If the sum of the climate option value plus the adjustment 
costs due to too low initial abatement exceeds the sum of the investment option value 
plus the adjustment costs due to too high initial abatement, the net option value is 
positive, the climate irreversibility effect dominates, and ‘early action’ policies should 
be preferred. This shows that it is not possible to advocate either an ‘early action’ or 
‘wait-and-see’ strategy merely on the basis of the existence of irreversibilities, nor on a 
direct comparison of option values. The additional expected adjustment costs resulting 
from deviations from traditional expected utility maximization, which ex ante are 
always non-negative, must also be considered. 
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4. Decision criteria 
The question of irreversibilities in climate change policy has traditionally been 
addressed in an expected utility framework. In fact, all the papers cited above use this 
framework, and this literature indicates that climate irreversibilities should not have too 
much impact on the design of climate policy. It would be interesting to reconsider this 
result under alternative decision criteria. The discussion of figures 4A, B, and C was not 
tied to the principle of expected utility maximization. Hence, the figures could be used 
to consider implications of the use of alternative decision criteria that are based on the 
economic principle of equalizing marginal costs and benefits, given beliefs about future 
states of the world. We will in this section indicate briefly how this could be analyzed in 
the framework of this paper, saving the in-depth analysis for our future work.  
The complexity of global warming makes it impossible to completely overlook 
the consequences of alternative choices. One might therefore ask whether this problem, 
which exhibits such severe forms of uncertainty, should be analyzed in a framework of 
ignorance, or at least partial ignorance. Theories of rational behavior under complete 
ignorance can be found for example in Arrow and Hurwicz (1972). Non-probabilistic 
criteria build on such a notion of ignorance. Critics of these criteria have put forward 
that the decision maker must at least have some vague partial information about the true 
state of nature (Luce and Raiffa 1957). The question remains, however, if this vague 
partial information is sufficient to assign subjective probabilities to the possible states of 
the world. 
In Bretteville (2004) and Aaheim and Bretteville (2001), we examine the 
implication of the choice of a number of different decision criteria within a static setting 
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for abatement investments. We found that the choice of criterion to a large degree will 
influence policy choice and is therefore a political question. It is therefore very 
interesting to examine how the inclusion of timing of policy, irreversibilities, and the 
possibility for learning may change the conclusions from a static analysis of climate 
policy. 
The most well-known non-probabilistic criterion is perhaps the maximin 
principle (Rawls 1971). This principle implies maximization of the welfare in the worst 
possible case, and essentially it allows risk aversion to become infinite. It has been 
claimed that the conservatism of the maximin principle makes good sense in the context 
of climate irreversibility. Chevé and Congar (2002), for instance, argue that maximin is 
consistent with the precautionary principle. However, knowing the actual nature of the 
worst case is problematic. Another problem with the maximin principle is that the worst 
case might be a catastrophe of such dimensions that deciding between policy options 
might have no significant impact on the outcome. A third problem is that the conclusion 
depends on what you define as the worst case. 
Applied to the problem of climate change, the maximin criterion can be 
interpreted as choosing the level of abatement that maximizes the social welfare in the 
worst possible state of the world. In the context of this paper, the worst state would 
mean that the decision in period 0 is based on both high damages and high abatement 
costs. If there is uncertainty attached to policy effectiveness, ‘early action’ cannot be 
rationalized as the appropriate maximin strategy because the worst case scenario would 
be to implement a costly remedial policy that fails to avert severe damages. Bouglet and 
Vergnaud (2000) analyzes the maximin criterion in a context of irreversibility theory 
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and concludes that it does not necessarily lead to more flexible decisions than expected 
utility maximization. 
Minimax regret (/risk/loss), suggested by Savage (1951) as an improvement on 
the maximin criterion, aims at minimizing the difference between the best that could 
happen and what actually does happen. The decision-maker tries to minimize possible 
regrets for not having, in hindsight, made the superior choice. In this global warming 
example, it can be interpreted as choosing the strategy that minimizes the difference in 
benefits between guessing right and wrong. This is easily connected to the discussion in 
Section 4. We found that the effect of a possible option value of early abatement on the 
maximum regret is less the more irreversible investments are, but this last effect is 
smaller the longer the time horizon. The possible mistake of choosing a too low level of 
abatement in the initial period is thus reduced compared to the case with climate 
irreversibility only. The preferred policy option depends on the relative size of the two 
option values and the possible adjustment costs. If the sum of the climate option value 
and the adjustment costs due to too low initial abatement exceeds the sum of the 
investment option value and the adjustment costs due to too high initial abatement, the 
net option value is positive, and the maximum regret is minimized by choosing  ‘early 
action’  over a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy.37  
 It is obvious from the discussion above that the probability distribution over 
states will influence the net option value, and thus the preferred policy.  Our model 
supposes two future scenarios. This can be interpreted as picking two of all the possible 
scenarios – one in the low cost range and one in the high cost range – or it could be 
                                                 
37
 Chevé and Congar (2002), however, claims that the minimax regret criterion is not consistent with the 
precautionary principle. 
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interpreted as some sort of a mean or median in the two groups. Out model can thus be 
used as a framework for analyzing the Generalized Maximin/Maximax criterion, also 
known as the pessimism-optimism index criterion of Hurwicz (1951). This criterion 
states that the level of abatement should be chosen in order to maximize a weighted 
average of the net benefit in the best and the worst state. The size of the pessimism-
optimism index (the weight) should reflect the decision-maker's beliefs about the 
probabilities of facing different future states of the world. Whether the net option value 
is positive or negative with this criterion depends on the choice of focus, which states 
we choose as the worst and the best, and also the choice of weight. If the states in focus 
are the same as in the discussion above, the conclusions are, of course, unchanged.
  
 Another criterion mentioned in the literature on decision-making under 
ignorance is the principle of insufficient reason, first formulated by Bernoulli in the 
17th century. This criterion states that if there is no evidence leading us to believe that 
one event is more likely to occur than another, the events should be judged equally 
probable. In our model we have two possible scenarios, A and B, and they should thus 
each be assigned a probability of 0.5. In our two-period model with uncertainty and 
learning, this means that when we decide on the initial abatement we treat the two 
scenarios as equally likely, and when we decide on future abatement we have acquired 
new information and can adjust our emissions accordingly. If state B really is a low-
probability extreme event, it would be weighted too heavily relative to the weight we 
would assign to it if we had had enough information to apply expected utility 
maximization. The occurrence of B is fortunate because then we are more likely able to 
increase our abatement sufficiently to avoid most of the damage. If the future optimal 
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abatement turns out to be higher than the maximum, the climate irreversibility 
constraint will be encountered. If B does not occur, which is the most likely outcome, 
we did too much in the initial period and would thus like to increase emissions after 
learning the true state of nature. If future optimal abatement is less than zero, the 
investment irreversibility constraint is encountered. 
    Combinations of probabilistic and non-probabilistic criteria are also possible 
candidates for decision-making. The limited degree of confidence criterion is one 
example. It implies that we maximize a weighted sum of the expected utility criterion 
and the maximin criterion. The weight reflects the degree of confidence in the 
underlying probability distribution. In the case of full confidence, the weight is equal to 
1 and the expected utility criterion is used, whereas under complete uncertainty the 
weight is equal to 0 and the maximin decision rule is applied. Lange (2003) compares 
expected utility with this criterion in a two-period model. He finds that more weight on 
the worst case (less weight on EU) may lead to increased first-period emissions and that 
the irreversibility effect holds if and only if the value of learning is negative.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Because of the irreversibilities related to climate change, a question arises of 
whether a more environmentally cautious policy (a policy based on beliefs of high 
future damages), could yield a higher expected benefit than a decision based on 
expected values. This depends on three factors: first, the size of the climate option 
value; second, the size of the investment option value; and third, the possible loss from 
deviating from traditional maximization of expected utility (meaning option values are 
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disregarded). The net option value must thus exceed the expected value of this loss if a 
cautious initial policy is to be preferred.  
The model discussion showed that whether the social loss of an ‘early action’ 
policy exceeds the social loss of choosing a ‘wait and see’ strategy, in the case of 
climate irreversibility only (the Arrow and Fisher, and Henry case), depends on the 
option value of early abatement as well as the possible abatement choice adjustments 
resulting from initial period mistakes. The option value of early abatement (the climate 
option value) depends on the probability of encountering the climate irreversibility 
constraint, which depends on the size of the maximum abatement in the future.  
Including irreversibility in abatement investments (the Kolstad case) scales 
down the effects of climate irreversibility equivalent to the effect of an increase in the 
discount factor. Ceteris paribus this leads to an allocation of abatement from period 1 to 
period 0. Total abatement is, however, likely to go down. The possible mistake of 
choosing a too small abatement level in period 0 is reduced compared to the case with 
irreversibility only in emissions of greenhouse gases. We found that the effect of a 
possible climate option value on the policy choice should be less the higher the option 
value of late investments (the investment option value), but that this effect is smaller the 
longer the time horizon.  
The option values relates only to the costs of encountering the irreversibility 
constraints. Under a process of learning, additional costs will occur because of 
adjustments desired as a result of new information. The climate option value is realized 
only if the desired future abatement, after learning takes place, is higher than what is 
actually possible. Then the climate irreversibility constraint is binding. Similarly, the 
investment option value is realized if the desired abatement investment, after learning 
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takes place, is negative. Then the irreversibility constraint on investments is binding. 
The loss imposed when encountering the irreversibility constraints adds to the costs of 
the policy adjustments as a result of learning.  
Changes in the parameters will affect total abatement, as well as the allocation 
between periods. If the value of damages increases, total abatement goes up, and future 
abatement increases relative to present abatement. An increase in expected future 
abatement unit costs contributes to an allocation of abatement from the future to the 
present. An increase in the discount rate affects, in this model, only the abatement 
assigned to period 0 which is reduced. Some of the reduced abatement may be allocated 
to the future, but the total amount will most likely go down. Changes in uncertainty 
contribute for the most part to a reallocation of abatement from the present to the future. 
Choice of strategy in climate policy is not only a question of comparing costs, 
but also a choice of decision criterion. The choice of criterion will to a large degree 
influence policy choice and is therefore a political question. The model in this paper is 
applicable for analyzing and comparing alternatives to expected utility maximization. 
For example, if the choice between criteria is subject to a comparison between the 
required adjustment costs under extreme outcomes, the model can be used to attach 
relative numerical values to alternative strategies. This is a subject for future research. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSTANTS OF A MEAN-PRESERVING SPREAD OF RISK 
The constants on which the optimal solution is based are all subject to uncertainty in 
damage costs and abatement costs. Each constant will, however, be affected differently 
depending on which variable is subject to uncertainty. As a consequence, also the value 
of abatement will change when the policy is adjusted to account for new information, 
depending on the nature of this information. Below follows a discussion of how a mean-
preserving spread of risk will affect the constants defined in Section 4. This affects, in 
particular, how the abatement is adjusted when new information arrives in period 1.  
In general, the constants in Section 4 can be represented by three categories of 
expected values: 
 
  
BA xxEX )1( ππ −+= , (A1) 
 
which applies for all the constants when there is uncertainty only in the damage costs; 
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 BA yy
EX 1)1(1 ππ −+= , (A2) 
 
which applies for C1, Ψ0 and Ψ1 when there is uncertainty in the damage costs; and 
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which applies for Ф1 when there is uncertainty in the damage costs. 
A mean-preserving spread of risk means that dX = πdxA + (1-π)dxB = 0, or dxB = 
-π/(1-π) dxA. Hence, for (A1), dEX = 0 by definition. That is, the expected value is 
unaffected by a mean-preserving spread of risk in damage costs, if the abatement costs 
are certain. 
For (A2), we have: 
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Therefore, dEX is positive or negative depending on whether yA is higher or lower than 
yB. If we talk about a spread of risk, dyA will be negative if yA is lower than yB, and vice 
versa. Therefore, dEX will increase with ‘more’ uncertainty in the abatement costs. 
For (A3), we have: 
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Since a spread of risk means that dyA < 0 if yA is lower than yB and vice versa, dEX > 0 
when the uncertainty in abatement costs increases. 
Table A1 sums up the effects on the expected value of the six model constants 
from a mean preserving spread of risk in damage costs and abatement costs 
respectively: 0 denotes unaffected, 1 represents a first-order effect described in equation 
A2, and 2 the second order effect described in equation A3. 
 
Table A1 Effects on model constants from a mean preserving spread of risk. 
Constant Damage costs Abatement costs 
C0 0 0 
C1 0 1 
Φ0 0 0 
Φ1 0 2 
Ψ0 0 1 
Ψ1 0 1 
 
That is, a spread of risk in the damage costs does not affect the expected value of any of 
the constants, but a spread of risk in abatement costs does. From the effects on the 
constants, we can now discuss how the trade-off curves for state A, state B, and the 
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expected outcomes with equal probabilities are affected by a spread of risk. These are 
summarized in table A2. 
 
Table A2 Effects of a spread of risk on the trade-off curves 
Period 0 Period 1 Trade-off curve 
for: Interception 
with a0-axis 
Slope Interception 
with a0-axis 
Slope 
Damages 
uncertain 
    
Expected None None None None 
State A Down Gentler Down None 
State B Up Steeper Up None 
Abatement costs 
uncertain 
    
Expected None Steeper Down Steeper 
State A Down Steeper ? Steeper 
State B Up Gentler ? Gentler 
 
The effect on the climate option value from increases in uncertainty depends on 
the shifts in the trade-off curves for state B. The more uncertain the damage costs are, 
the higher will the sate B curves for both period 0 and period 1 be, thereby increasing 
the climate option value. The increase is, to some extent, counteracted by the increased 
steepness of the state B trade-off curve for period 0, implying that the adjustment costs 
contribute to a larger part of the total cost of guessing wrong. 
If the uncertainty in abatement costs increases, the state B trade-off curves 
become gentler. In addition, the curve for period 0 shifts upward while the shift in the 
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trade-off curve for period 1 is ambiguous. However, since the stronger shift is in the 
trade-off curve for period 0, the climate option value decreases. 
The cost of the investment option value can be read from the shifts in the 
interceptions of the state A trade-off curves with the a0-axis. An increase in the 
uncertainty in damages shifts the interception point of both periods’ trade-off curves 
downwards, leaving the effect on the investment option value open. If the uncertainty in 
abatement costs increases, however, the interception of the period 0 curve shifts 
downwards, while the change in the interception point for period 1 is ambiguous. The 
investment option value is thereby likely to increase. 
 
 
APPENDIX 2:  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
In this numerical example we have, as far as possible, tried to base the choice of 
parameters on assumptions that seem to be standard in studies of optimal climate policy. 
The simple structure of the model in this paper nevertheless implies that the results can 
only be considered as illustrations.  
Each period counts 25 years, making coverage of the period 2000 to 2050. We 
assume that the ‘business-as-usual’ emissions grow between 1.5 and 2.5 percent per 
year, proportional to the growth in GDP. What this implies for the exogenous variables 
e0 and e1 is not easy to say. This is because the model expresses emissions in units of 
concentrations, but it does not include a natural rate of decay in the concentrations. 
Hence, using the sum of emissions would, first, exaggerate the contribution to 
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concentrations, and second, disregard the fact that emissions contribute less to 
concentrations the higher the concentrations are. We have therefore replaced emissions 
with additions to concentrations in each period from the chosen emissions assumption. 
The natural decay was set to 1/250, which is an approximation of the CO2 decay rate in 
the long run. 
The unit cost of abatement is based on an assumption that reducing emissions by 
10 percent costs 0.75 percent of GDP. This is relatively high compared with other 
studies. For the damage costs, we assume 5 percent of GDP at a concentrations level of 
550 ppmv. Again, this is high. The reason for choosing an upper level for both is that 
we assume that the policy is to be implemented for the entire world, whereas most cost 
estimates apply for developed countries, assuming that only these countries abate under 
the allowance of trading and CDM engagement. 
The assumed unit cost of abatement corresponds to a cost lower than 0.5 
USD/tC. This is extremely low compared with estimates of marginal costs in other 
studies (see e.g. IPPC, 2001). The reason is that we assume a constant unit cost of 
abatement, which means that the cost represents the average, rather than marginal cost, 
which is usually reported. The damage resulting cost per unit of concentrations is 
approximately 2 USD/ppmv. Based on the assumption for the damage costs, the 
constant of the damage cost function was set to 0.0015. 
The base case for our numerical example is thus: 
y_hat e0 e1 c0 c1A c1B 
368 63 116 1.15 1.1 1.3 
 
q0alpha0 q1alpha1A q1alpha1B pi  r 
0.001 0.0015 0.0019 0.5 1.75 
Essay no. 2: Option Values and the Timing of Climate Policy 
 
 
 130 
 
To show how sensitive the abatement decisions are to changes in the exogenous 
variables, we have made some calculations based on variations in one variable at the 
time illustrated in the figures below. First we examine the implication of increasing q1α1 
in the damage function. Figure A shows how the sum of the abatement in the two 
periods change with changes in q1α1 for state A, which is the low damage scenario, for 
three different values of π. Recall that π is the probability of state A. 
FIGURE A 
Increasing q1LOW
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Similarily, Figure B shows the development in total abatement when q1α1 for state B 
increases. State B is the high damage cost scenario. 
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FIGURE B 
Increasing q1HI
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The next two figures show the how the allocation of abatement between the two 
periods, as well as the total amount of abatement, changes with q1α1 for state A (Figure 
C) and state B (Figure D) respectively, when the probability of state A is 0.5. 
FIGURE C 
Increased q1alpha1LOW: PI=1/2 a0, a1, SUM a
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FIGURE D 
Increased q1alpha1HI: PI=1/2 a0, a1, SUM a
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In the same fashion, we have computed changes in abatement when the 
abatement cost in period 1 increases, first in the low-cost scenario (A), and second for 
the high-cost scenario (B). Figures E and F show the development in total abatement in 
the two cases for three different values of π. 
FIGURE E 
Increasing c1LOW
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FIGURE F 
Increasing c1HI
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Figures G and H show the changes in total abatement and how abatement is allocated 
from period 1 to period 0 when the future abatement costs increase and the probability 
of state A is 0.5. 
FIGURE G 
Increased c1LO: PI=1/2 a0, a1, SUM a
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FIGURE H 
Increased c1HI: PI=1/2 a0, a1, SUM a
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1,
1
1,
2
1,
3
1,
4
1,
5
1,
6
1,
7
1,
8
1,
9
2,
0
a0 E(a1) PI=0,5 SUM a
  
Lastly we will show the implications on abatement decisions of changes in the 
discount rate. Figure I shows changes in total abatement for three different values of π. 
FIGURE I 
Increasing r
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Figure J shows the allocation abatement for π=0.5. When the discount rate increases 
abatement is allocated from the present to the future, while the total amount is constant. 
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FIGURE J 
Increased r: PI=1/2 a0, a1, SUM a
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Abstract 
This paper considers whether the climate change problem is better dealt with through 
regional cooperation than through a global treaty. Previous research suggests that, at 
best, a global treaty will achieve very little. At worst, it will fail to enter into force. 
Using a simple dynamic game-theoretic model, with weakly renegotiation proof 
equilibrium as solution concept, we demonstrate that two agreements can sustain a 
larger number of cooperating parties than a single global treaty, even when the cost of 
reducing emissions is the same. The model provides upper and lower bounds on the 
number of parties under each type of regime. It is shown that a regime with two 
agreements can Pareto dominate a regime based on a single global treaty. Thus, should 
the Kyoto Protocol not enter into force, cooperation based on regional agreements can 
be a good alternative. If Kyoto does enter into force, regional cooperation might be an 
option for future commitment periods. 
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1. Introduction 
No international regime on climate change will be fully effective without the 
involvement of countries that have not yet committed to reduce emissions levels under 
the Kyoto framework, such as China, India, other developing countries, the United 
States, and Australia. In this paper we argue that individual countries might have a 
greater incentive to join a regional agreement than a global one. Regional arrangements 
for climate control are thus more likely to enter into force than a single global treaty. 
Furthermore, we show that an arrangement with more than one agreement can also 
sustain a larger number of cooperating parties. A global agreement like the Kyoto 
Protocol (was intended to be), requiring agreement among a large number of countries, 
is therefore not necessarily the best way to effectively control emissions of greenhouse 
gases. 
There is speculation about possible U.S. interest in a regional climate 
arrangement that would include NAFTA members (Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States) and (perhaps) Australia.  While such an arrangement is complicated because 
Canada is still within the Kyoto agreement and Mexico is exempt as a developing 
country, a western hemispheric continental agreement could be facilitated by the North 
American Commission on Environmental Cooperation. This existing institutional 
framework could oversee and monitor implementation of a North American emissions 
trading region should one be established. It has also been suggested that the United 
States cannot afford “climate isolationism” and should join with China or other 
developing countries in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In either case, there are 
potential gains to the United States from extending emissions reduction possibilities 
beyond its borders, particularly in the form of an extended scope for emissions trading. 
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Regional cooperation on climate change is already taking place in the European 
Union (EU). In March 2000, the European Commission launched the European Climate 
Change Programme (ECCP) to coordinate the EU effort to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. This initiative has already resulted in ratification of Kyoto by the EU 
Commission in May 2002 and has implementation of an emissions trading scheme 
within the European Union scheduled for 2005. The EU-wide emissions trading system 
is intended not only to ensure that the EU achieves the eight percent cut in emissions by 
2008–2012 to which it is committed under the Kyoto Protocol, but also to reduce 
member nation abatement costs and lessen competitive impacts of achieving 
compliance. While the EU directive governs only trades within the region, it provides 
that the EU may enter into separate agreements with non-EU countries to extend the 
scope of emissions trading beyond the Union.  
Given the possibility of at least two regional climate policy arrangements and 
the likelihood of more in the future as developing countries commit to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, the next phase of the global accord for climate control might 
devolve into a series of more limited regional alliances, with global emissions trading 
among and within the regions. Previous research suggests that, at best, a global treaty 
will achieve very little and at worst, might fail to enter into force (e.g., Barrett 1999, 
2003; Carraro 1998). It is therefore interesting to consider whether multiple regional 
treaties might be more successful than a single global treaty.  
Using a simple dynamic game-theoretic model, we show that a regime based on 
two agreements can sustain a larger number of cooperating parties than a global treaty. 
This is true even when the cost of reducing emissions is the same for both types of 
regime. The model provides upper and lower bounds on the number of parties under 
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each regime. It is shown that a system with two agreements can Pareto-dominate a 
regime based on a global treaty. We conclude that, should the Kyoto Protocol not enter 
into force, cooperation based on regional agreements could be a good alternative. And 
even if Kyoto does enter into force, regional cooperation might still be an option for 
future commitment periods. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background 
and reviews the existing literature on the conditions for a global climate treaty. The 
third section compares these conditions to the conditions for regional climate 
agreements in a simple dynamic model. The fourth section briefly discusses the 
possibility that a regime based on regional agreements could actually be chosen in 
future negotiations over a new design for the international climate regime. The paper 
closes with some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Background and Literature Review 
Pure public goods provide non-rival and non-excludable benefits for a given (local, 
national, or international) set of agents. Climate change mitigation is a pure public good 
on a global scale. Each country’s emissions of greenhouse gases add to the world’s 
atmospheric stock and each country’s efforts will have only a minor impact on total 
global emissions. All parties thus have a strong incentive to free ride on other countries’ 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A good is said to be impurely public to the 
extent that benefits are either partially non-rival or partially non-excludable. If the 
benefits can be excluded at an affordable cost, then pseudo-market arrangements in the 
form of clubs can collect tolls or membership fees to finance the good, reducing 
incentives for free-rider behavior (Buchanan 1965; Mueller 1989). In the absence of an 
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exclusion mechanism, a real concern exists as to how countries will confront the 
incentive to free ride on the actions of others. In the extreme, no nation may act, but a 
more likely scenario is suboptimal provision by a few well-to-do countries (Olson 1965; 
Sandler 1998). 
There is a considerable body of literature addressing under-provision of global 
international pollution control41. One focus of this literature is the conditions leading to 
the formation of multilateral agreements or coalitions. A fundamental assumption is that 
international agreements must be self-enforcing since there is no supranational authority 
to enforce compliance (Barrett 1994). The main problem analyzed by these models is 
that a country can – at least temporarily – achieve net gains by free-riding, or by joining 
a smaller but more stable coalition. There are two types of incentive for free riding: the 
incentive for a country to not sign the agreement and thus benefit from the signatories’ 
abatement efforts; and the incentive for a signatory to violate commitments made in an 
agreement (non-compliance). Because of these free-rider incentives, there will generally 
be suboptimal equilibrium coalition structures in global pollution control (Finus and 
Rundshagen 2001). 
To be effective, an international treaty needs to specify a strategy that can deter 
free riding and enforce compliance.  Moreover, it must be in the best interest of each 
party to act in accordance with this strategy.  A strategy is credible if no country is 
worse off accepting the agreement (individual rationality) and no sub-coalition of two 
or more countries can achieve a higher joint payoff by concluding a partial agreement 
(collective rationality).  Furthermore, collective rationality implies that an equilibrium 
agreement must be renegotiation proof. In particular, it must be in the (collective) best 
                                                 
41
 Notable examples are Barrett (1991, 1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1992, 1993), Hoel (1992), and 
Tulkens (1979). 
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interest of other countries to insist that a non-compliant country be punished before 
cooperation can be resumed (Barrett 1997; Finus 2001). 
 International environmental agreement models differ with respect to the 
specification of the utility functions of governments and the stability concept they 
employ. However, they can roughly be divided into two groups – dynamic game models 
and reduced-stage game models (Finus and Rundshagen 2001). The dynamic game 
models typically assume an infinitely repeated game where governments agree on a 
contract in the first stage that has to be enforced in subsequent stages by using credible 
threats (e.g., Barrett 1994; 1997; 1999).42 Main results include that the allocation of 
abatement burdens crucially affects the success of international environmental 
agreements, that a grand coalition is unlikely to form, and that a sub-coalition may 
achieve more than the grand coalition. The reason for these results is that the larger the 
number of parties to an agreement (k), the greater the harm suffered by the k-1 other 
countries when they impose the punishment needed to deter a unilateral deviation, and 
consequently the less credible the threat. 
Reduced-stage game models depict coalition formation as a two-stage game. In 
the first stage, countries decide on coalition formation. In the second stage, they choose 
abatement levels and how the gains from cooperation will be distributed (e.g., Chandler 
and Tulkens 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Hoel 1992)). Some of these models 
define equilibria with both internal stability, meaning that no signatory has an incentive 
to leave the coalition, and external stability, meaning that no non-signatory wants to 
accede to the agreement. A key result is that the number of signatories generally falls 
                                                 
42
 Note that it is generally easier to sustain cooperation in infinitely repeated games than in finitely 
repeated games. 
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short of the grand coalition. Often, the equilibrium coalition is rather small. A second 
result is that the coalition typically achieves results far from the social optimum.43  
Other reduced stage models (Bloch 1997; Carraro 1998; 1999; 2000; Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1998; and Siniscalco 1999) have addressed the possibility of giving 
countries the freedom to negotiate more than one climate agreement, much in the same 
way as the international trade regime allows countries to be parties to both regional and 
global agreements. A two-stage coalition game is used to show that when more than one 
coalition is possible, the equilibrium coalition structure that endogenously emerges from 
the negotiation process is characterized by several coalitions. It has also been shown 
that social welfare can be higher with multiple agreements than with a single global 
accord. Below we analyze the question of global versus regional agreements in an 
infinitely repeated game framework. Our results support the conclusions reached by 
Carraro and others using a reduced-stage game framework. 
The model presented below follows Barrett (1999), but while Barrett (1999) uses 
the assumption of strong collectively rationality,44 the equilibrium concept implied here 
is weak renegotiation proofness45 (Farrell and Maskin 1989).  Barrett (2002), also using 
weak renegotiation proofness, shows that a single treaty can be broadened to 
incorporate all countries (a consensus treaty), but at the cost of limiting the per-country 
level of cooperation. Allowing the depth of cooperation to vary, he demonstrates that 
countries might prefer a ‘broad but shallow’ treaty over one that is ‘narrow but deep’. 
                                                 
43
 Other models apply the concept of the core to determine the equilibrium coalition structure. A key 
result of these models is that by choosing a cleverly designed transfer scheme, the grand coalition 
establishing the social optimal emission vector can under special circumstances be an equilibrium, 
depending on the number of countries and on the degree of farsightedness. See Finus and Rundshagen 
(2001) for a review of these models. For overviews of the coalition literature, see Bloch (1997) and Finus 
(2001). 
 
44
 The notion of strong collective rationality is explained in section 4.  
45
 Weakly renegotiation proofness is defined formally in Section 3.2. 
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Thus, compared to Barrett (1999), Barrett (2002) changes both the equilibrium concept 
and the model. By contrast, we show in this paper that overall participation can be 
increased even without changing the model, using weakly renegotiation proof 
equilibrium as solution concept. 
Sandler and Sargent (1995) discuss a number of coordination games where 
potential ratifiers are uncertain about the actions of others. They argue that if countries 
are distrustful of one another, a mixed strategy makes sense. Each country must then 
anticipate the likelihood that other countries will cooperate. Distrust is relevant 
whenever some parties have, or might have, an incentive to free-ride. There is little in 
the Kyoto agreement itself that ensures that ratifying countries will actually fulfill their 
obligations. However, the Marrakesh Accords provide details for a compliance 
mechanism for the climate regime. As argued by Barrett (2002; 2003) there are a 
number of problems with this mechanism.46 It is therefore far from clear that Kyoto’s 
enforcement mechanism will be able to ensure compliance. Hence, external means of 
enforcement are potentially relevant as an alternative – or a supplement – to the 
provisions of the Marrakesh Accords.47 Regional agreements may contribute to this, 
because countries in the same region tend to be highly integrated. A high level of 
interdependence implies that a host of options are available (via issue linkages) for 
providing responses to non-compliance in any one particular issue area.48 In addition, 
                                                 
46
 Barrett’s main objections to the compliance mechanism are that (i) the punishment might be forever 
delayed; (ii) the anticipation of being punished is likely to induce countries to hold out for a generous 
allowance for the second period; (iii) there are no provisions for enforcement of failure by a non-
compliant country to accept the punishment; (iv) a country that is being punished might choose to 
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol; and (v) the compliance mechanism is not legally binding, and can be 
made so only through an amendment that must be ratified by the member countries. 
47
 See Hovi (forthcoming) and Stokke (forthcoming) for discussions of the potential relevance and 
effectiveness of external enforcement in relation to the international climate regime.  
48
 There is a whole body of literature suggesting that a solution to offset countries’ free-riding incentives 
is the linkage of environmental negotiations to other economic issues (issue linkage). The idea is to link 
an issue with excludable benefits (a club good) to the public good provision. It has for example been 
Essay no. 3: Regional versus Global Cooperation for Climate Control 
 147 
countries that are in close geographic proximity also tend to be culturally close, to have 
similar economic and political systems, and therefore to have similar preferences.49 All 
of this might lower the costs of reaching agreement in the first place. Countries may 
thus not only be more likely to comply with a regional agreement, but also more 
inclined to join a regional agreement in the first place. 
To sum up, a regime based on regional agreements might reduce uncertainty, 
ensure intra-treaty homogeneity, enhance trust, reduce negotiation costs, and hence 
encourage compliance and participation. All of these features represent a potential 
rationale for regional agreements, and could make a regime based on regional 
agreements an attractive option in the continuing negotiations on the international 
climate regime. However, we show below that a regime based on multiple agreements 
can increase participation even when the above advantages to a regional regime are 
disregarded. In fact, multiple agreements can be attractive even when countries are 
completely homogenous, so that no special cultural, economic, or political ties exist 
between particular subsets of countries.  
 
3. A Simple Dynamic Model of Regional Climate Agreements 
 Consider a situation where the world consists of two regions (A and B) that are 
identical in all relevant respects. Assume that there are two options for an international 
regime to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Option 1 is a global agreement on 
emissions reductions and option 2 is a regime consisting of two separate agreements, 
                                                                                                                                               
suggested to link the climate change negotiations with negotiations on trade liberalization (i.e. Barrett 
1995; 2003) or research and development cooperation (i.e. Barrett 2003; Carraro and Siniscalco 1995; 
1997). 
49
 Of course, this is not always the case. In the Middle East, for instance, some neighbouring countries are 
likely to have very different preferences. 
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one for each region.50 To isolate the effect of regime type, we assume that in both types 
of agreement, emission reductions are uniform within as well as across regions. 
Regardless of which option is chosen, the (periodic) cost of compliance is c.  
In every period of the game, each country must choose to cooperate (i.e., reduce 
emissions) or to defect (not reduce emissions). Following Barrett (1997; 1999), in the 
case of a global agreement a country’s periodic payoff if it chooses cooperate (C) is  
 
∏ −= cdkC)( , 
 
where d is a constant (d>0), and k  is the total number of countries that cooperate.  
For a country that chooses defect (D), the periodic payoff is similarly 
  
∏ = bkD)( , 
 
where b is another constant (b>0). As a special case, we may have b=d.  
Similarly, with two regional agreements, the payoffs are:  
 
ckkdCP BA −+= )()(  
)()( BA kkbDP +=  
 
                                                 
50
 One commentator objected to this formulation saying that, since geography is not explicitly included, 
the real question addressed by the model is if two agreements are better than one. We agree. However, 
with two agreements, one would need a criterion to decide what countries to include in which agreement. 
Clearly, one possible criterion might be region, although other criteria are certainly also conceivable. 
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where kA and kB are the number of cooperating countries in regions A and B, 
respectively.51 Like Barrett, we assume that 0>≥> bdc .52 We also assume that 
0)1( >−>− cdNNb , meaning that full participation is not a Nash equilibrium of the 
stage game, but Pareto dominates the situation where no country participates. These 
assumptions are sufficient to show that defect is dominant in the stage game, and that 
the resulting Nash equilibrium (that all countries play defect), is inefficient. This means 
that the stage game is a special version of the N-person Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
 Following Barrett, we assume that compliance in the global agreement is 
sustained by way of the “Getting Even” strategy.53 This strategy specifies that a 
participating country plays cooperate except if another participating country has been 
the sole deviator from Getting Even in the previous period, in which case defect is 
played. Non-participating countries play defect after any history.54 It is well known that 
a global agreement of this type admits only a very limited number of parties (e.g., 
Barrett 1999).  
In the case of two regional agreements, compliance is likewise sustained on the 
basis of a close relative to Getting Even. This strategy, which we refer to as “Regional 
Getting Even,” specifies that a participating country plays cooperate except if another 
participating country in its own region has been the sole deviator from Regional Getting 
Even in the previous period, in which case defect is played. As in the case of a global 
                                                 
51
 We also did the analysis with cross regional heterogeneity in b and d, that is bA ≠ bB and dA ≠ dB, but 
this did not change the results significantly.
 
52
 See Barrett (1997, pp.11-13). 
53
 There are other strategies that might potentially sustain cooperation as a renegotiation proof 
equilibrium. Different strategies might potentially produce different results. 
54
 This formulation of the Getting Even strategy differs slightly from Barrett’s. In Barrett’s formulation, a 
participating country is presented with the prospect of a future reward even if it does not take part in the 
punishment of a deviating country. Barrett’s formulation requires that an additional condition be checked, 
which leads to non-trivial calculations. However, this additional condition does not seem to be an 
essential part of the strategy, and does not impinge on the main results presented in this paper. Hence, we 
prefer the slightly simpler formulation of the strategy given in the text. 
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treaty, non-participating countries play defect after any history. It may be noted that if 
all countries use this strategy, then a defection by a participating country in region A 
will be punished by other parties in region A, but not by parties to the agreement for 
region B, and vice versa.55 
 In order to be a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (in the sense of Farrell 
and Maskin 1989), a strategy profile must satisfy two requirements. The first is that no 
player is able to gain by a one-period deviation in some state. This requirement is 
necessary and sufficient for the strategy profile to be a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
The second is that not all players gain if they deviate collectively from implementing 
the threatened punishment, given that a defection has taken place. The latter 
requirement ensures that the subgame perfect equilibrium is weakly renegotiation 
proof.56 In the following, we compare a global agreement to a regime based on two 
agreements with respect to each of these two requirements. We assume throughout that 
all countries discount future payoffs using a common discount factor δ  ( 10 << δ ). 
 
3.1 The subgame perfection requirement 
Consider first the case of a global agreement. In this case there are two states to check. 
The first state is that there is no single deviator in the previous round. Getting Even then 
prescribes that all participating countries cooperate. As long as all participating 
countries follow this prescription, country j collects a payoff of cdkg −*  in each period, 
                                                 
55
 We show below that this is part of the equilibrium behaviour. 
56
 Various concepts of renegotiation-proof equilibrium exist in the literature (see Bergin and MacLeod 
1993 for a discussion). When we use that term in this article we always refer to the concept of weakly 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium, formalized for 2×2 games by Farrell and Maskin (1989), and extended to 
N-person games by Barrett (1994) and by Finus and Rundshagen (1998). Recall that every weakly 
renegotiation-proof equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium (but not vice versa). 
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where *gk  is the number of parties in the global agreement. By contrast, suppose country 
j defects in period t and reverts to Getting Even at time 1+t . It then gets a payoff of 
( )1* −gkb  in period t. In period t+1 it is punished by the other players and receive cd − . 
And at time t+2 cooperation is restored, meaning that country j obtains cdkg −*  in that 
and in any future period. It is individually rational to stick to Getting Even unless j gets 
a strictly larger payoff in periods t and 1+t  by deviating. Formally, this condition is 
satisfied if [ ] [ ] [ ]cdkbcdk gg −+−≥−+ δδ 1)1( ** . Solving for *gk  gives: 
 
(1) dbd dbcgk δδ+− +−≥* , 
 
which may be rewritten as  
 
(2) dbd dcgk δ+− −+≥ 1* . 
 
If condition (2) is fulfilled, then the strategy profile where all countries play Getting 
Even is a Nash equilibrium. It may be noted that if bd = , then the right-hand side of 
condition (2) approaches dc  as δ approaches 1. Thus, for cooperation to be a Nash 
equilibrium when db =  and δ  is close to 1, the number of cooperators must simply be 
large enough to secure each cooperating party a payoff above the zero payoff it would 
receive with no cooperation.57 
                                                 
57
 The intuition behind this result is that in an infinitely repeated game with no discounting all payoffs above the no 
cooperation baseline are sustainable in equilibrium (cf. the folk theorem). 
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The second state to check is the one where a single deviation has taken place in 
the previous period. If the country that deviated at time t ‘accepts’ the punishment and 
reverts to Getting Even at time t+1, it receives cd −  in period t+1 and cdkg −
*
 in any 
future period. By contrast, if it defects for one more period before it reverts to Getting 
Even, it receives a payoff of zero at time t+1 and cd −  at time t+2. Thus, it is 
individually rational to revert to Getting Even (at time t+1), provided that 
 
(3) [ ] )(0* cdcdkcd g −+≥−+− δδ . 
 
Solving for *gk  gives 
 
(4) d ddcgk δ δ+−≥* , 
 
which may be rewritten as 
 
(5) ddcgk δ−+≥ 1* . 
 
Note that dbd dcddc δδ +− −− +≥+ 11  as long as bd ≥  and dc ≥ . Both of the latter conditions 
hold by assumption in our model. Hence, (5) provides the binding requirement for 
subgame perfection. This condition places a lower bound on the number of parties 
needed to make an agreement sustainable.58  
                                                 
58
 This is one possible explanation why most multilateral treaties (including the Kyoto protocol) provide a 
clause stating that their entry into force requires ratification by a certain number of countries. 
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Next, consider a regime with two regional agreements. In this case, there are 
three states to be considered to ensure subgame perfection. The first is the state where 
no single violation has taken place in any of the regions in the previous period. If 
country j in region A deviates in period t and reverts to Getting Even at time 1+t , then 
in period t it collects a payoff of )1( ** BA kkb +− , where *Sk  is the number of parties in 
the agreement for region S (S=A, B). In period t+1, the deviating party pays penance by 
being the only country in region A to comply, whereas cooperation continues as before 
in region B. Country j thus obtains a payoff of ckd B −+ )1( * . At time 2+t compliance 
is restored, and so j receives rBA ckkd −+ )( **  in that and in any future period. Had 
country j not deviated, it would have received ckk BA −+ )d( **  in every period. So, it is 
individually rational to stick to Regional Getting Even, provided that: 
 
(6) [ ] [ ]ckdkkbckkd BBABA −+++−≥−++ )1()1()()1( ***** δδ  
 
By symmetry, we know that the number of parties in the two agreements must be 
identical. Setting *** SBA kkk ==  and solving for 
*
Sk  gives: 
 
(7) )(2* bdd dbcSk −+ +−≥ δ δ  (S=A,B), 
 
which may be rewritten as 
 
(8) )(2 )(* 1 bdd bddcSk −+ −−−+≥ δ   (S=A,B) 
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Condition (8) ensures that the strategy profile where all countries use Regional Getting 
Even is a Nash equilibrium.59 
 The second state to check is the one where a single deviation has occurred in 
only one of the two regions in the previous period. Suppose the deviation takes place in 
region A. By reverting to Regional Getting Even at time t+1 the deviating country 
obtains a payoff of ckd B −+ )1( *  in that period, and ckkd BA −+ )( **  in period t+2. By 
contrast, if it defects for one more period, and then reverts to Regional Getting Even, it 
receives *Bbk  at time t+1 and ckd B −+ )1( *  at time t+2. In either case, cooperation is 
restored from period t+3 onwards. Hence, it is individually rational to revert to Regional 
Getting Even (at time t+1), provided that  
 
(9) [ ] [ ]ckdbkckkdckd BBBAB −++≥−++−+ )1()()1( ***** δδ  
 
Setting *** SBA kkk ==  and solving for 
*
Sk  gives: 
 
(10) bdd dcdSk −+ −+≥ δδ* , 
 
which may be rewritten as 
 
(11) bdd bddcSk −+ −−−+≥ δ )(* 1  
 
                                                 
59
 It may be noted that in the case where bd = , the right-hand side of condition (5) approaches dc  when 
δ approaches 1. 
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For this state, we also need to check that after a violation in one region, it is individually 
rational for the parties in the other region to continue to comply. If a defection in region 
A occurs in period t, and all countries use Regional Getting Even from period t+1, then 
country r in region B receives a payoff of rB cdkd −+⋅ *1  in period t + 1 and 
rBA ckkd −+ )( **  in period t + 2. By contrast, if r deviates (defects) in period t+1 and 
reverts to Regional Getting Even in period t+2, it receives )1(1 * −+⋅ Bkbb  and 
rA ckd −+⋅ )1( *  in those two periods. In either case, cooperation will be reestablished in 
both regions in period t + 3. Thus, country r has no incentive to deviate from Regional 
Getting Even if: 
 
(12) bdd bddcSk −+ −−−+≥ δ )(* 1 . 
 
Condition (12), which turns out to be identical to condition (11), says that if the number 
of participating countries in each region is sufficiently large, then it is not worth 
suffering a (temporary) break-down of cooperation in one’s own region in order to 
punish a defection in the other region. 
Finally, we must check the state where there is a sole deviator in both regions in 
the previous round. If all countries, including the deviator in the other region, play 
Regional Getting Even from time t+1 onwards, a deviating country obtains cd −2  at 
time t+1 and cdkdk BA −+ **  at time t+2. By contrast, if it defects for one more period 
(and then reverts to Regional Getting Even), it obtains b at time t+1 and cdkd B −+ *  at 
time t+2. In either case, cooperation is restored in both regions from time t+3 onwards. 
Hence, it is individually rational to revert to Getting Even (at time t+1) if  
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(13) [ ] [ ]cdkdbcdkdkcd BBA −++≥−++− *** 1(2 δδ . 
 
Setting *** SBA kkk ==  and solving for 
*
Sk  gives 
 
(14) d dbcdSk δδ 2* −++≥ , 
 
which may be rewritten as 
 
(15) d bddcSk δ )(* 1 −−−+≥  
 
It is easy to verify that for d = b, conditions (8), (11), (12) and (15) all becomes 
identical. For d > b, condition (15) is stricter than (11), which in turn is identical to (12) 
and stricter than (8). Hence, (15) is the effective lower bound on the number of parties 
in a regime based on two agreements, and represents the binding condition for the 
regime based on two agreements to be a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
To illustrate the difference between a global and two regional agreements, 
assume that 95.0=δ , 2=c , and 1== bd . We then find that a global regime requires 
at least three participating countries.60 With two agreements, by contrast, the minimum 
number of parties is three in each region. For a second illustration, assume that the cost 
of compliance is eight rather than two. Then the minimum number of signatories in a 
global regime is nine, as opposed to nine in each agreement with a regional regime. In 
either case, the minimum number of parties in the regional regime is twice that of the 
global regime. If b < d, then the difference between the two types of regime can be 
                                                 
60
 Recall that this number must be an integer.  
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smaller. For example, assume that 95.0=δ , 8=c , b = 1/2, and d = 1. Then the 
minimum number of parties with regional agreements becomes sixteen (eight in each 
region), as opposed to nine in the global agreement.  
 
3.2 The renegotiation proofness requirement 
Somewhat loosely formulated, an equilibrium is renegotiation proof if the players as a 
group cannot find a better alternative (Bergin and MacLeod 1993). More precisely, a 
subgame perfect equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game is weakly renegotiation-
proof if there does not exist two continuation equilibria such that all players are better 
off in one continuation equilibrium than in the other (Farrell & Maskin 1989:330-31). 
Assume that country j defects in period t. For the global agreement to be weakly 
renegotiation proof, the other parties must be better off by carrying out the punishment 
than by restarting cooperation at once (i.e., without punishment).  If the punishment is 
carried out in accordance with Getting Even, then in period t + 1 each of the other 
players receives a payoff of b. By contrast, if cooperation is restarted immediately, then 
each country receives cdkg −
*
 in that period. In either case, each player receives 
cdkg −
*
 in every future period, so all we need to consider is period t + 1. Thus, 
renegotiation proofness requires that  
 
(16) bcdkg ≤−* , 
 
which reduces to 
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(17) d cbgk +≤* . 
 
Thus, if the number of participating countries is too large, the payoff from renegotiation 
(i.e., resuming cooperation immediately) exceeds the payoff from carrying out the 
punishment.  
While the subgame perfection requirement places a lower bound on the number 
of parties in the agreement, the renegotiation proofness requirement places an upper 
bound on this number. To illustrate, suppose that d = b = 1 and that 2=c . Then 
renegotiation proofness requires that the number of signatories in the global agreement 
is at most three. Similarly, if the cost of compliance is eight rather than two, the 
maximum number of signatories is nine. In other words, the maximum number of 
parties increases with the cost of cooperation. This result may be explained as follows. 
After a defection it must be better for other parties to punish than to renegotiate (i.e., to 
restart cooperation without punishment). Given that cooperation is sustained by the 
Getting Even strategy, this is equivalent to a requirement that choosing defect when 
only one country cooperates must be at least as good as the outcome where all 
participating countries choose cooperate. This condition defines the maximum number 
of parties. Increasing the cost of cooperation is equivalent to a constant, negative shift in 
the payoff function for cooperation, meaning that cooperation (and hence renegotiation) 
becomes less attractive. Thus, the maximum number of parties becomes larger. 
 Next, consider regional agreements. Assume that country j is a party to the 
agreement in region A, and that this country defects in period t. If the punishment is 
carried out in accordance with Regional Getting Even, then each of the other countries 
in region A receives )1( *Bkb +  in that period. By contrast, if cooperation is restarted at 
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once, each of them receives ckk BA −+ )d( **  in period t+1. Renegotiation proofness 
therefore requires that  
 
(18) )1()d( *** BBA kbckk +≤−+  
 
With identical regions, the condition reduces to: 
 
(19) bd cbSk −+≤ 2*  (S=A, B). 
 
It follows that a regime with two separate agreements allows more countries to 
cooperate in weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium than a regime based on a single 
global agreement. For example, if 2=c , and 1== bd , then with two agreements a 
total of 3 + 3 = 6 countries can cooperate in renegotiation proof equilibrium. Similarly, 
if 8=c , then the two regional agreements admit a total of 9 + 9 = 18 countries. In either 
case, the regional regime doubles the maximum number of cooperating countries, 
compared to a single global agreement. 
 In combination with the subgame perfection requirement, the renegotiation 
proofness requirement leaves a very narrow set of possibilities regarding the number of 
parties in an international regime. In fact, the number of parties is sometimes fully 
determined. For example, with 95.0=δ , 8=c  and 1== bd , a global agreement 
requires exactly nine parties. By contrast, a regime based on two regional agreements 
must have exactly eighteen parties (nine in each region).  
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3.4 Discussion 
The model analyzed above has a number of interesting implications. First, it 
provides upper and lower bounds on the number of parties in each type of agreement. 
As we have seen, the two boundaries might even fully determine this number. The 
participating countries’ identities are, however, not generally determined.61 
Second, a regime based on regional agreements admits a larger number of 
parties (for the two regional agreements taken together) than the global regime. At the 
same time, however, the required number of parties in the regional regime is also larger 
than the number required by a global treaty.  
Third, while the model analyzed here includes only two regions, one might 
reasonably ask why one should stop there. Why not design a regime with an even larger 
number of agreements? This idea can certainly not be dismissed on the basis of the 
above model. We have seen, however, that there is a bottom line to the number of 
parties in each regional agreement. Hence, with a given pool of countries to select from 
(not all of which are likely to join any kind of climate regime, at least not at the present 
time) there is an upper limit to the number of agreements that can be sustained in 
equilibrium. 
Fourth, the model suggests that a regime based on regional agreements has 
certain advantages in terms of efficiency. Note first that a global treaty is Pareto 
inefficient if  
 
(20) cdNbkg −<*  
                                                 
61
 The parties’ identities are determined only if the number of participating parties in the two agreements 
add (exactly) up to the total number of countries, i.e., Nkk BA =+ ** . If Nkk BA <+ ** , the selection of 
participating countries might represent a substantial co-ordination problem. 
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i.e., if the total pool of countries is sufficiently large compared to the number of parties 
in the global agreement. Next, compare the following two scenarios: 
• A global regime where *gk  countries cooperate. 
• A regime with two regional agreements where ** gA kk ≤  countries cooperate in 
one agreement, and ** gB kk ≤  other countries cooperate in another agreement, 
such that *** gBA kkk >+ . 
With linear payoff functions, it follows immediately that countries included as parties 
under both regimes prefer the regional regime. The same is true for countries that are 
non-parties in both cases. The reason is simply that, from the point of view of these 
countries, the number of other countries that cooperate is larger in the regional than in 
the global regime. The question is therefore whether the regional agreements regime 
would be acceptable to the members of the additional agreement, i.e., to countries which 
are allowed to free ride in the first scenario, but required to cooperate in the second. 
With a global agreement, each of these countries receives a (periodic) payoff of *gbk . 
With two regional agreements, each of them obtains ckkd BA −+ )( ** . Hence, if 
*** )( gBA bkckkd ≥−+ , i.e, if 
 
(21)  d
cbk
BA
gkk +≥+
'
**
, 
 
each of these countries is at least as well off being a party to one of the two regional 
agreements as it is free riding on a global agreement. It follows that, whenever condition 
(21) is fulfilled, a regime based on regional agreements Pareto dominates a global 
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agreement. To see that this condition is always fulfilled in the regional agreements 
equilibrium, recall that it is feasible for any participating country in the additional 
agreement to deviate by always playing defect. If country j starts defecting in period t, 
other countries in the same region will also defect from period t+1 on, thereby 
effectively terminating the additional agreement. Defecting from a regional agreement 
in this way would give the deviator a higher payoff than it would obtain with the global 
agreement. However, it follows from the subgame perfection requirement that such a 
deviation is not profitable. Hence, whenever the subgame perfection requirement is 
fulfilled, two regional agreements Pareto dominate a single, global agreement. 
 For an analytical demonstration, let the additional agreement be in region A. 
Multiplying (6) by δ−1  and rearranging terms gives 
 
(22) [ ] [ ] [ ]ckkdckdkkbckkd BABBABA −++−+−++−−≥−+ )()1()1(1)1()( **2***** δδδδ  . 
 
By rearranging (9) we get 
 
(23) [ ] [ ] **** )()1()1( BBAA bkckkdckd ≥−++−+− δδ . 
 
Combining inequalities (22) and (23) gives 
 
(24) [ ] ***** 1)1()( BBABA bkkkbckkd δδ ++−−≥−+ , 
 
which may be rewritten as 
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(25) [ ]1)1()( **** −−+≥−+ ABBA kbbkckkd δ . 
 
Since 1* >Ak , condition (21) follows with strict inequality. Hence, even the 
participating countries in region A strictly gains by forming an additional agreement.62 
Fifth, the above model also identifies an important condition for a regime based 
on regional agreements to be sustainable. Recall that a regime based on regional 
agreements not only admits, but also requires, a larger number of signatories than a 
global agreement. This means that only if a sufficiently large number of countries are 
willing to accept international commitments to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases 
will a regime based on regional agreements be an attractive option. If this number is too 
small to sustain two regional agreements, then a global agreement might be the only 
viable option. 
Finally, an important driving force in Barrett’s model is the way in which the 
agreement is enforced. The reason why the maximum number of signatories is so 
limited is that a single violation triggers punishment by all other parties. Our model 
provides less pessimistic results because it allows each agreement to be enforced 
regionally. The enforcement mechanism is similar to Barrett’s in the sense that all 
parties to the agreement for region A punish a violation of the agreement for region A. 
However, since cooperation in region B is allowed to continue undisturbed by a 
violation in region A, the total number of punishers becomes smaller than in Barrett’s 
model. It is this feature that allows the maximum number of signatories to become 
larger with a regime based on regional agreements.    
 
                                                 
62
 We are indebted to Geir Asheim for this proof. Note that the analytical argument follows the verbal 
one.  
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4. Regional Agreements, Enforcement, and Participation 
In the previous section we have shown that two agreements can accommodate a larger 
number of parties than what is possible in the scenario with a single global agreement 
studied by Barrett (1999). It is important to note that we are using a weaker concept of 
collective rationality than Barrett (1999). In our model, we rely on the concept of 
weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, which requires that participating countries 
cannot do better collectively than to impose the prescribed punishment if a single 
deviation has occurred in the previous period. By contrast, Barrett (1999) adds the 
requirement that if these countries can choose to impose other punishments than the one 
specified by the treaty, they can not gain collectively by doing so (strong collective 
rationality).  
The use of weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium also opens other avenues for 
broadening the number of parties, in addition to the multiple agreements approach 
highlighted in this paper. While the informal arguments presented in Section 2 suggest 
that a regional approach might be an attractive option, other alternative enforcement 
regimes would also admit a larger number of signatories than Barrett’s design for a 
global treaty. For example, the maximum number of parties in a global agreement might 
be increased by designing an enforcement scheme whereby a single defection triggers 
punishment only by a subset of the other parties.63 Indeed, even a global agreement 
could – in principle – be enforced regionally, and so the effects analyzed here could also 
be achieved within the setting of a global agreement.64 However, we find it rather 
                                                 
63
 In fact, in the appendix to Barrett (1999) this type of regime is examined, but rejected on the ground 
that it fails to be strongly collectively rational. 
64
 Another option could be to have both a global and a set of regional supplementary agreements. 
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implausible that a system of regional enforcement would be adopted except as part of a 
regime based on regional agreements.  
This brief discussion reflects the fact that the above model admits a multitude of 
equilibria (involving various degrees of cooperation). Is it likely – or at least possible – 
that the regional agreements equilibrium would actually be chosen in future negotiations 
over a new design for the international climate regime? Obviously, we can not provide a 
full discussion of this question here. However, an attractive feature of the two 
agreements equilibrium is that the punishment is carried out equally by all parties in the 
same region. Thus, the right to reap the benefits connected with punishment would seem 
to be fairly distributed (provided that defections are evenly distributed between regions). 
Granted, a fair distribution of the right to punish might also be possible – at least in 
principle – in equilibria based on a global agreement where only a subset of the 
participating countries punishes a deviation. With homogenous countries, however, this 
assumes that over time, the right to punish is allocated to different subsets of countries, 
so that in the long run, all countries are allowed to reap the benefits of punishing 
equally. To the extent that deviations are rare phenomena (which they should be, 
according to the theory), and countries discount future benefits, the fairness problem 
might well prove to be real with this kind of enforcement mechanism. Of course, with 
heterogeneous countries, other difficulties (such as different notions of fairness) are 
likely to come in addition. 
One might also ask why a defection in one region ought to be enforced by other 
members of the same agreement. An obvious alternative is that a sole deviation in one 
region is punished by all countries in the other region. Again, the distribution of the 
rewards of punishment would seem fair (assuming that defections are evenly distributed 
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over regions). However, with heterogeneous countries, punishment by other countries in 
the same region arguably comes closer to the notion of having a defector judged by a 
‘jury of its peers’. If so, it might be easier for a defecting country to accept punishment 
by countries in its own region than to accept punishment by countries that are more 
distant in terms of both geography and culture.65 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has used a simple dynamic game-theoretic model to analyze how a 
regime based on two agreements would affect the prospects for cooperation to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases. A main finding is that two treaties are able to 
encompass a larger number of parties than a single global treaty, assuming that the cost 
of reducing greenhouse gases is the same with both types of regime. We have also 
shown that a system with two agreements can Pareto-dominate a regime based on a 
global treaty. These results support the findings of previous research by Carraro et al., 
using a different type of model. 66  
The model analyzed in this paper follows Barrett (1999), but while Barrett 
(1999) uses the assumption of strong collectively rationality, the equilibrium concept 
implied here is weakly renegotiation proofness (in the sense of Farrell and Maskin 
1989). We have emphasized that the use of weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium also 
opens other avenues for broadening the number of parties besides the multiple 
agreements approach highlighted in this paper. However, informal arguments presented 
in Section 2 suggest that a regime based on regional agreements can reduce uncertainty, 
                                                 
65
 Interestingly, empirical studies on economic sanctions suggest that sanctions imposed by friends and 
allies tend to be more effective than sanctions imposed by more distant countries (Hufbauer, Schott and 
Elliott 1990).  
66
 For example, Carraro (1998, 1999, 2000), Carraro and Siniscalco (1998), and Siniscalco (1999). 
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ensure intra-treaty homogeneity, enhance trust, and reduce negotiation costs. These 
factors further strengthen the main conclusions of the formal analysis in section 3. Thus, 
should the Kyoto Protocol not enter into force, cooperation based on regional 
agreements can be a good alternative. If Kyoto does enter into force, regional 
cooperation might be an option for future commitment periods. 
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Abstract:    
Over ten years ago the EU Commission proposed a directive on carbon taxes, but faced 
so much domestic resistance that agreement was not reached until last year – and after it 
had been considerably watered down. The aim of this paper is to look into economic 
reasons for the political infeasibility of extensive carbon taxes. Since opposition is 
believed to arise prior to the policy implementation, the cost estimates have a myopic 
character compared with market estimates, in the sense that sectors are presumed to take 
into account their own substitution opportunities, but disregard changes in other sectors 
as well as the macroeconomic welfare gains from a tax regime. With this myopic 
approach, we estimate and compare costs of emissions cuts across sectors and across 
countries in the EU, showing how different sectors might have anticipated the impacts 
from an expected carbon tax. This focus illustrates that what seems to be cost-effective 
and to the best for the region on paper turned out too controversial to be politically 
feasible.  
Three main conclusions are drawn. First, common measures across countries are 
generally not attractive since a particular measure may be advantageous to one country 
in order to keep the national cost of climate policy down, but may in another country 
                                                 
67
 camilla.bretteville@cicero.uio.no 
68
 aaheim@cicero.uio.no 
Essay no. 4: Sectoral Opposition to Carbon Taxes in the EU 
 174 
spur opposition that could be avoided if exceptions were allowed. Second, the 
electricity sector plays a key role in climate policy in every EU country and in the 
potential opposition to any policy measure. Conditions in this sector vary greatly among 
countries, and a long-term strategy to reduce conflicts of interest would be to introduce 
a common electricity market. Third, before a common electricity market can be 
established, further differentiation of national emission targets could represent an 
important opportunity for mitigating conflicts of interests across countries. 
 
Key words: climate policy, EU, interest conflicts, opposition, political infeasibility,   
regional carbon tax 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The influence of interest groups is a common theme in the study of 
environmental politics. In an open society, environmentalist groups and their opponents, 
generally the corporations and businesses that resist the costs involved in complying 
with environmental regulation are presumed to spend resources on trying to influence 
policy-makers. The policy-makers need the votes, the money, the moral approbation, 
and the publicity these groups might provide in exchange for policy stances that gain 
approval, and avoid disapproval. Environmental policy is thus a function of the different 
pressures emanating from these (and other) interest groups, and hence seldom fully 
reflects the interests of any one of them (Barkdull and Harris 2002).   
Conflicts of interest within the European Union (EU) countries have represented 
a major obstacle for the achievement of a common climate policy. Organized interests 
have resisted increased costs and have used arguments like that of competitiveness with 
success. National positions in the policy negotiations are the result of political solutions 
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to internal conflicts resulting from different preferences among political actors, 
perceptions of fairness, and anticipated economic effects of policy measures.  
The EU Commission’s carbon tax directive proposal, launched in 1992, was met 
with intense lobbying. Why was the opposition to taxes so great? One obvious 
explanation is the anticipated cost increases; another is that most economic actors do not 
take into account the macroeconomic welfare gains from an efficient policy regime. The 
aim of this paper is to look into economic reasons for the political infeasibility of 
extensive carbon taxes. We suggest that interest groups do not take all market effects of 
the policy into account when they present their case to policymakers because they have 
incentives to exaggerate the negative effects of regulation. By using a myopic approach 
the paper illustrates how differently economic sectors might have anticipated the 
impacts from a common carbon tax.  The differences in these estimated cost 
anticipations are presumed to explain, at least partly, the opposition to carbon taxes in 
the EU. The study is based on estimating and comparing costs of emissions cuts in six 
countries; France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom69. 
Since opposition is believed to arise prior to the policy implementation, the cost 
estimates have a myopic character, compared with market estimates, in the sense that 
sectors are presumed to take into account their own substitution opportunities, but 
disregard changes in other sectors as well as the macroeconomic welfare gains from a 
tax regime. We argue that this narrow focus helps explain why what seems to be cost-
effective and to the best for the region turned out to be too controversial to be politically 
feasible. 
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 The analysis is based on Aaheim and Bretteville (1999, 2000). 
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The following sections present some background information (section 2), 
explain the methodology (section 3), summarize and compare carbon tax costs in six 
EU countries (section 4 and 5), and draw conclusions (section 6). 
 
2. Background 
Three main regulatory options have been considered most relevant for 
environmental regulation: first, traditional command-and-control regulation, where 
proportional targets for individual sources are defined; second, a uniform emissions tax 
on all sources; and third, auctioned as well as grandfathered permit markets, where 
polluters are given their initial distribution of permits free of charge, typically according 
to historical emissions70. The government has – according to public choice theory – an 
incentive to prefer environmental taxes because they contribute to revenues, although 
the primary concern of elected officials is presumed to be getting re-elected. Climate 
policy affects all economic sectors, but the various policy options will influence sectors 
differently. Interest groups will therefore try to influence the policy choice.   
In public choice theory it is assumed that the direction in which these interest 
groups will try to push the policy choice will depend on the distribution of costs and 
benefits from regulation (Mueller 1989; Svendsen 1998). With a tax solution, every 
emitter must pay for all emitted units, which increases production costs substantially 
and thus lowers the political acceptability of the instrument. Buchanan and Tullock 
(1975) show that existing firms will prefer traditional command-and-control measure to 
taxes because the former create a barrier to entry and are more open to negotiations and 
lobbying influence. Grandfathered permit markets provide an even stronger barrier to 
                                                 
70
 See for instance Baumol and Oates (1988) for a comprehensive treatment of these options. 
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entry because the initial permits are free of charge, suggesting that this option will be 
even more attractive to existing firms. Permit trading also leads to reduced abatement 
costs and more flexibility than is possible with both command-and-control regulation 
and emission taxes (Svendsen 1998).  
Taxes have been prescribed as a corrective for externalities at least since Pigou 
(1920), and it was only natural that they should be considered as policy tools in the EU, 
both for efficiency and revenue reasons (Howe 1994). Thus, the EU Commission 
launched a carbon tax directive proposal in 1992, but this attempt was opposed by 
several member states. For instance, the United Kingdom was against common EU 
taxes in principle, wishing to deal with the CO2 problem on their own. Spain, Portugal 
and Greece refused to accept increased production costs until they reach an economic 
level similar to that of the more wealthy northern EU countries (Svendsen 1998). In 
March 2003, however, the EU finally reached political agreement on a proposed 
common framework for energy taxation. The framework is seen as a key element in the 
EU’s climate policy, but its influence will be felt only over time because minimum EU 
tax rates have been watered down considerably compared to the Commission’s initial 
proposal (Environmental News Service, August 26, 2003).  
The historical discrepancies between the declared targets and implemented 
actions in EU climate policy have been explained by the different decision layers which 
influence lobbying behavior. Historically, interests hostile to climate policy have had 
more influence and been able to prevent the use of stringent instruments that might lead 
to real emissions reductions (Michaelowa 1998). In discussing the goals of different 
interest groups and their influence on EU institutions and the climate policy process, 
Michaelowa (2000) suggests that a strengthening of pro-abatement interests compared 
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to those of emitters lead to more demanding national climate policies in the EU. His 
analysis of selected sectors shows that at the EU level the importance of emissions-
intensive sectors (e.g., fossil fuel based energy, metal producers, and chemical industry) 
is declining, while sectors that profit from climate policy (e.g., producers of renewable 
energy, nuclear energy, and hydro electricity) gain importance. As the influence of 
emissions-intensive sectors diminishes, stronger packages of climate policy instruments 
are likely at the national level (Michaelowa 2000). This may be an explanation for why 
the EU finally managed to reach agreement on a common energy tax. 
The usual economic approach assumes that individual opinions on economic 
policies are based on their calculations on the post-policy market equilibrium. In this 
study, however, anticipated costs of a carbon tax are calculated, disregarding the effect 
on market prices of the reduction in energy demand and structural changes that would 
follow in general equilibrium models. The reason for this choice is that we wish to look 
into economic reasons for the political infeasibility of carbon taxes. We assume that the 
anticipation of costs of a carbon tax would create different levels of opposition in 
different sectors and countries in the EU, and that sectors where the costs of climate 
policies are low will be less reluctant to accept such policies. Furthermore, opposition is 
presumed greater when the costs are unevenly distributed because this gives rise to 
organized lobbying. Since economically strong, well organized, groups have substantial 
political power in Western democracies (Bang 2004), opposition is believed to arise 
prior to an implementation of a disadvantageous policy. Interest groups are assumed not 
to anticipate – at least not officially – all possible market effects of a tax ex post and the 
cost estimates on which the analysis is based have a myopic character, compared with 
market estimates. Our myopic approach assume that actors consider their own 
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opportunities for switching to less emissions-intensive technologies, but they do not 
take all market effects into account when they present their case to policymakers 
because they have incentives to exaggerate the negative effects of regulation.  
 
3. Measures and Measurements 
Assume that if the government announces a carbon tax, sectors will anticipate 
the associated added cost by considering two factors. One is the carbon content in their 
energy demand, which is the share of fossil fuels in the sector’s total energy demand, 
including the indirect carbon content in their electricity demand. Thus, if a large share 
of the electricity supply is generated by coal-fired power plants, a sector with a high 
demand for electricity also contributes to high emissions. A tax on carbon emissions 
thereby affects production costs in this sector more than if electricity were generated 
from less carbon-intensive energy sources.  
The second factor determining the anticipated cost of a carbon tax is the 
possibilities for switching to less emissions-intensive technologies or activities. For a 
specific firm or individual, these substitution possibilities depend first and foremost on 
available technologies and individual flexibility when it comes to adaptation to a change 
in relative prices. On a national level, the substitution possibilities also depend on the 
economic structure of the economy. Countries with large energy-intensive industries are 
likely to be more vulnerable than service-oriented economies, to the extent that 
transport constitutes a large part of this sector. The opportunities to switch to less 
emission-intensive technologies are greater if most of the energy in the service sector is 
used for heating purposes. 
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 The country study consists of two elements. One is a formal analysis of the 
anticipated, added cost of production following a change in the relative prices of the 
input arising from a carbon tax and the resulting substitution between input factors. To 
give additional insight we add informal discussions, where the substructures of the main 
sectors, as well as expected technology advancements and opportunities in the years to 
come regardless of a carbon tax are taken into account. 
The formal analysis is based on a standard, macroeconomic demand scheme, 
which has been used frequently to study the cost of emissions control in general 
equilibrium models (see e.g., Edmonds and Barns 1992, Oliveira-Martins et al. 1992, 
Peck and Teisberg 1994, or Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1994). We divide the economy of 
each country into two sectors, the energy sector, and production of other commodities 
and services, which produce the output xi (i = 1,2). Both sectors use labor, ni, and 
energy, ui, as input, so the production function is xi = fi(ni, ui). Strictly speaking, this 
means that input of real capital and other intermediate input are considered constant. 
However, since our interest is to compare possibilities for substitution when fossil fuels 
are being taxed, labor may be interpreted in a broader context, giving some 
representation of ‘other input’. We assume CES technology: 
[ ]ρρρ αα 1)1( iiiiii unAx −+=   (i = 1,2) 
and we derive the demand for ni and ui as functions of output and factor prices of 
labor, w, and energy, q under the assumption of profit maximization in competitive 
markets: 
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Energy can be considered an aggregate of fossil fuels, f and electricity e (δ and µ 
are constants): 
( )( ) iii efu iii µµµ δδ 11−+=  
The demand functions for fossils and electricity are derived in a similar fashion 
as those for labor end energy. Fossil fuels are an aggregate of coal, oil and gas. The 
energy input in the electricity sector consists only of fossil fuels. In addition, electricity 
may be provided by other energy sources, such as nuclear power or hydropower. These 
sources are not explicitly included in the demand scheme, since they are considered to 
be unaffected by a carbon tax. In countries where a large part of the electricity supply 
comes from sources other than fossil fuels (e.g., France), the price of electricity would 
be relatively insensitive to a carbon tax and the immediate effect on costs of a carbon 
tax would be relatively small. On the other hand, the emissions intensity of the overall 
economy is low because of the large amount of non-fossil fueled based power71. As a 
result, switching to less emissions-intensive power sources is more costly than in 
economies with coal-based electricity. 
                                                 
71
 Low emissions intensity is used throughout as equivalent to not emissions intensive; and high 
emissions intensity as equivalent to emissions intensive. 
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Each firm takes market prices as exogenous. A change in prices will lead to 
substitution between input factors, resulting in a new composition of oil, coal and gas in 
the fossil fuel aggregate. In the electricity sector, fossil fuels may be replaced or replace 
other input, represented here by labor. The composition of fossil fuels and electricity 
will change in the commodity and service sector, resulting in a change in the relative 
input of energy and labor. The rates at which these changes will take place depend on 
the increase in prices. Thus, if the price of oil coal and gas increase by a vector ∆p that 
corresponds to a CO2 charge, we can calculate the resulting increase in the price 
aggregate, first for the output from the electricity sector. This is then used to calculate 
the changes in the energy input for the commodity and service sectors, and finally the 
cost increase per unit of production for the commodity and service sectors. We call this 
increase in the production cost for the cost-push indicator.  
Households demand goods from the two sectors. Hence consumption is an 
aggregate of energy and other goods and services, and the consumer’s utility can be 
expressed (β and γ are constants, and p and q are prices): 
[ ]γγγ ββ 1)1( uxU −+=  
Assuming utility maximization, the demand functions are: 
( )
γ
γ
γ
γγ
γ
γ βββ
−
−
−
−−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+
=
1
1
11
1
11
1
1
1 p
qp
x  
( )
γ
γ
γ
γγ
γ
γ βββ
−
−
−
−−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+
=
1
1
11
1
11
1 1
1
1 q
qp
u  
The cost-push indicator for households is calculated in the same manner as for 
production sectors by first calculating the added cost of fossil fuels resulting from the  
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Figure 1: Demand scheme for fossil fuels 
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carbon tax after substitution has taken place, then finding the cost of the energy 
aggregate, where the electricity price is also subject to the tax, and finally calculating 
the increase in total expenditures. The second order effects on prices due to changes in 
demand and supply are thus not taken into account in this type of analysis, that is, prices 
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are not subject to equilibrium constraints. An illustration of the aggregates is given in 
Figure 1. 
The characteristics of each of the six countries studied in this paper can be 
captured by calibration of the demand functions. The magnitude of the cost-push 
indicators gives an indication of whether the opposition to carbon taxes in European 
countries has an economic explanation. However, the cost-push indicator depends to a 
large extent on the elasticity of substitution72 in the domestic industries. On the 
aggregated level used in this study, this elasticity for the same aggregate in one industry 
may vary from country to country, but there were no reliable estimates available. 
Therefore, we chose the same elasticity for the same aggregate in all countries, as 
shown in Table 1. The constant terms and the distribution parameters were calibrated 
specifically for each country. To compensate for the lack of estimates for the 
substitution parameters, we also perform an informal analysis of the sectors in each 
country economy, where we focus particularly on the composition of the commodity 
and service sectors, and on the opportunities in the electricity sector.  
High elasticity means that a given change in relative prices leads to a large 
change in the composition of input factors, and conversely that low elasticity leads to a 
small change. Hence, the manufacturing sectors and the household sectors exhibit a 
relatively flexible use of input. The service sectors are assumed to be relatively 
inflexible with respect to the use of energy because transport constitutes a large share of 
the service sector. The electricity sectors are also assumed to be inflexible at the macro 
level73. 
 
                                                 
72
 The elasticity of substitution shows the relative change in the composition of input factors due to a 
relative change in the factor prices. 
73
 The elasticities are thus chosen by assumption to the best of our ability. 
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Table 1. Elasticities of substitution by sector. All countries 
Aggregates and sub-aggregates    
Fossil fuels Energy Output Sector 
0.625 - 0.588 Electricity 
0.714 0.909 0.800 Industry 
0.500 0.444 0.980  Services 
0.909 0.909 0.645 Households1 
1
‘Output’ in the household sector is total consumption. 
 
The demand functions were calibrated with data from different sources: 
Economic macroeconomic figures were taken from OECD (1996). Energy data in 
physical terms were provided from IEA (1995), and energy prices from IEA (1993) and 
Boug and Brubakk (1996). 
The purpose of the demand schemes (Figure 1) is to find how sensitive the 
demand for fossil fuels is to a carbon tax. This is found by imposing a supposed carbon 
tax on the use of fossil fuels in order to obtain a 10 percent reduction in CO2 emissions 
for each country. Thus, the tax would be the same for all sectors within a country, but 
would vary from one country to the other. The abatement effort would thus be cost 
effectively distributed within the countries, something that means that the costs would 
be unevenly distributed. To calculate the expected costs of abatement for the different 
sectors, we use two indicators; one related to production costs, and one related to 
abatement costs. The first is the cost-push indicator (defined above) that indicates the 
increase in the unit cost of production for a sector subject to the carbon tax. The 
indicator can thus be interpreted as the elasticity of production costs with respect to 
national carbon cuts. The second is the anticipated unit cost of abatement, which is the 
cost-push per unit of CO2 emissions reductions in the local sector or country. The 
anticipated unit cost of abatement is thus an indicator for the amount of emissions 
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reductions you get per dollar. Both indicators will vary across sectors and across 
countries, while they would be the same in an equilibrium model. Thus, if the policy 
was implemented, the sectors with low anticipated costs might in fact have to abate 
more than indicated by the calculations, and the sectors with high anticipated costs 
might have to reduce less than indicated. Alternatively, the indicators reveal in which 
sectors a myopic approach exaggerates the final costs, and in which sectors it 
understates them.  
 
4. Differences in energy structure 
The six countries studied in this paper; France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK), account for nearly 85 percent of the EU’s total 
population and more than 85 percent of the region’s CO2 emissions. The energy 
structure varies substantially between the countries. The Netherlands has by far the most 
energy intensive economy, due to its relatively high consumption of natural gas. This 
proportionally large share of gas means that its emissions intensity in terms of CO2 per 
billion USD of gross domestic product (GDP) is the same as for Germany and the UK. 
These three countries’ level of CO2 per billion USD of GDP is approximately twice that 
of France, which has the lowest emissions intensity, while the level for Italy and Spain 
lies between these extremes.  
The national emissions intensities are closely related to those of the electricity 
sectors. Figure 2 shows emissions intensities in the electricity sector by country for 
1994. German power plants emit 10 million tons of CO2 per billion USD of GDP. The 
corresponding figures for the Netherlands and the UK are lower, but significantly higher 
than for the three other countries. For France, the explanation is the substantial 
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contribution of nuclear power, which amounts to about 75 percent of the total supply of 
electricity. For Italy and Spain, the reasons are less obvious. Italy has banned nuclear 
power, and the electricity sector is heavily based on imported oil. As a consequence, 
electricity is expensive and energy intensity is low, both because the high price 
encourages effectiveness and because it leads to a high contribution to the GDP. Spain’s 
electricity sector is mainly coal based, but nuclear power and hydropower also 
contribute noticeably. This increases the economic value of power generation in Spain, 
and implies that the emissions intensity of the electricity sector is low, that is, the 
production of electricity per unit input of fossil fuels is high. In contrast, the German, 
the Dutch, and the British electricity sectors can be characterized as emissions intensive.  
 
Figure 2. Emission intensities in the electricity sector by country (1994) 
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There are fewer differences in energy use patterns in other sectors, with the 
exception of the Netherlands, which in general exhibits high energy intensity. The 
manufacturing sectors divide their energy use between coal, oil, gas, and electricity, but 
gas contributes to a higher share in Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK than in the other 
three countries. The German and the French manufacturing sectors use more coal than 
manufacturing sectors in the other countries. The service sector’s energy use is 
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dominated by oil in all countries, which is due to transport. In the household sectors, 
one finds the same three ‘gas users’ as for the manufacturing sectors, British and 
German households are more dependent on coal than the households in other countries, 
while electricity is the main source of energy in French households. Table 2 shows the 
main indicators for all six countries.74 
The distribution of cost-push among sectors exhibits approximately the same 
pattern across countries. Recall that in this model the national cost-push is perceived as 
the anticipated increase in the cost of the national product of a carbon tax sufficient for a 
10 percent reduction in emissions below business as usual. The cost-push is two to three 
times higher in the electricity sectors than in the manufacturing sectors, while it is one 
and a half to two times higher in the manufacturing sectors than in the service sectors. 
The unit cost of emissions cuts is highest in the manufacturing sectors, and usually very 
low in the electricity sectors. However, the levels of the cost-push indicators are 
different and shown in Table 2 and Figure 3.  
To concentrate on the effects from the myopic approach, new options or 
technological ‘jumps’ are not taken into account in the demand scheme presented in 
Section 3. However, large potentials have been documented in several countries in 
many studies. These may represent technological jumps with respect to emissions cuts 
(Kram and Hill 1996, COHERENCE 1991). According to Krause and Koomey (1996), 
the potential for new technologies with substantially lower emissions of CO2 seems to 
be most promising in the electricity sector and the manufacturing sector. This implies 
that the possibilities differ between countries, since the potential is large in most coal- 
fired plants and in heavy manufacturing industry. Economies with a greater share of 
                                                 
74
  A more thorough study of country characteristics is given in Aaheim and Bretteville (1999). 
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Table 2. Main indicators. All countries. 
GDP (billion USD) and consumption (1994) 
Country Total Commodities Services Electricity 
Household 
consumption
France 1235 382 827 25 976
Germany 1753 666 1052 36 1262
Italy 1127 338 753 56 902
The Netherlands 305 32 207 6 225
Spain 511 174 317 20 409
The United Kingdom 1009 303 676 30 668
Energy intensity (PJ/GDP) 
Country Total Commodities Services Electricity Households
France 5.26 4.80 4.20 11.58 0.91
Germany 7.86 4.88 3.89 112.26 1.99
Italy 5.86 5.18 2.85 17.84 1.32
The Netherlands 19.1 8.49 4.77 107.7 1.91
Spain 6.95 5.57 4.73 36.11 0.85
The United Kingdom 8.53 6.12 4.58 64.72 1.96
Emissions intensity (mill. t CO2/GDP) 
Country Total Commodities Services Electricity Households
France 0.31 0.27 0.27 1.09 0.03
Germany 0.55 0.28 0.27 10.44 0.10
Italy 0.36 0.28 0.19 2.06 0.07
The Netherlands 0.58 0.47 0.31 8.03 0.09
Spain 0.47 0.31 0.32 3.42 0.04
The United Kingdom 0.57 0.36 0.30 5.85 0.10
Cost-push indicator 
Country Total Commodities Services Electricity Households75
France 1.33 1.59 1.14 3.88 4.07
Germany 8.37 12.92 5.02 22.21 22.03
Italy 3.28 4.11 2.32 11.87 12.48
The Netherlands 1.51 1.99 1.18 5.22 5.32
Spain 2.72 3.52 1.59 13.51 12.99
The United Kingdom 7.79 10.93 5.79 22.83 22.74
 
 
                                                 
75
 The cost-push indicators for households are calculated as the cost-push for total energy use and cannot 
be directly compared to indicators for other sectors. 
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Figure 3. Cost-push indicators by country: Percent increase in the cost of the national product 
for a carbon tax sufficient for a 10 percent reduction in emissions below reference level. 
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heavy manufacturing industry and greater reliance on coal-fired electric utilities should 
have greater opportunity to cut emissions and thereby the costs of emissions reductions.  
In addition, structural differences within sectors may explain why opinions 
about climate policy may vary across nations. For example, substitution possibilities 
within the service sector depend primarily on CO2 emissions from transportation 
sources. At present, the transportation sector depends heavily on oil, and there are 
currently few practical alternative fuels.  Therefore, it is probably more difficult to 
reduce emissions in the service sector if transportation sources comprise the largest 
share of energy use in that sector.  It should be noted, however, that although the 
technical potential for energy reductions in commercial buildings seems to be large, 
energy consumption in these buildings is usually relatively insensitive to prices (see e.g. 
Flavin and Lensen 1994). In the manufacturing sector, which includes agriculture, 
additional opportunities may be available if the contribution to the total greenhouse 
gases emissions from gases other than CO2 is large. 
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In the following the estimated cost-push indicators and anticipated unit costs of 
abatement constitute the basis for the assessment of sector and country opposition. 
Since these estimates are based on very general assumptions about sector technology, 
the possible conflicts of interest are also discussed in light of certain characteristics of 
sectors and countries not captured by the macro functions.  
 
5. Anticipated cost differences of a carbon tax 
The indicators displayed in Table 2 portray important differences among 
countries and among sectors within countries. These differences show how different 
economic sectors might have anticipated the impacts from an expected carbon tax. 
Figure 4 presents the anticipated unit costs of CO2 abatement by sector, while Figure 5 
shows the estimated change in demand for energy commodities by sector as a result of 
the carbon tax. 
 
5.1 Distribution of costs and changes in demand 
The anticipated costs of emissions cuts in France are dominated by the low 
emissions intensity in the electricity sector, which is explained by the fact that 
approximately 75 percent of the electricity is produced by nuclear power plants. A 10 
percent reduction in emissions thus implies a relatively small amount in terms of tons of 
carbon reductions, and this is why the cost-push is low. The reductions are, however, 
relatively concentrated. One third of the emission cuts are due to a reduction in the 
demand for oil in the service sector. Most likely this will turn out to be quite costly 
because transport constitutes a considerably higher share of the service sector in France 
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than in the other countries. In fact, the CO2 emissions from transport comprise 35 
percent of fuel-related emissions in France, while in the other countries the share is 
between 15 and 25 percent. The transport sectors in the EU are growing as a result of 
the increasing specialization of products that has been taking place since the start of the 
common market. The share of these products that are transported by road is also rising. 
 
 Figure 4 Anticipated unit cost of abatement by sector. USD/kg CO2 
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Figure 5  Change in the demand for energy commodities in PJ (petta joule) by sector as a result 
of a  carbon tax. 
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The second largest potential contributor to emissions cuts in France is the 
reduction in the demand for coal in the manufacturing sector. This sector is expected to 
cut 94 PJ of coal consumption, which is high in comparison to other countries. The 
structure of energy use in France makes it relatively cheap to reduce emissions also in 
the manufacturing sector (Figure 4). However, the possibilities of finding alternative 
technologies are strictly limited in the electricity sector and the service sector. This may 
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put stronger pressure on the manufacturing sector, where some opportunities may be 
available.  
Germany has the highest cost-push of all six countries due to the high levels of 
coal consumption. This is particularly evident in the electricity sector (see Table 2). The 
cost-push for electricity is, in fact, higher than the cost-push for direct use of fossil fuels 
in all sectors. This means that all the sectors will increase their direct use of fossil fuels 
relative to their use of electricity as a result of a carbon tax. Germany’s manufacturing 
sector faces the highest cost-push of all the countries’ manufacturing sectors, partly 
because the emissions cuts are large, and partly because the anticipated unit costs in the 
sector are the highest.  
It has shown to be very hard to phase out the use of coal in Germany for three 
main reasons: their big coal reserves, the strong labor unions, and the political power of 
the German coal-based energy producers (Bang 2004). Moreover, the German 
manufacturing sector has a lucrative voluntary agreement that makes them resist both a 
tax regime and emissions trading. Traditionally strong sectors, like the German 
manufacturing sector, have based their production on coal-based electricity. They have 
argued that it is hard for them to cut emissions without cutting production, and hence 
decreasing employment. Germany also has a strong labor movement that would lobby 
against a carbon tax76. 
Germany’s own reserves of fossil energy sources – oil, coal, and natural gas – in 
1991 amounted to less than 1 percent of world reserves. Furthermore, the country’s oil 
and natural gas production was not enough to cover its own requirements. At the time, 
oil met a total of 41 percent of Germany’s primary energy requirements, and gas a total 
                                                 
76
 See e.g. Bang (2004) for a detailed analysis of German environmental policy. 
Essay no. 4: Sectoral Opposition to Carbon Taxes in the EU 
 195 
of 18 percent. Hence, some 99 percent of Germany’s oil requirements and 96 percent of 
its gas requirements had to be met through imports.  The government has stated that 
Germany needs a balanced energy mix that includes hard and lignite coal, oil, natural 
gas, nuclear power and renewable energies to secure a reliable energy supply. Coal met 
about one third of Germany’s energy needs in the 1990s, and has been an important part 
of the country’s electricity production, particularly since it is the most abundant 
domestic fossil fuel source. The energy-mix trend shows that the use of hard and lignite 
coal as energy sources declined from 1990 to 1996, whereas the use of oil, gas and 
nuclear increased. But still in 1997 about half the electricity production was based on 
coal, while about a third was based on nuclear power (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, 
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, 1997). 
Also in Germany, the service sector would share a large share of the total 
emissions cuts. The transport sectors contribute a relatively low share of the emissions, 
slightly above 15 percent. The household sector contributes to the estimated emissions 
reductions by reducing the demand for all energy factors. The apparent possibilities for 
reducing emissions in the electricity sector and enhancing energy effectiveness in a 
large part of the manufacturing sector may reduce the costs of cuts in Germany 
substantially. Enhancing energy effectiveness through command-and-control regulation 
has in fact been a main goal in German climate policy.  
 
Italy is characterized by large natural gas consumption, and the electricity sector 
is thus not very carbon-intensive, which contributes to a rather atypical pattern in the 
estimated emissions reductions. It also helps explain why the cost-push in Italy is the 
third highest among the countries. Compared with the other countries, the unit cost of 
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emissions cuts in the electricity sector is higher relative to other sectors. The electricity 
sector thus contributes to a remarkably low share of total reduction – only 15 percent, 
which is even lower than for the electricity sector in France. Oil in the service sector 
contributes to more than 25 percent of the total estimated reductions in Italy. This 
abatement will be costly since transport represents a substantial part of the service 
sector. Moreover, the household sector contributes to more than 20 percent of total 
estimated reductions, mainly due to a reduction in the demand for gas.  
Generally, and particularly for the service and the household sectors, the 
anticipated costs for Italy are high. The competitive industries will thus have an extra 
strong incentive to lobby against taxes to obtain less costly measures to protect their 
international competitiveness. Against the background of these results, it is likely that 
Italy will be reluctant to support an aggressive carbon tax policy at the EU level. 
The energy consumption pattern in the Netherlands is connected to the 
availability of gas from their own reserves. Apart from being the country with the 
highest per capita gas consumption, it also has low energy prices, not only for gas, but 
also for coal and oil (see Birkelund et al. 1993). As a result, energy intensity in the 
Netherlands is very high, despite the large contribution from gas. This indicates that the 
gas fired power plants in the Netherlands are ineffective, and that abatement thus is 
relatively cheap, something which explains why emissions cuts in the Netherlands have 
a lower cost-push than any other country in this study. The implication is that Dutch 
power plants have a large potential for low-cost energy and emissions cuts. Potential of 
this magnitude is not assumed in other studies (see e.g. Kram 1998, and Capros 1998). 
One explanation for this difference may be that the present study applies price data for 
1991, when the energy prices were low in the Netherlands, according to IEA (1992). 
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The large potential for energy and emissions cuts also applies for the manufacturing 
sector, although the difference between the anticipated unit costs is larger than usual 
between the manufacturing sector and the electricity sector. Consequently, the potential 
is considered to be largest in the electricity sector. 
The energy intensity can be explained by the low energy prices, particularly for 
gas, that prevailed for many years. The Dutch gas reserves are, however, diminishing 
and prices have been increasing. The adaptation to higher prices will lead to an increase 
in energy efficiency, even without emissions targets for CO2. The flexibility embedded 
in an inefficient energy system and the expected increase in basic energy prices make it 
unlikely that carbon cuts will lead to high costs in the Netherlands. Low costs give the 
authorities an opportunity to choose among a larger set of measures than in any of the 
other countries. 
Like Germany and the UK, Spain is a heavy coal user. In Spain, however, a 
larger share of coal consumption is found in the electricity sector. In the manufacturing 
sector, oil and gas constitute approximately 85 percent of fossil energy use, while oil 
dominates in the service and households sectors. The cost-push effect in Spain is, 
however, much lower than in Germany and the UK, and this may partly be explained by 
the low carbon intensity of the electricity sector. Hence, the opportunities for low cost 
emissions cuts in this sector through the introduction of new technologies seem to be 
considerably less than in the other countries. 
The lack of low cost opportunities for switching to less emissions-intensive 
production in the electricity sector is important for Spain because more than 40 percent 
of the estimated emissions reductions are found in this sector. The reduction in demand 
for oil in the service sector, a slight reduction in coal consumption in the manufacturing 
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sector, and the cuts in the electricity sector put together constitute nearly 80 percent of 
the reductions in Spain. In other words, the bulk of the reductions would have to be 
concentrated within a few economic activities and this may spur opposition. In addition, 
the electricity sector in Spain is more concerned with expansion to meet the expected 
future growth in the demand for electricity. A carbon tax is thus controversial also in 
Spain. 
The United Kingdom shares many similarities with Germany. While emissions 
and energy intensities are high, there are probably many opportunities for reducing them 
by introducing new and more effective technologies. There are, however, important 
differences between the two countries. In particular, the cost-push in the manufacturing 
sector is about half as high in the UK. On the other hand, the potential of an efficient 
restructuring of the manufacturing sector in the UK is not the same as in parts of the 
German manufacturing sector. The British households contribute to a substantial part of 
the estimated cuts by reductions in the demand for gas.  
There is a clear potential for reducing the emissions of CO2 in the electricity 
sector. The manufacturing sector in particular may benefit from this by saving 
considerably in terms of indirect cuts in reducing the demand for electricity since the 
entire cost-push for the manufacturing industry in the UK can be explained by the 
increase in the price of electricity. Consequently, the manufacturing sector in the UK 
has a competitive advantage in the export markets by improving their terms of trade, 
implying that this sector should in fact be in favor of a common carbon tax. 
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5.2 Conflicts of economic interest and political feasibility  
One conclusion to be drawn from this is that differences in the anticipated 
effects of a carbon tax in the electricity and manufacturing sectors are the key to 
understanding the infeasibility of a carbon tax as the main climate policy instrument in 
the EU. The analysis above indicates were one would expect to find the greatest 
opposition. For instance would a significant share of total reductions have to take place 
in the electricity and manufacturing sectors because they contribute to large shares of 
national emissions. These sectors represent large firms with high emissions, often with 
significant political power. Consequently, they may have considerable influence over 
the government’s policy choices, including their choice of policy measures. Because all 
fiscal decisions under the European convention require approval by consensus, 
European businesses would have to persuade only one state to block the tax proposal.77 
Thus, as long as there was opposition by key sectors within each country, approval was 
not very likely. This explains why EU energy tax rates have been watered down 
compared to the Commission’s initial proposal. The harmonized minimum tax rates 
should reduce distortions of competition between EU states and between energy 
products. Furthermore, this system provides a basis for the EU to collectively raise 
energy prices over time, thus increasing incentives for more efficient usage. However, 
due to the difficulty of reaching agreement, the law is full of derogations and transition 
periods for various countries and sectors (Environmental News Service, March 21, 
2003).  
The main difference between the electricity and manufacturing sectors, however, 
is that while the manufacturing sectors face a high anticipated unit cost, the unit cost in 
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the electricity sectors are very low. Hence, the incentives to search for new technologies 
as a result of the emissions targets are quite different. However, the electricity sectors in 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK are presently undergoing a substantial 
restructuring, which leads to lower emissions regardless of climate policy targets. As a 
consequence, one ought to study the cost-push in the manufacturing sectors in the light 
of these changes.  
As pointed out earlier, the differences between sectors across countries, 
measured by the cost-push indicators, follow a rather similar pattern to the total cost-
push for the countries shown in Figure 3. How important the differences in the cost-
push are, however, depend on the degree of international competition for the given 
sector. It is difficult to distinguish clearly between internationally competing activities 
and non-competing activities, especially within the EU. All of the various sectors are 
exposed to competition from other countries to one degree or another. In general, 
manufactured goods are often used to illustrate changes in the competitiveness of an 
economy. Manufacturing products also compete to a considerable extent with industries 
in countries outside of the EU. The manufacturing sector may therefore be considered 
more vulnerable to a loss of competitiveness than other sectors.  
One way to make discrimination between sectors within a country legitimate is 
to argue that such discrimination is necessary to avoid a decline in competitiveness. Our 
analysis shows that the three northern countries have more opportunities because the 
electricity system is very emissions intensive, and they can deliver their electricity at 
low prices, partly due to subsidies. It is difficult to point at specific measures taken 
within countries that could contribute to mitigate the differences in the cost-push across 
Essay no. 4: Sectoral Opposition to Carbon Taxes in the EU 
 201 
the sectors of different countries. However, a development of a common European 
market for electricity would help mitigate these differences to a large degree. 
Looking specifically at economic conflicts of interest seems to strengthen the 
impression that there is a need for differentiation between the EU countries when it 
comes to the commitments related to the Kyoto Protocol. The EU went further than any 
other of the large signatories to Kyoto and proposed a 15 percent reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions from their 1990 levels by 2010. A prerequisite for this 
proposal was exactly that the EU managed to agree on an internal differentiation of 
targets. The differentiation was based on the so-called Triptych approach (Phylipsen et 
al. 1999). This approach differentiates emission allowances according to standard of 
living, existing fuel mix, and the competitiveness of internationally oriented activities. 
While the Triptych approach in many respects is based on similar criteria as those 
discussed above, potential sectoral conflicts of interest are not taken explicitly into 
account. National differences in energy prices, which have an important impact on the 
results of this study, are also not accounted for. 
In the Kyoto protocol, the EU ended up with 8 percent reduction and the targets 
for the six countries are (percent change from 1990 to the period 2008-2012): France 
0.0 percent; Germany -21.0 percent; Italy -6.5 percent; the Netherlands -6.0 percent; 
Spain 15.0 percent; and the UK -12.5 percent. Whether the consideration of the possible 
conflicts of interest, emphasized in this study, would change the distribution of targets 
for the EU countries is difficult to determine because it is not entirely clear what the 
assumed baseline (business as usual) emissions were for 2010. For example, the 
standard-of-living category was used as an argument to give additional emission 
allowances to the so-called Cohesion-countries, which include Spain, but it is difficult 
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to say exactly how much this means in terms of the emissions targets. The Triptych 
approach may thus moderate some of the internal conflicts of interest, but according to 
this study there are a number of potential conflicts left. It is reason to believe, however, 
that the flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto protocol; the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), as well as emissions trading within 
and outside the EU might lighten the burden for the countries substantially. 
It seems that the Netherlands has achieved a good agreement, considering the 
low estimated costs of emission cuts in the analysis above. One reason why the 
Netherlands may have received a relatively moderate target is the low price-level of gas 
in 1990, which was not explicitly taken into account in the Triptych approach.  
It is difficult to explain why Germany should reduce their emissions nearly 
twice as much as the UK. The German manufacturing sector is not pleased with the 
German emissions reduction target. One explanation that has been given is that GHG 
emissions reductions were an immediate effect of the unification of the eastern and the 
western federal states. The experiences from the drastic reductions in energy 
consumption as a result of unification indicated to German politicians that energy 
savings were both possible and economically sound. The belief at the time was that 
further energy savings were readily achievable, and that such savings would outweigh 
the heavy costs of unification in terms of infrastructure investments, economic 
subsidies, economic modernization, and so forth (Bang 2004). The net transfers of 
public funds from western to eastern federal states, however, amounted to DM 106 
billion in 1991, DM 115 billion in 1992, DM 129 billion in 1993, and DM 125 billion in 
1994.  Hence, the GHG emissions reductions in the early 1990s were not entirely ‘a free 
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lunch’ for Germany (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und 
Reaktorsicherheit, 1997).   
It appears that Italy’s target would be very difficult to achieve without great 
conflicts of interest. Again, the prices of energy may explain why it is difficult for Italy 
to reduce emissions without opposition, while at the same time, the Triptych approach, 
which emphasizes the energy mix, prescribes cuts at approximately the same level as for 
the Netherlands. On the other hand, the most severe interest conflicts in Spain may be 
overcome by the allowance of a 15 percent increase in its emissions. The fact that 
energy prices, which is assumed to be high in Spain in this analysis, is not explicitly 
considered in the Triptych approach, indicates that the differentiation according to the 
different levels of the standard of living may have been overemphasized when assessing 
targets for individual EU countries. 
Apart from the fact that differentiation is important to avoid conflicts, one 
should also be aware that if it is considered unfair or inappropriate by one of more 
parties, new and more serious interest conflicts might occur as a result. Differentiation 
of targets within the EU under the Kyoto protocol will probably contribute to mitigate 
interest conflicts, although some factors could probably be emphasized more in order to 
avoid them. In particular, the different price levels for energy in various countries do not 
seem to have been taken sufficiently into account. More competition in the electricity 
market may reduce the importance of this aspect, but, on the other hand, make the 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the present differentiation more visible. 
The three northern countries have more opportunities because the electricity 
system is very emission intensive, and they can deliver their electricity at low prices, 
partly due to subsidies. The change in competitiveness due to the supposed tax analyzed 
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here is thereby both unfair and inefficient. It is difficult to point at specific measures 
taken within countries that could contribute to mitigate the differences in the cost-push 
across the sectors of different countries. However, a development of a common 
European market for electricity would level out price variations and thereby contribute 
to mitigate these differences. This is clearly an issue where a co-ordination of the EU is 
advantageous, and probably also ahead of many other regions. Provided that the EU 
succeeds in establishing a common electricity market, the possibility to take directional 
leadership in climate polity would be improved, and in addition they would probably 
take directional leadership in energy policy. 
Other measures are often preferred to taxes even though taxes may lead to a 
cost-effective result. This may be due to practical difficulties in establishing a tax 
regime, or simply because a tax regime itself may generate opposition if it is considered 
unfair or unnecessary. The analysis shows that the opposition to carbon taxes in the EU 
in the nineties may, at least partly, have resulted from anticipation of the costs of such a 
tax. The basic assumption is that the differences in the anticipated costs would create 
opposition because unevenly distributed costs makes lobby group organizing easier. 
However, sectors where the costs of climate policies are low are presumed to be less 
opposed to a tax policy. The possibility of using alternatives to taxes is perceived to be 
limited, particularly in the case of CO2 emissions, because there is a large number of 
relatively small, widely dispersed sources (individuals, households, small firms), which 
leads to high administrative costs.  The costs of administering direct measures for a 
smaller number of large enterprises are typically less. However, the possibilities of 
ineffective control, due to for example asymmetric information and uncertainty about 
future costs, are greater. 
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There are many possible ways to confuse the connection between emissions 
targets and the costs of achieving them, e.g. by means of an appropriate tax. A common 
argument is that the industry needs a stable framework under which the authorities want 
them to operate, partly because of the long-term nature of capital-based production. 
They would prefer to know the future quantity they are allowed to emit rather than to 
have to adapt to an adjustable charge. In principle, permits may be just as effective as 
taxes, but permits would then have to be differentiated among activities. Assessing the 
appropriate differentiation is extremely difficult and the result is, in fact, just as costly 
to the individuals as taxes, except for those who are allocated free permits. Emissions 
permits are therefore assumed to be appropriate only for large enterprises.  
A combined system of both emissions permits and taxes could be advantageous 
for those who obtain permits at the expense of those subject to taxes. One reason is that 
the uncertainty around the national cost of achieving the target is put upon those who 
pay the tax. Second, the most significant options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are 
often found in huge but ineffective industries. A cost-effective strategy then implies that 
these industries reduce emissions by much more than others. The combined system may 
then represent a considerable opportunity for lightening the climate policy burden for 
the big enterprises, since they will gain from any target milder than the cost-effective 
one, while the authorities may easily regard any permit stronger than the average as a 
‘heavy burden’. 
Indeed, a mixed system is exactly what the EU has agreed upon when in June 
2003 the European Parliament approved the world's first international emissions trading 
system. The initiative enables the establishment of a multibillion EU-wide market for 
rights to emit carbon dioxide. Companies will be allowed to buy and sell the difference 
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between their actual emissions and their limit set by member countries. Some 10,000 
establishments including steelworks, power generators, oil and gas refineries, paper 
mills, glass factories, and cement installations will be affected starting in 2005. The 
parliament also adopted amendments that could bring aluminum and chemical 
producers into the program later. Governments are expected to distribute most pollution 
permits for free, but the law allows them to auction up to 5 percent of the allocated 
permits until 2007, and up to 10 percent after that (Environmental News Network, July 
3, 2003) 78. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
More than ten years after the EU Commission originally proposed a directive on 
carbon taxes they reached agreement on a proposed framework for energy taxation. The 
1992 proposal faced so much domestic resistance that agreement was not reached until 
the directive had been considerably watered down. The lobbying succeeded in having 
the tax altered significantly, with an energy component added, energy-intensive sectors 
exempted, and the entire tax package made conditional on other OECD countries 
undertaking precisely the same tax. 
 In addition, the Commission, which fought against an emissions trading system 
at the international level, arguing that the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol 
weakened the incentive to undertake domestic emissions reductions, nevertheless 
relented in 2003 and agreed to adopt the world’s first regional emissions trading system. 
The weakening of the carbon tax compared to the robustness of the emissions trading 
system thus looks like a de facto shift in policy. 
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It has been argued that the transition from resistance to policy innovation in EU 
climate policy is due to considerable pressure in the climate negotiations from the US. 
However, internal factors, like the political infeasibility of an extensive carbon tax 
regime, have had their share of the explanation. The analysis above suggests that 
opposition due to conflicts of interest emerging from market actor’s anticipation of the 
costs of a carbon tax may explain why carbon taxes have been politically difficult to 
implement. The mixed system (that is, the combination of carbon taxes and emissions 
trading) eventually adopted by the EU suggests that implementation of a regional 
carbon tax needs to be accompanied by other strategies in order to be politically 
feasible. Both the energy taxation framework and the permit market bill, however, 
allow exceptions.  
The aim of this paper was to study economic reasons for the political 
infeasibility of extensive carbon taxes. More specifically, we have pointed out reasons 
for why the opposition to carbon taxes was so great. The estimates and comparisons of 
costs of expected emissions cuts across sectors and across countries in the EU illustrated 
how different economic sectors might have anticipated the impacts from an expected 
carbon tax. This focus shows exactly how what seems to be cost-effective and to the 
best for EU as a region on paper may, because of the myopic vision of the affected 
sectors, turn out too controversial to be politically feasible.  
The decision on the directive for emissions trading makes the EU a pioneer in 
the large-scale application of market based instruments in climate policy. This 
development would have been unthinkable a few years earlier (Butzengeiger et al. 
2003).  It would therefore be very interesting to look further into reasons for why a 
system of emissions trading was more politically feasible than carbon taxes. One 
Essay no. 4: Sectoral Opposition to Carbon Taxes in the EU 
 208 
obvious explanation is the decision making procedures in the EU. While the carbon tax 
requires consensus because it is a fiscal measure, the EU directive on a framework for 
GHG emissions trading is a burden-sharing measure and as such requires only a 
qualified majority (Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003). When a majority rule is applied, the 
opposition must persuade a sufficiently large minority to block the proposal. It is no 
longer sufficient to convince only one country since the member countries have no veto 
right. A goal for further work would thus be to analyze other, non-institutional, reasons 
for the difference in opposition to the two systems. 
From the analysis it is clear that the selection of measures is vital, and that 
different countries have different needs when it comes to policy design. While certain 
measures may be acceptable to some countries, they are likely to generate opposition in 
others. The conflicts of interest are largely the result of dependency on fossil fuels, 
which is higher in the three northern countries and lower in the three southern EU 
countries in this study. In general, the greater the interest conflicts, the greater are the 
opportunities to find ways to reduce emissions because of the relative low efficiency in 
these countries’ electricity production.  
Three main conclusions can be drawn. First, common measures across countries 
are generally less attractive since a particular measure may be advantageous to one 
country in order to keep the national cost of climate policy down, but may in another 
country spur opposition that could be avoided if exceptions were allowed. Second, the 
electricity sector plays a key role in climate policy in every EU country and in the 
potential opposition to any policy measure. Conditions in the electricity sector vary 
greatly among countries, and a long-term strategy to reduce opposition due to internal 
as well as external conflicts of interest would, therefore, be to introduce a common 
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electricity market. Third, before a common electricity market can be established, further 
differentiation of national emissions targets could represent an important opportunity 
for mitigating conflicts of interests across countries. 
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